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This thesis is about the history of development encounters in the cotton sector in Benin. It 
presents a perspective that is centred on the long durée of the host context instead of the 
short-lived and specific experiences of each cotton project. I substantiate this change of 
perspective by addressing the following question: how has the cotton sector in Benin come 
to incorporate the institutional arrangements of development cooperation projects into 
enduring institutions? This thesis contends that development projects, although temporary 
and specific, are inserted into a historical continuum that has regularised development 
cooperation practices over time, and that is perpetuated by both implementers and hosts. 
Thus, while a project in isolation appears to be unable to change the wider structure and 
practices, successive processes of institutional bricolage with project components may. 
 
In the first three chapters, I describe the learning journey that led me to my research question 
and outline its relevance to contemporary debates on development. I go on to detail the 
conceptual framework and research methods. In the third chapter, I define the boundaries 
of my research, situating it in the history of Benin’s cotton sector since independence in 1960 
until 2018. I identify the successive waves of development assistance projects taking place 
over this period. In chapters four to seven, I examine how development cooperation projects 
have shaped the structure and practices both of subsequent projects and of the cotton sector 
itself. The conclusion discusses and reviews my findings in light of my research question. It 
appears that institutional bricolage with projects’ institutional arrangements is a process 
shaped by power relations in which early experiences have particular weight. This research 
shows that the way projects work depends on their place in the historical trajectory of 
development cooperation in the host context. It thus contributes to our understanding of 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This research is about encounters: what we bring to them and what we take from them. I am 
interested in understanding how experiences in development projects shape practices in the 
host context and in subsequent development encounters. I contend that projects create 
short-term and specific dynamics that, in isolation, are unable to change wider structures, but 
that successive processes of institutional bricolage with project components may. 
Prior to the PhD I worked as a development cooperation project manager in multilateral and 
bilateral organisations. During my first trip to a host country, I realised that ‘bringing change’ 
was more complicated than I had expected, and that our three-year project would have a 
negligible impact on the country’s reality. The processes we generated within the frameworks 
of the project were so different from the dynamics of the host context that I doubted that 
they could endure after the end of the implementation period. The realisation of the 
mismatch between the project and the context made me question the purpose of 
development projects. For a moment, I wondered why we spent time and money planning, 
implementing, and evaluating projects that were so disconnected from the host context that 
they were doomed to fail. At the same time, such mismatch was the purpose of the project 
itself. If there were no difference between project and context, change could not be 
envisioned. Thus, the project-context mismatch that troubled me was less about differences 
between arrangements and practices within and outside projects; it referred to the 
hierarchical and patronising relationship between project and host context. The normative 
tone in development project vocabulary sounded inappropriate in light of everything that 
happened outside projects spaces, which seemed to have more weight in the everyday lives 
of our partners.  
In Benin, I contributed to the implementation of several technical cooperation projects, 
ranging from cultural heritage to port management. In every project I had the feeling that 
there was much more going on than I could see. This feeling was particularly present when 
working in the cotton sector. Cotton is Benin’s main economic sub-sector, contributing to 
70% of export incomes (MPD, 2018), involving multiple strata of society and thereby the 
object of programmatic struggles. Due to its importance to the country’s economy, the sector 
has been, historically, a key beneficiary of development cooperation interventions: it has 
hosted a multitude of projects since the country obtained independence in 1960, and 
potentially shapes Beninese actors’ everyday lives. The project I helped to implement was 





subsequently found myself inserted into a continuum of projects, in which current practices 
are shaped by past experiences that have endured through time. 
Before I explore this further, I will describe my learning journey in the study of aid and 
development cooperation, with a critical look at the concept of the project. I will then 
summarise my thoughts as I detail the aim and scope of this research. 
1.1. Perspectives on the project-context mismatch in aid and 
development cooperation 
My concerns about the effectiveness of development cooperation are shared by many 
practitioners and researchers who put ‘aid at the crossroads’ (Eggen and Roland, 2013; 
Ramalingam, 2013). On one hand, development interventions are utopian blueprints that do 
not fit into the host context and introduce resources that are diverted towards national elites’ 
self-interests (Easterly, 2006, 2013; Moyo, 2009a, 2009b); hence aid should be discontinued. 
On the other hand, only a ‘big push’ with bigger and more ambitious projects combined with 
better understanding of the host context could end world poverty (Sachs, 2005). At the core 
of criticism is development interventions’ inability to structurally change the host context, 
which arises from the mismatch between development intervention plans and the host 
context’s own dynamics, history, geographies, and politics. 
In this section, I share the learning trajectory I undertook in this research. I start by exploring 
the origins and dimensions of the mismatch between development interventions and the 
host context. Then, I present elements of two paradigm shifts: the project-centred paradigm 
shift that enabled the emergence of approaches to reducing the mismatch with context; and 
the paradigm shift that emerged alongside South-South cooperation (SSC), in which the 
project-context mismatch is overlooked because of the context-similarity claim. Finally, in 
the last sub-section, I move from the perspective of donors and providers to the perspective 
of the context on the interplay with projects. 
1.1.1. The project-context mismatch in development practice 
As an entry point to understanding the project-context mismatch in development practice, I 
start with Escobar’s (1995) perspective of development as an authoritative discourse that has 
succeeded in imposing a hegemonic worldview and forms of intervention that have 
categorised and hierarchised countries’ historical trajectories. The constitution of such 
discourse is a historical process in which structural and unequal power relations between 





when development emerged as an international policy in the second half of the twentieth 
century, it reproduced colonial patterns of relations between countries of the Global South 
and those of the North. Maldonado-Torres (2007, p.243) defines the continuation of colonial 
relations beyond colonialism as ‘coloniality’, or, in his words, the ‘long-standing patterns of 
power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective 
relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administration’. 
Mudimbe (1999, p.2) recalls that colonisation comes from the Latin word colěre, which means 
‘to cultivate’ or ‘to design’, arguing that colonisers ‘tended to organise and transform non-
European areas into fundamentally European constructs’. Therefore, colonisation and 
coloniality rest on a paradigm of difference, in which colonised spaces, people, knowledge, 
and history are marginalised and subordinated to Euro-North American-centric concepts of 
modernity (Mudimbe, 1999; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013, 2015). Such classification of the world 
framed international development policy, as the coloniser-colonised dichotomy that 
organised North-South relations gave place to the categories of ‘developed’ and 
‘underdeveloped’ (Rist, 2014, p.73). From this perspective, development policy could only 
emerge through the perpetuation of the concept of the inferior, colonial ‘other’ – or of 
absolute otherness, in the case of African societies, as Mbembe (2001) suggests. This is to 
say that had colonial relations ended with colonisation, countries’ experiences would be 
equalised instead of contained within a poor-rich continuum that created – or maintained 
and reinforced – differences, and justified development interventions. As a result, 
development became a synonym of change, but not just any change: change that is oriented 
towards Western experiences and success.  
The invention and imposition of a hierarchy between social experiences and trajectories 
created the necessity to promote development, framed as a social economic status based on 
the experiences of world powers and that excluded alternative trajectories. As a result, 
development became a process entrenched in contradictions. The roles of former colonies 
in international trade after the advent of development are an example of the contradictory 
purposes and practices of intervention. In this context, dependency thinkers argue that, in 
spite of political decolonisation and promises of industrialisation through development 
assistance, the role of the former colonies – the periphery of the capitalist system – continued 
to be to provide resources, mainly commodities, to the metropoles – the centre (Amin, 1974; 
Prebisch, 1988). This outward-directed growth model defined the position of the periphery 
in the world trade system. This was a disadvantageous position that would only degenerate, 





commodities, leading to a deterioration of the terms of trade and therefore to a limitation of 
the gains in the periphery (Amin, 1974; Harvey et al., 2010; Prebisch, 1950, 1988). In the 
West African context, at the time of independence, the colonies were integrated into the 
world system in these conditions, already indebted and unable to invest in structural reforms 
– but aid served to perpetuate such dependency (Amin, 1974). This example shows the 
contradiction between development discourse and practice: development discourse praised 
industrialisation as a path to development, but the promoters of development never enacted 
structural economic changes to make the periphery competitive in the international market. 
On the contrary, the centre adopted policies that preserved their own economies by 
protecting vulnerable sectors and promoting free trade when they had competitive advantage 
(Prebisch, 1988). As we shall see throughout this dissertation, the support for the 
development of the cotton sector in Benin falls into these contradictions. 
As a consequence, the development project, as a form of intervention, at the intersection of 
discourse and practice, has been constantly contested but has remained the classic tool for 
framing development encounters. As Apthorpe (2007, pp.264–265) indicates, development 
policy is aid, and aid’s instruments – or guided missiles – are projects and programmes. As 
such, I approach the development project as the localised – in the sense that it is limited in 
time and space – expression of international development discourse. However, as Mbembe 
(2001, p.5) asserts, in order to avoid overemphasising the impact of discourses, it is important 
to recall that discourses have materiality, since the ‘social reality is made of a number of 
socially produced and objectified practices’. Thus, the existence and the constitution of the 
self as a ‘reflexive subject also involves, doing, seeing, hearing, tasting, feeling, and touching’ 
(Mbembe, 2001, p.7). In this sense, the development project is a social space in which the 
dichotomies of North-South, donor-recipient, dominant-subaltern, and project-context 
materialise. 
As I have suggested above, the mismatch within the development encounter is unavoidable. 
It is development’s – and therefore also the project’s – raison d’être. The mismatch has at least 
two dimensions. First, it is a mismatch of agency, as power is unequally distributed in 
development discourse and practice. Second, it is a mismatch of content, as the solutions 
that projects propose usually do not fit with the host context. In The Will To Improve, Tania 
Murray Li outlines these dimensions as she studies a series of development interventions in 
Indonesia, from the Dutch colonisation to the twenty-first century. With regards to the first 
dimension of the mismatch, Li finds out in her historical analysis that ‘improvement 





changes in the ways projects were implemented. Changes in project implementation 
mechanisms are ‘a way to reassert the authority of experts and of the State’ and did not 
represent a will to converge interests but to inscribe villagers’ interests in the preconceived 
project’s framework (Li, 2007, p.196). According to Li (2007, p.15), ‘trustees’ and ‘subjects’ 
– or donor and recipient, expert and indigenous – are on different sides of an intangible 
boundary separating ‘those who need to be developed from those who will do the 
developing’. Thus, she identifies a contradiction in development projects, as they aim to 
tackle inequalities but in fact reinforce them both within and outside project spaces. 
Such power asymmetry between donors and recipients comes to light in the content of 
projects. Had projects been a space with more equal relations between donors and recipients, 
they would not implement arrangements and practices that do not match the host context 
experiences. Ferguson (2007) demonstrates this mismatch of content as he describes the 
project aim of expanding cash crops in a context in which the male population was employed 
in mining, and livestock and crop production had a strong cultural root that was much more 
complex than the project document described. Thus, the project-context mismatch leads to 
uncertain outcomes, as hosts reappropriate project elements and give them their own 
meaning based on political interests that projects tend to ignore. 
The unequal power relations and the inappropriateness of intervention plans illustrate the 
coloniality of development. However, such inherent characteristics have not remained 
unchallenged; practitioners, researchers, and policy makers have attempted to address the 
mismatch and tried to take projects closer to the host context. 
1.1.2. Project-centred paradigm shifts 
The development project framework has been the subject of criticism that has enabled the 
elaboration of multiple innovative approaches to changing the aid paradigm and reducing 
the project-context mismatch. Already in the early years of aid, in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the international community started to move away from evolutionist and linear 
approaches that had hitherto framed development cooperation (Eggen and Roland, 2013; 
Rist, 2014). In the 1960s, Hirschman (1967) had already identified the inability of World 
Bank projects to consider the particularities of context and the hidden difficulties that 
inevitably affected project processes. Hirschman’s ‘hiding hand’ has a double facet, however: 
implementers underestimate the difficulties but also their capacity to overcome them. In 





and of context, especially in agricultural interventions, for which he called for longer periods 
of implementation. 
Despite early criticism, projects and programmes (understood as a combination of projects 
or a large-scale project) continued to frame development interventions. In the chronology of 
types of development project, large infrastructure projects, including rural development 
projects, were the norm until the mid-1970s (Eggen and Roland, 2013; Lavigne Delville, 
2016). In the 1980s, aid architecture started to move away from this kind of intervention, 
which primarily reflected a unique and linear development pathway, disregarding the 
particularities of the host context. In this sense, Brinkerhoff and Ingle (1989) proposed the 
‘structured flexibility approach’, which prioritised iterative learning and accommodated 
uncertainty in the project framework. The authors acknowledge that their approach might 
increase a project’s complexity, making it a ‘daunting and frustrating task’ (Brinkerhoff and 
Ingle, 1989, p.502), but they also note that bringing flexibility to the blueprint raised project 
performance. 
Going further in acknowledging the existing knowledge and resources of the context, Robert 
Chambers (1983, 2003) contends that most of the solutions that foreign interventions sought 
could be found in the host context itself through the adoption of rapid rural appraisals and, 
later, participatory rural appraisals. He argues that the vertical power relations between upper 
and lower, outsiders and local people, in which interventions are framed, have obstructed 
consideration of local people’s knowledge, and their creative and analytical capabilities 
(Chambers, 1994, p.963). 
Conversely, while some actors have looked at the host context as a source of the success of 
interventions, others have sought to isolate project from context to avoid misappropriation 
of project resources (Boone, 1996; Sachs, 1994). As a result, large projects started to 
disappear at the beginning of the 1990s to give place to smaller projects, which would give 
less room for local manoeuvre of project inputs. In the context of the projectivisation of aid, 
the project gained importance as the preferred structure in which to frame development 
cooperation initiatives, but the mismatch with context remained. 
More recently, critiques of projects have accentuated the importance of the mismatch. 
Ramalingam (2013) suggests that we should embrace context complexity instead of fearing 
it, because thinking through complexity can help us better understand the world in which we 
act. Along the same lines, Burns and Worsley (2015, p.18) follow the idea that complexity is 





they were not. Hence, the incorporation of complexity within project processes constitutes 
a way of ensuring interventions can scale up. Also adopting a systemic view, Green (2016, 
p.240) proposes the Power and System Approach as a solution to ‘making change happen’, 
by encouraging us ‘to nurture a genuine curiosity about the complex interwoven elements 
that characterize the systems we are trying to influence’. The adoption of iterative processes 
is recursive in these emerging approaches. Andrews et al. (2013; 2017) present the Problem 
Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) as a new approach to doing development. The principle 
remains the same: to move from the static, foreign-conceived blueprint to home-based 
problems and solutions; from best practice and institutional mimicry to positive deviance 
and experimentation (Andrews, 2015). These different but similar approaches meet in their 
efforts to take foreign intervention closer to the realities of context. 
Moving from the practical to the political domain, the critiques of the insufficiencies of 
projects reached the highest level of aid coordination in the 2000s. This period saw the 
expansion of the donor community as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) became 
increasingly present in the aid landscape and became a turning point for the aid effectiveness 
debate. Fraser and Whitfield (2009) call this period the ‘partnership era’ because it indicates 
a reframing of aid, as the donor community attempted to move away from power 
asymmetries and to incorporate new principles into the aid system. Discussions moved from 
the quantity of aid towards its quality, as donors were invited to look beyond project 
outcomes and to align project activities with national policies (Rahman and Farin, 2019). In 
this context, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development 
Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) organised four high-level fora on aid effectiveness 
between 2003 and 2011, seeking better results through improved coordination of aid 
delivery. The topics of the meetings evolved from basic statements about the need for 
coordination to more concrete guidelines, such as the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (Abdel-Malek, 2015; OECD, 2005), which confirmed the hegemony of results-
based management in development cooperation practice. The fourth – and last– high-level 
forum took place in Busan in 2011 and focussed on partnerships for effective cooperation 
in the face of the increasing participation of Southern providers and non-state actors in the 
development cooperation arena (Rahman and Farin, 2019). With regards to project 
management, the final declaration reiterated the emphasis on accountability, transparency, 
results, and ownership, but also recognised the diversity of ways of doing development 





The long-term efforts of practitioners and the donor community to transform the project 
experience so as to address the project-context mismatch illustrate the difficulty of the task. 
As a project manager, I have been following these debates and trying to assess my own 
practice accordingly. I became particularly interested in new methods and alternative 
frameworks. However, the application of such methods often felt artificial, and the 
transformation of the project experience became almost as important as whatever was 
produced by it. By no means do I intend to disregard the project experience or the 
importance of innovative mechanisms, in particular those that seek to reduce unequal power 
relations. The project constitutes the space which seems to be most adaptable by 
implementers and, as such, it needs to overcome hierarchical positions between donors and 
recipients, guests and hosts. Given this context, the reader will understand my eagerness 
when I was hired to join the Brazilian Cooperation Agency as a Project Analyst to manage 
technical cooperation projects in West African countries. South-South cooperation projects 
promised to be founded on different grounds, away from the colonial legacy and much closer 
to horizontal power relations.  
1.1.3. South-South cooperation and the context-similarity claim 
South-South cooperation (SSC), although not a new dynamic in the international arena, is 
presented as an alternative to the asymmetric power relations that predominate in traditional 
North-South aid architecture. Southern providers of development cooperation have 
distinguished their initiatives from North-South aid from the beginning (Gray and Gills, 
2016). Such initiatives are guided by the principles of horizontality, mutual benefits, non-
interference, non-conditionality, and equality (United Nations, 2010, 2019; UNDP, 1994). 
Thus, SSC is ‘a manifestation of solidarity among peoples and countries of the South’ (United 
Nations, 2010, p.2), instead of a type of ‘aid that promotes and specifically targets the 
economic development and wellbeing of developing countries’, which is the OECD’s 
definition of Official Development Assistance (OECD, 2020 n.pag.). As such, Southern 
countries stress that SSC is ‘not a substitute for, but a complement of North-South 
cooperation’ (United Nations, 2019 para. 10), and that such initiatives should not reduce the 
responsibility of developed countries in continuing and increasing development assistance 
(UNDP, 1994).  
In this context, the context-similarity claim, as an element of distinction, emerged 
progressively, underpinning the texts of the main documents that have framed technical 





Conference (1955) stressed common cultural traits between Asian and African cultures, and 
the Buenos Aires Plan of Action of 1978 focussed on common challenges that developing 
countries face (UNDP, 1994). Finally, in 1992, the South Commission put it clearly: 
South-South co-operation can provide important new opportunities for 
development based on geographical proximity, on similarities in demand and 
tastes, on relevance of development experience, know-how, and skills, and 
on availability of complementary natural and financial resources and 
management and technical skills. (Nyerere and South Commission, 1992, 
p.16) 
The context-similarity narrative thus became one of the central arguments that sustain and 
promote SSC initiatives. For example, the ‘cultural affinity’ narrative has been taken up by 
the Brazilian government since the 1970s, but was re-shaped and accentuated in the 2000s  
(Abdenur, 2015a, 2015b; Ferreira and Moreira, 2018), followed by similar claims from other 
emerging donors such as China and India (Arora and Chand, 2015; Chaturvedi and Mohanty, 
2016; CISSCA, 2019; GoC, 2006; Xu et al., 2016). The outcome document of the second 
High-Level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation, held in Buenos Aires 
in 2019, recognises that similar development challenges and proximity of experiences are the 
‘key catalysts’ to promoting and emphasising the principles of SSC (United Nations, 2019, 
p.3). 
Such claims circulated as emerging countries became providers and multiplied their initiatives 
from the 2000s, becoming thereby key actors in the development cooperation arena 
(Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013; Amanor and Chichava, 2016; Eyben, 2012; Eyben and 
Savage, 2013; Milhorance and Soule-Kohndou, 2017; Quadir, 2013; Woods, 2008). The 
increasing importance of SSC in the 2000s had an impact even on traditional aid architecture. 
Thereby, SSC attained the highest levels of ‘aidland’, transforming what was an acquired 
Northern territory into a paradigmatic battlefield, as such experiences challenged the 
structured power relations underpinning traditional aid (Esteves and Assunção, 2014; Zoccal 
Gomes and Esteves, 2018). 
However, even though the rhetoric of horizontality and mutual learning, along with shared 
geographies and a common colonial past, has flowed freely, it is not certain that SSC projects 
are implemented in such horizontal, innovative ways (Scoones et al., 2016, 2013) that would 
mean they bridge the project-context mismatch. Shankland and Gonçalves (2016) note that 
the ‘similarity claim’ takes a political stand in the multilateral fora, but becomes mainly a 
technical argument to support SSC in practice, especially in the agricultural development 





similarity claim are not immune to re-interpretations and also need to be historically and 
geographically contextualised. Along these lines, the study of emerging country cooperation 
in Africa demonstrates that Southern partners do bring new elements to the way programmes 
are negotiated and implemented, but also many continuities from older experiences (Gray 
and Gills, 2016; Inoue and Vaz, 2012; Mawdsley, 2012, 2015; Milhorance, 2014; Morvaridi 
and Hughes, 2018; Scoones et al., 2016, 2013). We still lack ethnographies of South-South 
projects to understand how SSC operates in the field, and furthermore recent research has 
challenged the notion of a ‘Southern identity’, arguing that Southern providers tend to 
reproduce the unequal power relations within development cooperation (Taela, 2017, p.211). 
In addition, as Cesarino (2013, p.171) demonstrates, a South-South project remains a 
‘spatially and temporally circumscribed enterprise’, unable to be fully perpetuated in and be 
owned by the host context, ‘as if cooperation projects, Northern and Southern alike, are 
doomed to fail by design’. 
From my experience, it seems that the assumption that shared geographies, histories, and 
experiences are enough to make South-South encounters and projects horizontal and power 
relations symmetrical has prevented Southern providers from looking thoroughly at projects 
as political processes and identifying the power asymmetries that inherently predominate in 
development encounters. It seems that Southern providers have been spending more time 
distinguishing themselves from traditional donors and signing projects than reflecting on 
project experiences. For example, when I started working at the Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency in 2014, a colleague called me ‘too much North-South’ when I expressed surprise at 
the flexibility with which we extended implementation periods unilaterally, or when I 
questioned the lack of activity reports. Certainly, many things have changed since the 2000s. 
Reflections on evaluation mechanisms, accountability, best practice, programmes, and 
actions, for instance, have recently become a concern in Southern fora (see BRICS Policy 
Center et al., 2017; Lopes and Costa, 2018; Pomeroy et al., 2017; UNOSSC, 2019; Vazquez, 
2013; Waisbich, 2020), while the need for systematising data collection has progressively 
permeated UN SSC outcome documents as a recommendation (see United Nations, 2019, 
2010). 
From the analysis above, both project- and context-centred paradigm shifts aiming to reduce 
the mismatch between projects and contexts seem insufficient to enable projects to 
overcome coloniality and a mismatch with the host context. In the next section, I turn to the 






1.1.4. Swapping perspectives: Seeing development cooperation from 
the context perspective 
In development cooperation host contexts, particular attention is given to the role of the 
state, which seems never to match the expectations of the international community. As 
discussed in the section above, development discourse and practice have placed developing 
countries on a linear path of change towards the Western model. From this perspective, the 
state plays a significant role in administering development change by coordinating, orienting, 
and governing institutions, and in establishing the rules for resource allocation and 
distribution. Leftwich (2000, p.7) suggests that we see this process as political, because it 
involves ‘new ways in which all manner of resources – both internal and external – are 
mobilized, directed and deployed’. Given this, the study of the state in sub-Saharan Africa 
has placed the experiences of countries along a linear continuum of institutional 
development, based on experiences which exclude Africa (Bayart, 1993, p.5). Alternatively, 
Mbembe (2001, p.36) suggests that one should not look simply at the reason and strength of 
the state, but at the relations of subjection for which ‘it is important to go beyond the 
fashionable slogans of traditional political science (soft state, strong state, patrimonial state, 
etc.) and to think about how the state sought to augment its value and manage utilities’. The 
main idea surrounding these arguments is that the African state is the result of a process of 
assimilation and adaptation of a foreign model of societal organisation (Banégas, 2003; 
Mamdani, 1996; Mbembe, 2001). In this respect, Bayart (1993, p.260) suggests that the 
‘transfer of representations, attitudes and cultural models follows patterns of creative 
derivation’, which give to African states their own historicity, so the African state can no 
longer be taken as purely exogenous. This implies that the state is founded on particular 
bases, unique to each country, that do not fit into Western-oriented political frameworks. 
Thus, it is not surprising that development projects which are generic models based on 
international best practice or on ‘institutional monocropping’ are likely to prove 
inappropriate and ineffective (Booth and Cammack, 2013, p.10), since they tend to disregard 
the specific features and interests of local politics. 
In an attempt to pay more attention to small-scale processes and unique experiences, 
Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan suggest studying the ‘‘real’ works of states and public 
bureaucracies in different African countries’ (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 2014, p.3; 
Bierschenk, 2014). At that scale of analysis, it is possible to distinguish islands of effectiveness 
within the state apparatus and the effect of the recurrence of development projects in the 





between the temporary and specific interventions, on one hand, and the enduring practices 
of the state, on the other. With regards to development projects, Olivier de Sardan (1988, 
p.219) argues that because interventions took place in almost every African village, there is a 
‘memory of such interventions among peasants, more so than among ‘developers’ who very 
often act as if they were debarking on virgin territory’. From the perspective of the host 
context, Olivier de Sardan sees development projects as ‘travelling models’, or as a 
‘standardised institutional intervention that aims to produce social change’, in which de-
contextualisation is a central element (Olivier de Sardan, 2021, pp.26–36).  
Accordingly, such harmonisation of models of intervention and disconnection with the 
context requires networking. The concepts of development brokers (Bierschenk et al., 2002; 
Mosse and Lewis, 2006), as mediators between project and context, and of boundary 
partners, those who take part in project activities and whom implementers identify as key 
influencers outside the project boundaries (Earl et al., 2001), are particularly important in this 
research. In the same vein, Mosse and Lewis’ (2006, p.16) take on development brokers 
focusses on how actors buying into policy models – including those development projects 
provide – allows them to be part of their own social and political trajectories. Thereby, the 
configuration or re-configuration of enduring institutional arrangements remain subject to 
adaptation and interpretation by local actors, especially local elites (Booth and Cammack, 
2013, p.138; Crewe and Harrison, 2002), who influence the rules and govern the distribution 
of resources. 
From this perspective, development cooperation projects become almost insignificant as 
drivers of change, for being incompatible, or too short, too specific. Development 
anthropologists have critically observed the limitations of projects and the importance of the 
host context (Crewe and Harrison, 2002; Bierschenk et al., 1991; Ferguson, 2007; Li, 2007; 
Mosse, 2005, among others). Eyben (2014, p.101) argues that we have always known that 
projects fail, because ‘however well designed, it may not be possible for a project to effect 
some radical transformation without changes to the broader context’. In other words, 
projects are too simple and too linear when compared to the problems they aim to solve and 
to the contexts in which they are implemented. 
Along these lines, Mosse (2005, 2004, 1998) suggests that different views of development 
have hindered a deeper understanding of project implementation and processes. Not only 
are projects unable to read context, but researchers and practitioners also fail in 





and practitioners to consider the complexity and unpredictability of planned interventions. 
As Crehan and van Oppen (1988) suggest, a project is a ‘social event’ which necessarily has 
unpredictable effects. It is less a matter of whether a project works or not, is good or bad, 
succeeds or fails, than an exploration of whatever is made with project components 
(resources, arrangements, relationships, practices), by whom and why. 
This implies that project components are permeable and prone to be manipulated by host 
actors. Crehan and von Oppen (1988) examine how farmers, as project recipients, can 
succeed in readjusting objectives according to their own interests, because a project 
constitutes an arena of struggle in which the agency of foreign interveners can be contested. 
It is questionable, therefore, to talk about project failure, since there are winners in every 
project (Crewe and Harrison, 2002; Elwert and Bierschenk, 1988; Mosse, 2005).  
Ferguson (2007) demonstrates that project components can be re-interpreted and used to 
reproduce established power structures in the host context. Hence, the failure of a project is 
not accidental, because the political machine of the host context processes all inputs to its 
own benefit. In this sense, the complex political dynamics of the local context are 
independent from simple and temporary interventions, such as development projects. This 
perspective raises the question of who benefits from projects, in the end. It is not that 
projects have no effect on local hierarchies, but that they reinforce them (Amselle, 1988). 
While Ferguson demonstrates that the interests of the host context prevail, he also suggests 
that development projects, by being disconnected from the host context, seem to seek to 
benefit themselves and their own objectives, through their own resources. In this sense, 
Amselle (1988) suggests that the real failure is not in the project itself, but in the contradiction 
between the devised objectives of projects and their real effects. 
In sum, the perspectives above elaborate on the duality between project and host context, in 
which neither is insignificant nor hegemonic within project processes. Instead, there seems 
to be a complex interplay in which one constructs the other. This is particularly interesting 
in contexts that have been hosting projects for many years and which have left their mark. It 
is the project-context interplay through time that I investigate in this thesis. To put it 
differently, I go from what a project is to how it came to be. In the next section, I state the 





1.2. Research aim and scope: Cotton development projects in Benin 
During my learning journey, I explored different perspectives on the development 
encounter. These perspectives oscillated between a strong focus on either structure or 
agency, which I could translate into an oscillation between views in which development 
cooperation projects are either dominant or insignificant elements in the historical 
trajectories of developing countries. On one hand – the structuralist perspective – 
development cooperation responds to the interests of developed countries and forcibly 
places other countries in a subaltern position in a linear path of change, as though host actors 
had no agency. On the other hand, development projects – development’s main tool of 
dissemination – are too short and specific to weigh against the agency of agents in the host 
context.  
These shifts of perspective led me to think of the project as a dinner party, when time and 
space are distinguishable from how they are in everyday dinners. Having dinner is an 
everyday practice that is constructed through time. Our way of preparing and having dinner 
stems from our past experiences, hence it is the product of the accumulation of similar 
experiences in our life trajectories. When we prepare dinner, we have our own habits, 
possibilities, constraints, and resources (both material and human). For instance, we might 
need different kitchenware; others might use help, others not. There are also certain social 
rules, such as the time at which dinner is eaten and dining etiquette, which differ from one 
country to another. Yet every day we have dinner according to the possibilities that our rules 
and resources provide us. This is our host context and enduring practices. 
One day, however, we host a dinner party, and the rules and resources change for one 
evening. For the sake of the analogy, let us consider that for this dinner party a friend of ours 
has proposed to teach us a special dish that will, according to them, enable us to improve 
our diet, and ultimately our health. On this occasion, distinct rules and resources are imposed. 
The external cook is bringing their own kitchenware, and they might even bring special and 
exotic ingredients to enrich the dish. The rules also change for one night. For instance, all 
invitees need to participate, either in cleaning the dishes, chopping vegetables, or assisting 
the cook. We, the hosts, must comply with these rules for the successful ‘implementation’ of 
the dinner party. The dinner party is a development project. 
At the end of the day, the dinner party, as an isolated event, is successfully implemented. The 
food was tasty and nutritious; it accomplished the task of providing a balanced meal to all 





day, however, we go back to our everyday practice, shaped by the arrangements, rules, and 
resources that prevail in our host context. We still need to have dinner, although, after having 
tasted some new recipes, we would like to change our everyday menu. However, the cook is 
no longer there. They have left some of the kitchenware they brought, but we are unable to 
have such a feast again due to a lack of resources, our time constraints, and our own social 
arrangements. Additionally, because we all play different roles in our household, some of us 
are more prone to replicate the practices that we learnt, while others might even be able to 
decide whether or not it is worthwhile to incorporate them as an everyday practice and to 
reallocate resources accordingly. 
Just like dinner parties, development projects consist of ad hoc, extraordinary experiences 
that contrast with the prevailing rules and resources of the host (country). The aim of a 
project, in addition, is to make this extraordinary experience become ordinary (sustainability) 
and to scale it up to other households – expecting a single evening to shape years of 
accumulated practices in preparing dinner. Yet even though dinner parties are brief, specific, 
and extraordinary events, they still represent life experiences from which we can draw 
elements to shape the way we do things. Ad hoc experiences become an ingredient in a 
repertoire of dispositions that we piece together to construct our overall practice. 
Therefore, instead of discarding either perspective completely, it is the interplay between 
projects and context, dinner parties and everyday dinner, that interests me in this research. 
This presupposes that the agency of projects in context and the agency of the context within 
projects are not predetermined or fixed; instead, they are constantly changing and possibly 
changing each other. It requires the adoption of a historical perspective which cannot be the 
project’s, due to the limited temporality of the latter. It comes to locating project footprints 
in life trajectories, institutional arrangements, and enduring practices that transcend the 
spaces and times of projects, in order to understand how host actors’ agency is constructed, 
including to what extent it stems from project experiences. In sum, the aim of my research 
is to investigate the progressive construction of agency within both projects and host context. 
This thesis seeks to answer the following main question and sub-questions: 
How does the host context come to incorporate ad hoc development project arrangements into enduring 
institutions? 
- How different are ad hoc development cooperation arrangements within the host 
context? 






- How are ad hoc development cooperation arrangements navigated across social 
fields? 
I approach these questions using key concepts from social theory, which provide a theoretical 
background for understanding the relationship between institutions and practices, structure 
and agents, as each influences the other. I present the conceptual framework of this research 
in the next chapter. 
The focus of this research is on the history of development encounters in the cotton sector 
in Benin since independence from French colonial rule in 1960. The history of development 
cooperation in Benin has not yet been compiled as such – and especially not from the 
perspective of the host country. Since independence in 1960, Benin has been receiving 
foreign assistance from various European countries and international organisations 
(European Union, 2012). We can observe in the chart below (figure 1) that the fluctuations 
correspond to both national events (e.g. the adoption of structural adjustment plans in 1989 
and the subsequent democratic transition and privatisations from 1990) and external factors 
(e.g. the boom in development assistance in the post-9/11 era and its decrease from 2009 as 
a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis).  
Figure 1: Net Official Development Assistance1received by Benin per year from 1960 to 2018 (in millions of current 
USD) 
 
Source: (World Bank, 2020) 
The structural adjustment plans (SAP), adopted from 1989 in Benin, have left a mark on the 
country’s economy and on the relationships between foreign donors and national elites (Van 
 











































































de Walle, 2001), emphasising foreign interference and increasing the dependency on foreign 
assistance (Lavigne Delville, 2010; Whitfield and Fraser, 2010). Gazibo (2005, p.78) 
demonstrates how the success of the Beninese democratic transition improved Benin’s ability 
to attract external financial support, because ‘the country responded quickly and decisively 
to the donors’ and international financial institutions’ new paradigms of democratic 
conditionality and good governance’. The good timing of the transition and the good 
sequencing of economic and political reforms produced willingness on the part of donors to 
remain committed (Gazibo, 2005, p.79). In turn, this might have had an impact on how 
Beninese actors experienced development cooperation projects and on how they engage with 
and participate in these arenas of struggle. 
Rural development, specifically, has been on the agenda of the main donors and international 
organisations in Benin since independence. Agricultural development has progressed 
through the different paradigms of aid as a key sector of development, especially for the 
relative importance of the rural population in developing countries in general and the 
increasing disparities between urban and rural areas (Ellis and Biggs, 2001). Structural 
reforms in the agricultural sector have appeared in every memorandum between Benin and 
the International Monetary Fund since the 1990s. By then, ‘sustainable agriculture’ had 
gained momentum in the context of a post-green revolution and the Brundtland report 
(Conway and Barbier, 1990). 
Against this background, there has been a multiplication of rural development projects being 
implemented in Benin.2 Almost all of these projects had a focus on the cotton sector, the 
importance of which in the Beninese economy is repeatedly highlighted for its contribution 
to export revenues3 and for having replaced palm oil and derivate products as the preferred 
cash crop for small farmers since the 1960s (IDA, 1972). As we will see in chapter 3, different 
waves of cotton projects have succeeded one another, having a variable and complex 
interplay within a changing host context. 
1.3. Overview of the study 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. In the next chapter, I detail the concepts 
and methods used in my research. The conceptual framework revolves around the interplay 
 
2 See database of World Bank projects in Benin: 
http://projects.banquemondiale.org/search?lang=fr&searchTerm=&countrycode_exact=BJ. 






between projects and the host context through institutions as mediators of the interplay 
between agency and structure, and power as a prism that directs which arrangements prevail. 
From this framework, I move to the methods I adopted. I describe my first encounter with 
Benin and how I came to study its cotton sector. Then, I turn to an outline of my research 
strategy, the definition of the boundaries of my research, and the impact that my fieldwork 
experience had on those choices. I also describe my experience of conducting field research 
in Benin and reflect on potential bias in my research and on my positionality. Finally, I 
conclude chapter 2 by describing how I pieced together the data I collected, which implied 
the continued development of the conceptual framework and expansion of the literature. 
In chapter 3, I provide the background to this research, as I describe the historical 
constitution of the cotton sector in Benin. This chapter presents the actors in the cotton 
sector, from the coloniser to the national private elite, and the power relations between them 
in regards to control of the sector. Projects are also part of this process and I also identify 
them within this trajectory. I draw from a variety of sources, ranging from the history and 
politics bodies of literature, news articles, project documents, and other information from 
primary sources. Given the background already outlined, I move to the study of the 
footprints of cotton development cooperation projects in the host context. 
I begin chapter 4 by describing the life trajectories of different key informants. By doing this 
I aim to locate project experiences in their life paths and bring up the different perspectives 
on development cooperation from the host context. I share the perspectives of a farmer, an 
extension agent, a cotton researcher, and a coordinator from the Interprofessional Cotton 
Association (AIC), collected through multiple in-depth interviews during field research. 
Their perspectives bring up the distinctions in project arrangements, relationships, processes, 
and practices in the host context. In the second section of this chapter, I depict the innate 
characteristics of project arrangements that make projects an asset in the host context (their 
rules and resources, for instance), while also limiting their ability to make an impact, because 
of their short-lived and exclusive nature. 
From the distinctions between project arrangements, I move to the historical journey of the 
constitution of development projects as an enduring institution, in chapter 5. I show that 
early projects introduced then regularised development cooperation practices that endured 
within subsequent development projects. The recurrence of cotton projects created a 
tradition of development cooperation, with rules taken for granted and expectations for 





in subsequent projects. The arrival of Southern providers of cotton projects in the late 2000s 
involved an encounter between traditional aid and SSC paradigms in the host context. The 
outcomes of this encounter illustrate the institutionalisation of development practice and 
indicate possibilities for and obstacles to change. 
In chapter 6, I turn to the effects of projects in national institutions of the cotton sector. I 
revisit the historical trajectory of cotton projects, but with a focus on the project components 
that were incorporated into national institutions and that endured over time. Put differently, 
the chapter’s focus is on the effects of projects outside project spaces. I start the chapter 
with an analysis of the role of early cotton projects in a nascent cotton sector. In that section, 
I take the example of cotton research, one of the main recipients of cotton projects since the 
1960s. I then show the evolution of the role of projects, through liberalisation and the 
multiplication of partners and projects from the 2000s. I conclude the chapter by exploring 
how project components are incorporated into the host context within the current 
organisational and functional mechanisms. 
I discuss my findings in chapter 7 to shed light on the evolution of the role and weight of 
projects in the host context, across time and host actors. That perspective on the interplay 
between projects and context enables me to identify the conditions through which projects 
shape context and vice-versa. Finally, I conclude this thesis in chapter 8 by reframing the 
discussion around the concept of institutional bricolage and reflecting on the insights 
afforded to the debate on development cooperation paradigms and practice, and the 
contributions of this research to a different way of looking at projects and their incremental 






CHAPTER 2. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION COMPONENTS IN 
INSTITUTIONAL BRICOLAGE: THEORY AND METHODS 
At the time of writing my research proposal, my initial idea was to study the influence of 
local elites within project processes – here simply understood as a sequence of actions. I was 
convinced of the role of elites in shaping policies and institutions, and in allocating resources 
according to their interests. Conversely, while elites seemed to shape development pathways, 
I was implementing projects that sometimes seemed to diverge from the interests of 
powerful groups, running sometimes implicitly behind the project stage. Reflecting on 
project sustainability, I wondered how we could succeed in such circumstances. I started 
sketching some ideas that I wrote down during a workshop I was co-facilitating in Port-au-
Prince, Haiti. We were in a closed room, but I could not help looking out through the window 
and seeing the contrast between what I saw outside and what we were saying and doing 
inside. There was a mismatch. It seemed that the room, improvised in an adapted container, 
was isolated in space, like an island, cut off from the outside world, its actors, interests, rules, 
and resources. Yet I was convinced that the solid wall of the real room was thicker than the 
figurative blurred boundary that separated the space of development cooperation and the 
host context. I wrote down my first questions: how do elite interests permeate project spaces? 
What do they take from them? 
During the first year of the PhD programme at IDS, two main points emerged and became 
pillars of my research. First, I was encouraged to look beyond elites. There are other groups 
of actors who navigate across project spaces and between projects and the host context. By 
doing so, those actors might also work as brokers between project and context. I came to 
look at power as relational, taking different configurations in different spaces. I came to look 
at project hosts, including local project staff, experts, and participants at large. As projects 
implement activities that overlap with practices that exist outside the project space, any 
participant would be able to take something ‘from here to there’. Thus, institutional bricolage 
emerged as a concept through which to understand the interplay between project and 
context. 
Second, as I opposed the ‘time of projects’ to the ‘time of the context’, I needed a historical 
perspective. This would support me in demonstrating the contrasting temporalities of 
projects (relatively short and specific) and of context (undetermined and infinite), and the 
role of ‘brokers’ – or of bricoleurs, as we shall see – from one project to another, from project 
to context, and from context to project. Going almost in the opposite direction, I also wanted 





ensemble, are inserted into a continuum and connected to each other throughout history. 
Indeed, a project is linked to previous projects, and it is the hosts who connect them as they 
navigate from one to the other in the host context. In this research I attempt to address the 
tension between the temporality of a project, of projects, and of the context, as I explain in 
the next sub-sections. 
Subsequently, I faced the question of how to distinguish ‘project’ from ‘context’. My 
supervisors and I agreed that projects introduced arrangements, relationships, and practices 
that were different from the part of the context that endured after the end of the 
implementation. Yet projects were part of the context and could not be completely 
disentangled from it – they also endured, because one project succeeds another. Hence, I 
could not simply use ‘context’ to speak of those spaces outside a project’s framework; I 
needed an adjective for the everyday life of context ‘minus’ projects. We dropped ‘permanent 
context’ very quickly. It was an easy choice as the main antonym for ‘temporary’ or 
‘intermittent’, which characterise project spaces. However, it sounds static, or something that 
does not change. This would give the wrong idea by insinuating that context is immutable, 
independent of projects. I also attempted the use of project versus ordinary arrangements, 
as the literature on organisational studies suggests (see for example Lundin and 
Steinthórsson, 2003, p.245). However, this choice would neutralise the power relations 
between projects and host context arrangements that I aim to capture. At last, I found 
comfort with ‘prevailing’, ‘enduring’, and finally ‘host context’. In the writing phase, I decided 
to keep these three adjectives, but I use them distinctively. The host context is Benin and its 
cotton sector in its condition as project host; this is the beneficiary or partner. ‘Enduring’ 
and ‘prevailing’ I use to characterise the institutions, arrangements, relationships, processes, 
and practices of the host context. Enduring institutions include projects as an ensemble, as 
well as the other institutions that prevail in the host context – for example, cotton research. 
Prevailing institutions are the enduring institutions ‘minus’ projects, because their 
arrangements prevail over and above the temporary and specific arrangements of projects. 
Given this background, in the next sub-sections I develop the concepts that frame my 
research and the methods I adopted. 
2.1. Project ‘ad hocness’, institutional bricolage, and power 
In this section, I analyse the concepts that I have adopted in this research. There are three 
main ideas that I use to approach the interplay between projects and context over time. The 





project and context. The concept of institutional bricolage provides a frame within which to 
approach the interactions between different institutional settings, along with institutional 
building and change. Finally, these processes are shaped by power relations within and 
outside projects, and between projects and the host context.  
2.1.2. Development projects as ad hoc institutions 
This research builds upon the idea of the mismatch between project and host context. The 
idea comes from the observation that projects enable arrangements, relationships, and 
practices that would not exist in the host context without the project. In this sense, projects 
function as institutions, as they mediate the duality between structure and agency by 
providing rules and resources that enable and constrain human action. 
Therefore, the emphasis is less on the supremacy of either structure or agency in shaping 
action. Rather, I follow Gidden’s (1984) structuration theory, which suggests that structure 
and agency are both products and producers of one other, thus reproducing sets of rules and 
resources and patterns of social life. Giddens’s duality of structure also relates to Bourdieu’s 
(2005, p.82) ‘dialectic of internalisation of externality, and externalisation of internality’, in 
which structures are the product of history, but also produce and shape practices, and hence 
history again. By mediating the structure-agency duality and functioning as an institution, 
projects constitute one of the channels through which one’s practices construct a structure, 
and, simultaneously, a structure guides one’s practices. 
Institutional theories provide many insights into how institutions mediate the interplay 
between structure and agency (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Lowndes, 2010). As institutionalists 
drew from sociology, anthropology, and law, the definition of ‘institution’ challenged earlier 
approaches that saw institutions mainly as the ‘rules of the game in a society that shape 
human interaction’ (North, 1992, p.3). Emerging views aimed to move away from this static 
definition to encapsulate the complexities, uncertainties, and context particularities, as well 
as to incorporate power into the analysis (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Lowndes, 2010). The 
contributions in the literature on natural resource management are particularly relevant to 
this research. Leach et al. (1999, p.237), for example, define institutions ‘not as rules 
themselves, but as patterns of behaviours that emerge from underlying structures or ‘sets of 
rules’ in use’. From this view there is a focus on social interaction and processes going beyond 





The recursiveness of patterns of behaviour over time is a fundamental characteristic of 
institutions (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). Institutions are constituted by ‘regularized 
practices performed over time’ (Leach et al., 1999, p.238). Giddens (1984, p.24) also 
characterises institutions as ‘the more enduring features of social life’, which give solidity to 
social systems across time and space. As both product and producer of history, institutions 
enable and constrain practice. Also giving a particular weight to history and past experiences, 
Bourdieu’s (1990, 2005) habitus is ‘embodied history’, a system of transposable dispositions 
construed by past experiences that structure one’s practice. 
The long life of institutions being a necessary condition of their existence presupposes that 
development cooperation projects, which are limited in time, cannot be considered 
institutions per se. Indeed, a single project is too short-lived to create patterns of social 
behaviour. They do provide and organise times and spaces within which arrangements shape 
relationships and practices, and distribute power among stakeholders, enabling and 
constraining agency, but these do not last long enough beyond the project time frame to 
become a pattern. Such is the inherent temporary characteristic of projects. 
However, development cooperation projects, as an ensemble, have a long history of at least 
sixty years. Therefore, ‘current projects take place in a milieu that has already experienced 
previous interventions that have left their mark’, and they structure, at least in part, current 
behaviours (Olivier de Sardan, 2005, p.139), as ‘a constitutive phenomenon of the historicity 
of African societies and political regimes’ (Blundo, 2011, p.1). Hence, although each project 
differs from another, there are regularised practices in development encounters that can be 
observed from the early years of aid to the present – as I demonstrate in subsequent chapters. 
In this sense, in which development projects are seen as an ensemble, they constitute a type 
of institution, with particular practices, defined actors and roles, relationships, processes, and 
power relations that have endured over time. Thus there is as much continuity as 
discontinuity in development project institutions. Projects are intermittent and constant, 
according to the scale of time and analysis one adopts. Hence, I adopted the adjective ad hoc 
to reflect this contradiction when characterising development cooperation institutions. Thus, 
‘ad hoc institutions’ aims to acknowledge the temporary nature of each project alongside the 
idea that each of them is part of a broader history of development encounters, in which 






Going further, the identification and distinction of development cooperation institutional 
arrangements assume the co-existence of multiple institutions in the host context. In this 
sense, institutionalist approaches have drawn from scholarship on law to adopt, first, the idea 
of legal pluralism (the existence of multiple legal frameworks), then that of ‘institutional 
multiplicity’, which focusses more on the interplay among different institutional settings 
(Hesselbein et al., 2006; Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013). This concept is applied to 
understanding how actors navigate sets of rules in which the distribution of power and power 
relations differ (Mehta et al., 2001, 1999; Leach et al., 1999). In turn, this implies a move 
towards actor-oriented approaches (Long, 1992, 2001). Long sees projects as arenas or social 
encounters in which ‘contests over issues, resources, values, and representations take place’ 
(Long, 2000, p.192). Such perspectives enable us to observe actors’ agency in different 
institutional settings, indicating the different possibilities and constraints of different spaces. 
More interestingly, an ‘interface analysis’, by following actors’ interactions within different 
locales, enables an understanding of the interplay between institutions and social spaces 
(Beck, 2016; Long, 1992). This is particularly interesting for approaching the possibilities of 
institutional change. 
With regards to change, Giddens’ structuration theory and Bourdieusian approaches tend to 
be deterministic, at least at first sight. Both authors emphasise the submission of current 
practices to past experiences, as though agents were locked in a rigid structure of institutions. 
Nevertheless, despite suggestions to the contrary, Bourdieu’s theory of practice incorporates 
possibilities of change (see Schlerka, 2018, for example). Although one’s habitus tends to 
ensure its own consistency and its defence against change that might call it into question 
(Bourdieu, 1990, pp.60–61), this does not imply that our practices are immune to change. 
Rather, Bourdieu (2000, p.161) suggests that the ‘habitus changes constantly in response to 
new experiences… and dispositions [which constitute the habitus] are subject to a kind of 
permanent revision’ – even though such changes are never radical. According to Giddens 
(1984, p.3), a continuity of patterns of behaviour presumes reflexivity and monitoring of 
actions, which in turn is only possible because of a continuity of practices. It is specifically 
because there is a pattern over time that agents are able to reflect upon their and other agents’ 
actions, monitoring consistency, ensuring continuity, but also opening possibilities for social 
change (Giddens, 1984, p.245). Building on these ideas, the study of institutions moved away 
from structuralism and determinism to more dynamic approaches, focussing on practices as 
they shape institutions and social structures. This implies, nonetheless, that institutional 





1996; Leach et al., 1999), but not necessarily a rational process, and subject to interpretation 
and re-interpretation (Hall, 2009; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). 
The concepts presented above contribute to approach projects as institutions. Other 
overlapping concepts also see a project as a particular social space where resources, 
meanings, values, and ideas are at stake, spaces in which host actors engage, unpack and re-
use elements and resources, and transform. In this research, I focus less on the interactions 
within a specific type of social arena or encounter, and more on the relations between 
different institutional settings or social spaces, namely between project and host context. By 
doing so, I connect the co-existence of multiple institutions to how institutional change is 
envisaged. As actors navigate across institutional settings, they collect experiences and build 
a repertoire of dispositions that structures their practices. This repertoire of dispositions 
provides them with tools to react to everyday challenges in multiple institutional settings. 
Experiences in development projects are one of these sources of dispositions (also referred 
to as institutional components), which actors can use in subsequent projects or in other 
domains of action. As they assemble the pieces, they perform ‘institutional bricolage’. In the 
next sub-section, I discuss how I apply this concept in my research. 
2.1.3. Institutional bricolage: Piecing together institutional 
arrangements 
In this research, the concept of ‘institutional bricolage’ serves to shed light on the use of 
project components in other institutional settings and in subsequent projects – or how, in 
this process, such components go from ad hoc to durable. Cleaver (2001, 2012) takes further 
Douglas’ concept of institutional thinking, in turn based on Lévi-Strauss’s idea of intellectual 
bricolage. For Lévi-Strauss, intellectual bricolage characterises primitive thought, but 
Douglas (2011, pp.65–66) argues that the assembling of pieces is an important stage of 
institution building in modern societies as well. From this perspective, critical institutionalism 
sees institutional bricolage as a more conscious process in both institution building and 
institutional functioning. Cleaver and de Koning (2015, p.4) define institutional bricolage as 
the ‘process through which people, consciously and non-consciously, assemble or reshape 
institutional arrangements, drawing on whatever materials and resources are available, 
regardless of their original purpose’. This concept has been adopted and developed in 
research on natural resource management; I believe it can also contribute to understanding 





Cleaver identifies five key elements of bricolage (see Cleaver, 2012, pp.45–50). First, there is 
a focus on the necessary improvisation and innovation of everyday practice. As people react 
to everyday challenges by combining institutional arrangements sourced from different 
institutions, the resulting practice is a ‘patchwork’, a mosaic of arrangements that make sense 
in that particular situation. As I consider past and present development projects as sources 
of institutional arrangements, I am interested in exploring which project pieces are being re-
used and reworked by bricoleurs in the cotton sector in Benin. 
Second, institutional bricolage assumes that those pieces are multi-purpose, since they can 
be used in multiple institutional settings. This stays valid even if such arrangements were 
made to work under a specific institutional setting, such as a development project. As an 
arrangement becomes part of the repertoire of dispositions, the bricoleur is able to unpack, 
re-shape, and re-interpret it, and give it a different purpose in a different social space. This 
element of bricolage addresses what might be perceived as the diversion of project resources 
by host actors, who might give a different purpose to project institutional components, away 
from project objectives. While some researchers and practitioners see it as a factor of project 
failure (as discussed in chapter 1), it becomes bricolage within a critical institutionalist 
approach. Bricolage sees the multi-purpose application of arrangements as a method of 
cooperation among institutions, as bricoleurs borrow components from one institutional 
setting and apply them in another. From this perspective, the focus is on the complexity of 
the host context. It provides a different way to approach the apparent messiness of 
institutional functioning and sheds light on the effectiveness of improvisational use of what 
is available (Bruns, 2009). 
Third, Cleaver insists on the weight of meanings and traditions in the process of piecing 
together institutional arrangements. As bricoleurs piece together old and new to make 
something different, this ‘must appear familiar, it must work on a routinely accepted logic, it 
must socially fit’ (Cleaver, 2012, p.47). Hence, bricolage is mainly path-dependent, as 
bricoleurs draw from previous experiences and pre-existing ways of doing things. This 
element is important as it represents the idea of the mismatch between the project and the 
host context. It appears that project components that contrast with traditional practices 
would be less likely to be pieced together later on, outside the project structure. Additionally, 
this means that the ‘innovations adopted are in fact often adopted for reasons other than 





Institutional bricolage also implies that meanings and traditions ‘leak’ from one institution to 
another. Cleaver (2001, p.32) explains the ‘leakage of meaning’ with the example of a 
caretaker in Uganda who borrowed beliefs from another ethnic group and whose rituals 
appeared to become a multi-ethnic institution. Cleaver also gives the example of local 
authorities who borrowed state bureaucratic titles to reinforce their legitimacy over water use 
management. Taking it further, de Koning (2011) argues that when the leakage of meaning 
is persistent and recurring, this can start a process of alteration in socially embedded 
institutions, since meanings and traditions are re-interpreted, and new ones emerge. In this 
process, development brokers play an important role in translating arrangements between 
institutional settings. However, whereas this role was first defined as requiring certain types 
of competency, such as rhetorical, organisational, and relational, and referred primarily to 
local development professionals (Bierschenk et al., 2002), I consider every bricoleur (or 
project participant) as a broker, since agents are constantly navigating different institutional 
settings, and combining and re-interpreting arrangements. 
As a consequence, the arrangements produced through bricolage become natural, as a 
patchwork of arrangements that share common broader meanings and traditions. In turn, 
this entails that the process of bricolage is both conscious and unconscious, which is its 
fourth key element. Cleaver (2012, p.49) notes that a multitude of factors (from gender to 
spatial location, wealth, and aspirations) will have a bearing on the ways that bricoleurs shape 
and engage with institutions. Consequently, institutional design and change involves 
repeating and questioning previous patterns, though they are rarely unquestionably kept the 
same or completely rejected. 
Finally, the fifth key element of bricolage acknowledges that bricoleurs have different 
constraints and opportunities in piecing together institutional arrangements. Hence, 
institutional bricolage ‘is an authoritative process, shaped by relations of power’ (Cleaver, 
2012, p.49). This addresses the gaps found within earlier institutionalist studies with regards 
to power analyses within institutional functioning. The social positions of bricoleurs 
determine their ability to shape institutions, to allocate resources, and to impose moral world 
views. This ensures that the resulting arrangements reflect the interests of powerful groups. 
The latter are also concerned about ‘consolidating their interests across different domains of 
action’ (Cleaver and Whaley, 2018, p.10) – across different institutional settings, for example, 
within and outside project structures. Thus, existing power structures influence institutional 
building and functioning, making bricolage a way of reproducing inequalities in different 





outcome of those development interventions that seek to mitigate power asymmetries in the 
host context. For example, interventions intending to work with smallholder farmers might 
benefit the heads of small cooperatives, who are, by definition, the biggest farmers among 
the members. Institutional bricolage also pays attention to the ways through which invisible 
power hinders the ability of bricoleurs to contest prevailing structures. In the next sub-
section, I develop further how I conceptualise power in this research.  
Within this framework, I study how arrangements produced by projects are borrowed in two 
domains of action: in subsequent projects, and in other institutional settings in the prevailing 
context. In other words, the recurrence of project components beyond a project’s framework 
signifies the passage from ad hoc to durable. When bricoleurs borrow components from past 
projects in subsequent ones, they enable the building and reproduction of ad hoc 
development cooperation institutions. When they borrow components to act in other 
institutional settings of the host context, the project becomes part of the building and 
functioning of other institutions existing in the host context. It is the reappearance of ad hoc 
project institutional arrangements in other spheres of action that makes them durable. 
By project components (or pieces to be assembled by bricoleurs), I refer to arrangements, 
relationships, processes, and practices. As Olivier de Sardan (1988) suggests, the project is 
not only a technical package being offered, but also an organisation that proposes it, hence 
should be studied as such. This implies that, beyond the package, the project also introduces 
to the host context patterns of relationships and behaviour that are equally prone to be 
unpacked by hosts. Thus, arrangements are the ways in which projects enable participants to 
access resources and facilities which, in turn, enable practices. For example, the ways farmers 
access agrochemicals, agricultural material, and other resources. Relationships are how 
people interact: the patterns of social interaction within project spaces and that might be 
reproduced outside the project framework. On this point I focus, for example, on the kind 
of relationships between trainer and trainee, expert and beneficiary, farmer and 
administrator, and so on. Consecutively, relationships shape practices and processes. Simply 
put, processes are a series of actions or practices. Practices are the ways in which people do 
things, the technique farmers adopt to farm cotton (sow, plough, harvest), to deliver training, 
to conduct field visits, and so on. 
A project introduces into the context components that bricoleurs might borrow afterwards 
in later projects and outside the spaces of development cooperation – thereby going from ad 





bricolage is shaped by power relations within and outside projects, and between projects and 
the host context. 
2.1.4. Power relations from ad hoc to durable 
Bricolage as a process is a result of the power relations that govern social interaction in a 
given social space. Bourdieu provides a useful conceptualisation of power that can help us 
to understand how agency is construed differently in different spaces. For Bourdieu, one’s 
capacity to respond to the constraints and solicitations of one’s milieu is guided by the way 
society becomes embodied in forms of capacity and of structured propensities to think, feel, 
and act in determinate ways – this is one’s habitus (Wacquant, 2011, p.319). Practice is thus 
an unconscious process, meaning that agents might also act in favour of their powerlessness 
because of the naturalisation of domination through a process that Bourdieu calls 
‘misrecognition’, to describe ‘why individuals are sometimes not aware of their own 
subordination to powerful agents’ (Navarro, 2006, p.14). In these conditions, power for 
Bourdieu is relational and contingent to a specific social space (or field, in his theory) and 
moment in time. In other words, social spaces (a concept that I connect with social fields, 
arenas of struggle, social encounters, or locales, from different authors) have different power 
configurations, which in turn configure meanings, arrangements, relationships, and practices 
that might transfer to other spaces. There are three main elements related to power that are 
particularly important in this research: power is relational and specific to each social field; 
social fields are permeable among themselves and influence each other; social fields and 
habitus change through time. In the next paragraphs, I detail the application of each of these 
elements in this thesis. 
A social field, according to Bourdieu, consists of a social space structured according to power 
relations, objects of struggle, and rules that are taken for granted (Pouliot and Mérand, 2013). 
Thus, inasmuch as the recursiveness of development cooperation projects means they 
constitute institution, development cooperation also constitutes a social field, in Bourdieu’s 
terms, with actors positioned in the field according to the capital they possess, the rules that 
are taken for granted, and regularised practices (see Esteves and Assunção, 2014; Zoccal, 
2018). This approach sheds light on the positions of dominant and subaltern, or donor and 
recipient, that characterise aid and international development cooperation interventions. 
Alongside the consolidation of the field as such, meanings and rules become taken for 






Such an approach to power also acknowledges that the distribution of power differs across 
social fields, meaning that certain actors might be powerful in some fields but not in others 
(Gaventa, 2003, p.9), or might resist domination in one and express complicity in others 
(Moncrieffe, 2006, p.37). This means that the power relations within the international 
development field, materialised through projects, are different from the power relations in 
other social fields in which host actors navigate, as each field has its own rules, objects of 
struggle, and regularised practices, or a practical sense. Thus, actors’ capacity to act varies 
across fields. In this sense, as Bigo (2011) argues, the study of a field cannot be disconnected 
from the specific practices it enables. Wacquant (2016, p.66) explains that Bourdieu’s habitus 
encapsulates a social aptitude, implying that agents’ practices vary across time, spaces, and 
distributions of power. Hence, a project might be a space that reshuffles the distribution of 
power in the host context. For example, a rural extension agent might have a say on budget 
allocation within a project that has adopted a participatory mechanism, but no voice in his 
everyday function. This leads us to question the ability of one field to influence another, or, 
in other words, the capacity of a project to change the positions of agents in other social 
fields, outside the project boundaries. 
Research on power and participation has sought to understand how to create social spaces 
that are able to change other spaces. Gaventa (2006) acknowledges that power takes different 
dimensions in different spaces, according to who created them. He indicates that different 
spaces of power influence and permeate each other, arguing that the ‘transformative potential 
of spaces… must always be assessed in relationship to the other spaces which surround them’ 
(Gaventa, 2006, p.27). Along these lines, Cornwall has questioned the ability of participatory 
mechanisms to transcend the spaces they create. For her, whether participatory processes 
will be transformative depends on the ‘leverage they offer other kind of actors, in other 
spaces; and on the opportunities they afford for people to gain voices that they can go on to 
use in other arenas’ (Cornwall, 2002, p.20). The incorporation of these ideas into this research 
means that bricolage with project components outside project spaces is submitted to one’s 
agency in other social fields, since ‘bricoleurs have varying capacity and opportunities to 
shape institutions and are differently affected by their functioning’ (Cleaver, 2012, p.45). It 
comes to the question of who has the power to shape practices in different fields and thus 
to borrow components from ad hoc experiences; and how agency can be construed by 
borrowing elements from other fields. 
Bourdieu’s concepts also help in understanding the ability of one social field to influence 





their boundaries ‘are constantly being shaped and reshaped both by internal struggles and by 
external interventions of agents of other fields; the dynamic of the field is the rule, stability 
is the exception’ (Bigo, 2011, p.240). From this perspective, the power relations and relations 
of domination that structure social fields ‘must always be situated in time, space, and subject 
area’ (Bigo, 2011, p.232). Adopting this approach, Zoccal (2018) studied how the 
international development field changed with the emergence of Southern providers from the 
2000s. She argues that recipient countries were only able to expand the boundaries of the 
international development field when they acquired enough economic capital in the 
beginning of the 2000s. The economic development of emerging powers, such as Brazil, 
China, India, and South Africa, modified their position in the field, when, from being 
recipients, these countries became emerging donors and introduced divergent practices in 
traditional aid-hosting contexts. In doing so, they challenged traditions and the rules that had 
been taken for granted. This is an example of a change in power relations within the field 
because of internal struggles deriving from a new distribution of capital among agents. In 
this research, I take this further and analyse how the cotton sector was shaped and re-shaped 
by the international development field in different moments in time. Indeed, as we shall see 
in subsequent chapters, the position – and therefore the agency – of the actors engaged in 
the cotton sector changed over time. The power of the state, farmers, ginners, input 
importers, and foreign partners has varied. In this process of repositioning, the international 
development field, due to its importance within the cotton sector, played a role which I 
investigate in this thesis. I am also interested in how the power relations between dominant 
and subaltern – or between donor and recipient, project and context – evolved in spite of or 
in accordance with changes in the agents occupying those positions. 
To conclude this section, I see the power structure functioning as a prism mediating the path 
from ad hoc to durable through institutional bricolage. As a prism does to light, power 
unpacks and refracts institutional arrangements, distinguishing those that are discarded, 
incorporated into other institutions in the host context, or re-used in subsequent projects. 
As argued above and as subsequent chapters show, power structures (and fields and practices 
alike) are not static. It is precisely such changes – and the role of projects within them – that 
this research investigates. The diagram below (figure 2) serves to summarise my conceptual 
framework. 
The circles represent projects, inserted into an intermittent continuum that illustrates 
development cooperation spaces and ad hoc institutional arrangements. Projects appear as 





with and without projects’ influence, as the colour gradient of the background illustrates. 
The distinction between circles and the host context illustrates the project-context mismatch. 
The arrows represent the path from ad hoc to durable (A). The prism (B) is how the power 
structure shapes institutional bricolage, like a prism that refracts light. Note that the prism is 
different from one moment to another, illustrating the changes in the power structure of the 
host context. Passing through the prism, on the way from ad hoc to durable, some project 
institutional components disappear (1), while others become durable as bricoleurs 
incorporate them into other institutional settings within the host context (2) or borrow them 
in subsequent projects (3), building thereby ad hoc institutions. 
Figure 2: Conceptual framework 
 
In this section, I have presented the main concepts that frame my research. In the next 
section, I turn to the methods I adopted to approach these concepts. 
2.2. Methods: My research trajectory 
As I could not disentangle the methods from personal experiences, I begin with my 
encounter with Benin and my decision to study this country. I then dive into more detail 
about the process of data collection and analysis. 
2.2.1. My encounter with Benin 
Although I was in Haiti when the idea first came to me, I knew that I wanted to focus my 
research on a West African country. There, and particularly in Benin, I had had most of my 
professional experience as a development practitioner. I first went to Benin in 2010 when 














Geneva. I was contributing to the implementation of a project on sustainable tourism. One 
of the activities was to organise a study tour for Beninese public staff to Senegal. This 
required constant contact with Beninese people. Their explicitly positive reaction whenever 
I said I was Brazilian drew my attention. ‘We are like brothers then’, I remember hearing a 
few times from project partners. I knew close to nothing about Benin and how its history 
intertwined with Brazil’s. I became more familiar with this connection a few years after my 
first encounter. I was then a project analyst for the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and 
I was responsible for managing all technical cooperation projects we had with Benin. One 
of those was a project to record the material and immaterial Brazilian heritage in Beninese 
society. I learned then that the Bight of Benin had been an important slave port in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (well reported in Law, 2004). French, Dutch, English, 
and Portuguese outposts traded enslaved people that Dahomean kings captured in the 
hinterland. A fair share went to Brazil after crossing the ‘door of no return’ in Ouidah, a few 
kilometres east of Cotonou. From the second half of the nineteenth century, some freed 
people returned from Brazil and settled in their point of departure (Law, 2001; Ronen, 1975). 
The ‘returned’, or aguda, brought to the Dahomean coast many different aspects of Brazilian 
culture that are nowadays part of Beninese cultural heritage (Alem, 2005; Soumonni, 2001). 
The ‘Brazilian’, as the aguda came to be known, also formed a commercial elite, mainly 
because they had remarkable skills of negotiation that they used for exporting first ebony 
wood, then palm oil (Ronen, 1974). They thus became important landowners in the south. 
At the beginning of the French colonial administration, they were considered ‘almost white’ 
and were hired as public officials and intermediaries with other ethnic groups (Banégas, 2003; 
Ronen, 1975). Progressively, the aguda lost influence as more and more Dahomeans were 
instructed and permeated the colonial administration. The colony became the land of the 
akowé, the ‘evolved’, and the African Quartier Latin (as a reference to the neighbourhood in 
Paris in which the main universities and graduate schools are concentrated), exporting 
intellectuals instead of natural resources to other French territories. While the akowé led the 
movement for independence, the aguda were being pointed out as allies of the colonisers. 
The Brazilians were no longer an influential group, but their legacy can be easily found in 
Southern Benin, in the architecture of Porto-Novo and in the gastronomy, for example. I 
found this within development project spaces. 
Having worked with Benin with a number of organisations, I could not help noticing the 
different social relations I established according to the organisation I was representing. The 





austerity of relations when introduced as a UN consultant (saying that I was Brazilian always 
worked as an icebreaker though). This made me pay attention to the importance of 
relationships within development encounters, and of meanings and perceptions in regards to 
the partner country. These seemed to be based on elements that extrapolated that precise 
moment in time. Thus, history and historical links between countries and organisations 
shaped social relations and project processes. I thought then that this would have an impact 
on project outcomes. 
In this spirit, Benin emerged as a natural choice for the focus my research. In 2016, I went 
to Cotonou to deliver a workshop on international trade. I seized the opportunity to meet 
with Flavien,4 a former colleague from the Brazilian Embassy, who worked as liaison officer 
of the projects I used to manage. We spent a couple of hours talking about the progress of 
projects since I left ABC. We went through all of them, but the cotton project had the best 
stories. I was at ABC when we launched that project back in 2014 and organised the first 
activity in 2015. At the agency, it was known as the flagship project on agriculture with 
African countries. I became particularly attached to it because of my involvement in revising 
the project’s logical framework with colleagues. This had been one of the best professional 
experiences I had had hitherto. Hence my curiosity to know how the project was being 
implemented. 
At the hotel in Cotonou, Flavien shared with me the most recent events related to the project. 
One of them caught my attention. The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) was also implementing a cotton project in the same region and had contacted 
Brazil’s project team to exchange experiences. I remember there were stories we told in 
Brasilia about French experts who walked into a project’s experimentation field in Mali to 
check what we were doing there. Yet we never seemed eager to cooperate. No decision could 
be made in the field by project staff. This needed to be decided in Brasilia, via the official 
diplomatic channels. In the end, there would be no exchange between projects. Flavien 
seemed disappointed. Additionally, there were also German, Chinese, and Indian cotton 
projects being implemented, but there was no exchange among projects – at least none that 
he, as a liaison officer, was aware of. I wondered what his Beninese counterpart thought 
about that. The National Agricultural Research Institute of Benin (INRAB) was the host 
organisation for all these projects. It endures as projects continuously come and go, appear 
 





and disappear, in the host context. As Flavien told me the stories, many questions popped 
up in my mind: what does the INRAB take from each of those projects, past and present? Is 
there a difference between China, Brazil, Germany, India, the US? How different are 
relationships in each project? What really matters to host actors in the end? Additionally, the 
president of the Republic, who had been elected a few months earlier, was known as the king 
of cotton. There was thus a conjunction of several elements I wanted to study. I went back 
home with some notes and the decision made to focus on development cooperation in the 
cotton sector in Benin. 
2.2.2. Research design 
In Brighton, I defined the objective of my research as identifying traces of past experiences 
promoted by development cooperation projects in current institutional arrangements. In 
other words, I aimed to capture the flow of institutional arrangements, relationships, 
processes, and practices from projects to other domains of action. These other settings could 
be other subsequent or contemporary projects, or prevailing institutions, those not created 
by a project and existing beyond and across them. From that perspective, and based on the 
conceptual framework proposed in the section above, past experiences lay-up to constitute 
one’s practices. In the case of this research and of institutional bricolage, the sedimentation 
of past experiences is best illustrated by the idea of a repertoire of institutional components 
in which past experiences have a particular weight. In this sense, one draws from this 
repertoire to act and to react to everyday challenges. 
To investigate the sources of the social constitution of the agent – or of one’s repertoire of 
components – Wacquant proposes the following by building on Bourdieu’s practice theory: 
the synchronic and inductive approach consists of tracing connections between patterns of 
preferences, strategies, and practices across realms of activity. In my case, this involved 
observing practices within and outside project boundaries, and interviewing project 
recipients about the borrowing of project components in their enduring practices. The 
second approach, diachronic and deductive, involves the reconstitution of sedimentation of 
layers of disposition (which shape an agent’s practices) through the mapping of agents’ life 
trajectories (Wacquant, 2014, p.6). In this regard, I conducted repeated in-depth interviews 
with key informants to collect oral histories and to locate project experiences in their life 
trajectories. Wacquant also proposed a third approach, experimental, which involves 





was less able to adopt this approach. In my view, it requires longer periods of immersion that 
would not fit within the time frame of a doctoral programme. 
Setting boundaries 
The definition of the boundaries of my research was the object of various conversations with 
my supervisors, colleagues, and researchers who attended my seminars at IDS. The question 
was whether I should limit my research to a site and or to a specific time frame. The final 
decision was informed by the data I collected in Benin. With regards to the delimitation of a 
site, I collected data in the main cotton-producing districts, in the northern departments (see 
figure 5). These places were also where recent cotton projects focussed their activities. 
However, I could not restrain myself from expanding to other provinces where cotton is less 
predominant, and hence fewer cotton projects intervene. The activities I observed and the 
people I interviewed in Donga, Collines, Zou, and other southern departments helped me 
understand the importance of cotton to accessing rural credit, and its relative weight in 
northern departments, where it predominates. Additionally, the cotton sector is organised 
vertically, from local organisations in the districts to national representations that sit in 
Cotonou. In the economic capital, I conducted archival research and met with staff from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MAEP), INRAB and other relevant 
organisations, such as the AIC, national representatives from cotton growers’ organisations, 
NGOs, and staff from aid agencies. Considering the importance of the sector and the 
presence of cotton in the territory, a more specific site would have hindered more than it 
would have enhanced my research. 
Moving now to setting time boundaries, I also let the fieldwork experience inform the path 
I followed. Initially, I had thought of focussing exclusively on two recent cotton projects that 
were still being implemented in 2017/18. Hence, I would mainly focus on the most recent 
generation of projects. As field research progressed, I realised that limiting my analysis to the 
time frames of projects would be against my research objective, which seeks to bring forward 
context perspectives. I also realised that research participants navigated across past and 
present projects, as though they were contemporary. They would mix project names, donors, 
and objectives, and would refer to a project while intending to refer to another that was 
implemented ten, twenty years ago. For example, during an interview, a cotton farmer may 
situate the sources of current practice in their childhood and early experiences with family 
members, or, conversely, to project activities that they had attended in 1995 and again in 





research. Sometimes I wondered how I could be sure a participant was really mentioning one 
particular project and not another. Progressively, this became less of a problem and more an 
insight into project footprints in people’s trajectories and on the composition of their 
repertoire of dispositions. This meant that individual life trajectories and memories, which 
are variably influenced by development projects, set the time boundaries of my research. As 
such, field research in Benin constituted an important part of this research. 
Before I move to detail the data collection tools I adopted, it is necessary to lay out the 
definition of my sample. Within the context of the cotton sector in Benin, I targeted national 
boundary partners of development projects. These are stakeholders of the cotton sector who 
operate both within and outside the boundaries of intervention’s spheres of influence (Earl 
et al., 2001). This means that these actors frequently navigate among projects and prevailing 
institutions, either as focal points, managers, experts, or beneficiaries. In the cotton sector in 
Benin, these groups of actors comprise agronomists and researchers from the Cotton 
Research Centre of the National Institute of Agricultural Research (CRA-CF); cotton 
farmers; rural extension agents; and MAEP civil servants, civil society organisations, and staff 
from the AIC. These groups constitute what I refer to as host actors. Not to imply that they 
are homogenous. For the scale of analysis that I have adopted in this research, which focus 
on the interactions between projects and the host context, I mainly refer to host actors as an 
ensemble. Their differences and varied agency are brought forward as I examine how 
individuals interact with projects so to understand the main patterns of project-host context 
relations. It should also be noted that the cotton sector is predominantly male, with 
stereotypes still determining the participation of women (Alidou and Niehof, 2013). 
In addition, I went beyond the boundaries of projects and interviewed cotton ginners, who 
are key actors in the industry, but rarely involved in development projects. Although 
transporters play an important role in the functioning of the cotton sector, they engage in it 
intermittently and do not take part in its main organisation or structures. I then expanded 
my research to representatives from aid agencies and international organisations that were 
implementing cotton projects at the time of the fieldwork. Although they do not act across 
projects and prevailing structures, they provided me with important information on project 
management characteristics and on ongoing projects. Former and current staff from these 
organisations also helped me by providing information on past projects. I also included in 
my sample international development partners who have been implementing agricultural 
projects in cotton-producing areas without focussing on cotton. Because I adopted snowball 





also ended up interviewing representatives from national farmers’ unions and from local 
NGOs who intervened in agriculture, but not on cotton or in the main cotton-producing 
areas. The table below shows the breakdown of research participants by category. Further 
details on participants’ profiles can be found in appendices A.1 and A.2. 
Table 1: Number of research participants per groups of actors 
Groups of actors Number of interviewees  
INRAB Agronomists 9 
MAEP Extension Agents 9 
Cotton growers 18 
AIC 12 
Civil Society Organisations 4 
International Development Partners 17 
Total 72 
Number of participating 
institutions 15 
 
Interviews and focus groups 
I used interviews, and life stories specifically, as my main method of inquiry. In total, I 
conducted 83 interviews with 72 individuals from the categories described above. Each 
interview was recorded (with formal consent) and lasted for approximately one hour, except 
on a few occasions when one lasted for more than two hours. The interviews took place in 
very different settings, from under a tree in a field of cotton to offices in Cotonou. The 
choice of location was given to the interviewee after I presented the subject of my research, 
to enable them to make the most comfortable choice. Every research participant was 
forthcoming and flexible. As Herzog (2012) advises, I include my observations on the 
interview location and its meanings as an element of my research. For example, when 
conducting an interview in a farmer’s backyard (as illustrated in figure 3, right), the 
undisturbed activities happening in the background often served to provide further 
explanation about the broader context underpinning their activity as cotton grower and even 
added elements to the interview. On one occasion, for instance, a household member arrived 
from the field with a basket of neem seeds which led to a conversation about the use of neem 
seeds as organic pesticide and the farmer’s experience in a project activity. Similarly fruitful 
interruptions happened during interviews conducted in office spaces. In this sense, I kept 
the interview spaces permeable, allowing interference from participants’ everyday activities.  
The interviews were semi-structured and were all conducted in French, except for four that 





thesis from either French or Portuguese.5 For each cluster of informants, I had guiding 
questions organised in three sections: professional trajectory, current tasks, and involvement 
in cotton development projects. Towards the end, I focussed on their perceptions of the 
major changes they have seen in the cotton sector and on the role of their category in it. 
Following a first interview, I selected 23 informants with whom I conducted more than one 
and up to six interviews, in order to have an in-depth account of their life trajectory, and an 
oral history that focussed on their account of major historical events in the cotton sector, in 
order to understand how people observe the changes in their own practices and relationships 
in relation to a broad historical process (as suggested by Atkinson, 1998; Giles-Vernick, 
2006). I would use the intervals between interviews to review the topics covered in the 
previous meeting and identify the elements I wanted to take further on the next occasion. 
In addition to conducting multiple interviews with the same informants, I also organised 
focus groups and collective interviews. Following Beitin (2012) and Morgan (2012), here I 
make a distinction between focus groups that were content-oriented with participants from 
the same cluster, and collective interviews, where I focussed less on the topic and more on 
the interactions among informants from different socio-professional categories (e.g. 
agronomists, farmers, extension agents). The focus groups I organised were structured with 
clear objectives. With agronomists, I designed a script with collective exercises to identify 
and discuss their perspectives on development projects and on the contrasts with their own 
work environment (see figure 3 below, left). With farmers and extension agents, I focussed 
on their current practices while also gathering stories on old ways of growing cotton or giving 
agricultural advice. Collective interviews helped me see how agents from different clusters 
interacted among themselves. These settings gave me a glimpse of the power relations 
between actors that I explored further during individual interviews and participant 
observations. 
 










As a participant observer, I leant more on the complete observer position than on the 
complete participant, meaning that my main focus was observation, even though it 
necessarily meant a level of participation (O’Reilly, 2009). I observed and participated in 
farmers’ cooperative meetings, project field visits, cotton research monitoring field tours, 
farming activities, and AIC workshops and activities in the districts, such as the distribution 
of agricultural inputs (such as fertilisers, herbicides, and pesticides). For each activity, I was 
authorised by the organisers, I presented myself as PhD researcher, and I informed other 
participants on the objectives of my research. The observant participation in activities carried 
out within and outside projects boundaries showed me the distinction between these social 
spaces and their influence on relationships, processes, and practices. For example, I observed 
cotton researchers interacting with farmers and extension agents for three days in the bush, 
and with project partners in Parakou and Cotonou. I also accompanied farmers in their 
everyday practices in the field, in their meetings with extension agents and cotton researchers, 
and in the cooperatives, and could note the interaction with input suppliers during an AIC 
workshop on the correct application of chemical fertilisers. On these occasions, I was paying 
particular attention to the way they interacted, to those whose voice prevailed, to 
interruptions, and to the identification of possible social hierarchies between actors. 
Questionnaire 
Halfway through the field research, I started to see a pattern in the data I had been collecting 
through interviews, participant observation, and focus group discussions. My interviews had 
become more structured, with some key elements I wanted to explore further to validate 
some of my initial findings – namely the small footprint of projects among farmers. In this 





and complement the qualitative content, which constitutes the core of my research. The 
questionnaire revolved around the involvement of cotton sector actors in development 
projects. I deployed the questionnaire at the beginning of the cropping season, when farmers 
come to the cooperative headquarters in the district capitals to collect their agricultural 
inputs. This allowed me to reach to 240 respondents, of which 208 were cotton growers. A 
synthesis of results, the profiles of respondents, and the questionnaire’s flow chart can be 
found in Appendix A.3. The results served as an accessory tool that I use on a few occasions 
in chapters 4 and 5. 
Secondary sources 
I used documentary analysis in conjunction with the above methods. I adopted a critical 
approach (as described in Wooffitt, 2005), in the sense that I examined the way the 
documents relate to the broader social structures of the host context, and their role in the 
production and reproduction of power relations. 
The documents I studied were mainly secondary data from public sources. They included:  
- Programme documents: project documents, reports, evaluations, strategic papers, 
communication documents, policy briefs, assessment reports, brochures, pamphlets, 
and other relevant documents produced by the programmes. 
- Government of Benin sources: strategic plans, legal documents, economic reports, 
census reports, development programmes, archives. 
- INRAB documents: policy briefs, reports, manuals, archive of past cooperation 
partnerships. 
- Documents from national organisations (cooperatives, associations): constitutions, 
forms, minutes, reports, pamphlets, brochures. 
Many of these documents are available online through the organisations’ official websites. 
For example, the majority of project documents and reports in the online repositories of the 
World Bank and CIRAD are open access. During field research in Benin, I visited the 
physical archives of the MAEP, the INRAB, and the documentation centres in the districts. 
My main objective was to find documents related to past projects. However, despite the help 
of the staff, only recent project training materials were available. People who were involved 
in projects advised me to ask current and former staff for project documents instead of going 
through public archives. Cotton researchers, MAEP staff, and CIRAD staff positively 





also shared documents that helped me understand the functioning of the cotton sector and 
the broader context in which projects intervene. In the same vein, I also had access to 
Lasdel’s library in Parakou, where I was hosted during fieldwork. The figures below present 
examples of documents I collected during field research. 
Figure 4: Documentation found in the documentation centre in Banikoara (left) and a cooperative of cotton growers’ 
accounting ledger (right) 
  
2.2.3. Access to field research: Reflections on fieldwork and 
positionality 
I spent eleven months in Benin, from October 2017 to August 2018. I was based in Parakou, 
a city situated in the north, where cotton is predominant. The Beninese branch of the 
Laboratoire d’Études et de Recherches sur les Dynamiques Locales et le Développement 
Local (Lasdel) hosted me as a visiting researcher. They provided an office space, which 
allowed me to have daily contact with local researchers and students from the University of 
Parakou, who also used the centre’s facilities, and the opportunity to engage in rich dialogues 
and seminars. The northern region (composed of the departments of Alibori, Atacora, 
Donga, and Borgou – see map in figure 5 below) is where the CRA-CF has its headquarters 
and many experimentation fields, since the Northern region is where cotton production is 
concentrated (see figure 5). The AIC also has a regional office in Parakou, where the actions 
directed to northern departments are coordinated. From Parakou I was able to reach cotton 
farmers in the main cotton-producing districts, such as Banikoara, Kandi, Péhunco, and 
Bembereke. In addition, the geographic position of Parakou enabled me to visit districts 
where cotton is not as popular, but still important, such as Bassila and Boko. These villages 
are, to a certain extent, neglected by development partners working on cotton. 
Because I had worked on a cotton project before, as I mentioned above, my first contacts 
were with former colleagues and project focal points in Benin. As a recruiting strategy, the 
snowball method is particularly useful in cross-cultural research settings (see Liamputtong, 





I started field research by meeting former project contacts as soon as I landed in Cotonou. 
They suggested names in Cotonou and in the northern districts, where I would spend most 
of my time. I am extremely grateful for INRAB and CRA-CF staff in Cotonou and in the 
districts for connecting me to other groups of actors, such as the AIC, extension agents, 
farmers, and development partners, all around the country. Thanks to them, I already had 
meetings scheduled when I arrived to settle in Parakou. 
However, at the beginning of my fieldwork, I was particularly concerned about bias resulting 
from my positionality and my method of accessing research participants. The contacts that 
my former colleagues suggested were strongly linked to the project I used to work on. I 
found it difficult to disentangle myself from that project. At times, participants thought that 
I was still involved in the project. They would ask me to liaise with Brasilia or introduce me 
to new people as working for the cotton project. As a result, sometimes I felt resistance from 
participants in regards to speaking openly about their experiences within projects. 
Progressively, as my stay in Parakou lasted and after multiple meetings and interviews, I 
started to feel that they saw me more as a curious researcher than as a project manager. 
Conversely, at Lasdel, I was only a researcher studying cotton projects in general. This helped 
me overcome some limitations of snowball sampling (Liamputtong, 2010). Cotton has been 
studied by local researchers, and in the centre’s library I found sources I could not find 
elsewhere. The centre’s director at the time, Cather O. Z. Nansounon, had studied ‘cotton 
from below’, as the title of his book suggests (Nansounon, 2012). We held various informal 
‘corridor’ meetings in which we discussed the progress of my fieldwork and he suggested 
contacts in Banikoara, his hometown and the main cotton producing district. Thus, I could 
combine contacts coming from project partners and from Lasdel researchers. In this sense, 
my stay at Lasdel and relationships with the staff there were very important for me and my 
research. Additionally, I kept a journal in which I reflected on how my positionality affected 





Figure 5: Map of Benin 
 





Although my contacts with Lasdel brought some diversification to my sample, I remained 
open to exploring what my presence in the field provided. The extract from my field journal 
below explains how I got to my first interview with a farmer in a village located a few miles 
from Parakou. 
I was a little frustrated and lost. I felt the need to diversify my contacts. One 
day I crossed the road in front of Lasdel to go for a walk in the Albarika 
neighbourhood. I needed to find a place to make photocopies of the 
information sheet and consent form. When I got on the first street, on the 
other side of the road, I bumped into Magloire, who was washing his 
motorbike in a small stall. I had met him a few days before at Lasdel, because 
one of his relatives works there. He is the kind of guy who sticks on you, calls 
you regularly, wants to be with you only to know a bit more about distant 
places and cultures. He is a development broker as well. He has worked with 
several projects in the past, mainly on health, and now he works in a local lab 
conducting water analyses. The lab had been built by a German cooperation 
programme that ended a year ago. He has also helped foreign researchers 
(mostly Germans) who stayed at Lasdel. I said I was going to make 
photocopies. ‘I’ll go with you!’ he said. After making a hundred copies I 
invited him for lunch. He didn’t seem busy and had to wait for his motorbike 
to be washed anyways. Over lunch he asked me many questions about my 
research and said he could help me getting to the villages to see cotton fields 
and meet cotton producers. Sure, why not. The next day we would go to a 
rural village 20km north of Parakou. 
The village is a village-rue on the road that goes from Parakou to the north of 
Benin and Niger. Arriving there we met his friends at the market that lies 
along the main road, the heart of the village. After the cordial greetings he 
asked an elderly man where the closest cotton fields were. This was our first 
idea: to see the fields and, eventually, bump into a farmer. They directed us 
to a group of people sitting a few meters from there, specifically to the Doyen 
of Boko, a short and chubby 60-year-old man. He says he does know where 
to find cotton fields and he would take us there, but he has run out of fuel. 
‘With a bottle of fuel, we can make it… it’s not far’. He goes to find his bike, 
I pay for fuel, and we take the road again. After a few hundred meters on the 
main road we turned left, straight on a small muddy pathway in the middle of 
fields of maize, yams, beans, and soy. 
We passed through two isolated Fulani6 villages, in the middle of the bush, 
kids playing, women cooking, and men taking care of livestock. Magloire 
started to become impatient with the road. In some parts he had to roll with 
his feet on the ground because of the sand. ‘He said it wasn’t far! Eh! How 
far it is?’ He yelled through the fields. ‘One should always be suspicious when 
a peasant says it is not far…’. ‘Not far, not far’ the Doyen yelled back. ‘The 
road turns right, then left, and we get there’. And we wouldn’t. And Magloire 
kept complaining. Eventually we’d get there anyways… 
 





And we did. Compared with CRA-CF experimentation fields, this one was 
cheerless. I asked if I could take some pictures. No objection. Then we finally 
started talking. 
‘I don’t grow cotton anymore… this field belongs to a relative.’ 
‘But have you?’ 
‘Yes! A lot… long-time ago…’ 
I had my recorder, my consent forms, and information sheets and I thought 
that a spontaneous interview wasn’t such a bad idea. He accepted. We went 
back to the tree where we had parked the bikes and we made ourselves as 
comfortable as we could. 
After the interview, the Doyen connected me to other cotton farmers in the village who were 
also active members of the cotton growers’ village cooperative. I ended up returning there 
many times to meet the Doyen and members of the cooperative. Thanks to this, I was 
informed of cooperative meetings and introduced to more farmers. They also suggested 
contacts above them in the farmers’ organisational structure. I could then move from the 
village cooperative to the district and department organisations. I combined those 
suggestions with the ones I received from the AIC branch in Parakou. They shared contacts 
of the heads of cotton farmers’ village and district cooperatives in Banikoara, Bembereke, 
Kandi, and Péhunco. I would usually go on trips for a few days in those villages, where I 
would meet the heads of cooperatives, AIC staff, and Centre Action Régionale pour le 
Développement Rural (CARDER) extension agents. As a result, if at first my contacts in the 
south connected me to people in the north, eventually research participants in the north 
suggested names and organisations in the south. 
Regarding my positionality, from all these interactions, I found myself in a place that I had 
never been before. To a certain extent, I expected to be more an outsider within (Beoku-
Betts, 1994), but the identity that I was assigned had put me, at first, in the outsider category 
only. Some of my interlocutors saw me as the privileged ‘White Man’ coming from the Global 
North to study Africa. I am Brazilian, from a lower middle-class family in a marginalised 
region of Brazil, and having a mixed racial background, I have become used to being either 
white or black according to the space in which I find myself. In Benin, I was only white. In 
Parakou and in the smaller rural districts of northern Benin, I was maybe the whitest person 
some children had seen that week, or month, or year. 
Being an outsider conducting cross-cultural research might be an obstacle to gaining access 
to research participants or to establishing trustworthy relationships (Liamputtong, 2010). 





more doors, as people were eager to talk and share their ideas. I encountered more difficulties 
in interviewing foreign actors than Beninese people. This made me think of the 
internalisation of powerlessness and Frantz Fanon’s study of the inferiority complex, in 
which he observes psycho-pathologies in colonised people resulting from decades of 
violence and cultural, social, and economic domination (Fanon, 1952, 2002). This perspective 
also gave me insights into the effects of structural power relations in the cotton sector, 
because the voluntaristic engagement in this research faded as the participant profile moved 
nearer the cotton elite. For instance, ginners and foreign staff were those with whom access 
was more difficult. By contrast, farmers saw me as an opportunity to have their voice heard 
in Cotonou and abroad, or expected me to teach them better agricultural practices. For some 
time, I did not know how to react in order to avoid knowledge extractivism and sustaining 
the dichotomy between informants and knowledge producers (Burman, 2018). Although I 
could not answer their requests completely, I could not ignore them either and I was eager 
to make any contribution I could. I had the privilege of being part of different social networks 
and decided to connect farmers to other actors of the cotton sector, when requested and 
authorised by both sides. My internal commitment with my research collaborators also gave 
me strength to take this project towards completion – not that I envision this research having 
a particular direct impact on them, but perhaps a contribution to my project manager fellows 
and the next projects they and myself are going to implement. 
2.2.4. Piecing together life stories, project documents, and literature 
At the end of my stay at Lasdel, I had the privilege of presenting a summary of the activities 
I had carried out in front of an audience composed of CRA-CF agronomists, Lasdel 
researchers, and extension agents. I also presented a preliminary structure of the data analysis, 
which evolved to become the present thesis structure. The debate that followed my 
presentation between members of the audience provided me with additional insights about 
the multiple perspectives emerging from the context. Back in Brighton, I started piecing 
together the data. 
I started by transcribing interviews and coding them according to the preliminary structure 
while I was still in Benin. I used the NVivo software for transcribing and coding interviews 
and field notes. As I transcribed, I would update the inventory of projects and make 
consistency checks with other sources, such as project documents that I could find online or 
that were provided by interviewees. It was an interesting process to match the list of projects 





I was making. I could see discrepancies and confusions that told me about the place of 
projects in a participant’s life trajectory. This contrasted with the cold Excel table that I was 
compiling with data, project objectives, partners, and budget. 
In addition to the mismatch between the different types of sources (oral and written), I also 
had to deal with different perspectives from different actors. Sometimes, cotton researchers, 
farmers, and extension agents would mention distinct time frames or objectives with regards 
to the same project. In such cases, written sources helped me make connections and 
understand how the same initiative imparted distinct experiences to different groups of 
actors. In this sense, although the period of implementation I present in brackets after the 
acronym of each project is from the written sources, I by no means intend to discard 
informants’ lived temporality of projects.  
Against this background, I continued to expand my review of the literature and the 
conceptual framework. I found that the concept of institutional bricolage provided the best 
framework for my research. Guided by Cleaver and Whaley (2018), the analytical framework 
around processes, power, and meanings helped me make sense of the complexity of the 
institutional arrangements I observed. In particular, the emphasis on meaning, built from 
past experiences, allowed me to approach the multiple perspectives I had gathered from 
Benin. I was also invited to further engage with the literature on power and its different 
forms, and on the role of history in everyday actions.  
Before I dive into how projects’ ad hoc components become durable, let me provide 
background information about the constitution of the cotton sector in Benin. Such is the 
topic of the next chapter, before I turn to the investigation of project footprints in the host 





CHAPTER 3. THE HOST CONTEXT: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COTTON 
SECTOR SINCE 1960 
In the first chapter, I demonstrated the contradictions in development cooperation projects 
that sustain the project-context mismatch. I showed that there have been several attempts 
from development cooperation theorists, practitioners, and policy actors to transform the 
development cooperation landscape. The expansion of SSC initiatives also contributed to 
the debate because it was underpinned by a context-similarity claim between provider and 
host countries, thus apparently eliminating the mismatch. However, all that seemed 
insufficient to enable a development project to trigger structural change in a host context. 
While an ascertainment of the inabilities of development cooperation projects could lead to 
a complete neglect of project relevance, I propose that project processes can be better 
understood when perceived from the perspective of host contexts. 
When I arrived in Benin to implement a cotton project, I knew little about the crop and its 
meaning in Beninese society. I did not know the projects that had preceded mine, nor the 
impact they had had. Therefore, to understand how a context comes to incorporate project 
arrangements, it is necessary to begin by introducing the historical trajectory of the host 
context and its constitution as a field of struggle in which development cooperation takes 
place. A field is constituted through time and is centred around an object of struggle – in this 
case the earnings from cotton. The dynamics of the field are governed by the power relations 
between agents engaged within the field, which in turn regularise practices and create rules 
that become taken for granted. This chapter presents the cotton sector as a field in such 
terms and identifies the waves of cotton projects in that process. To do so, this chapter is 
structured in four chronological stages of the constitution of the field, from colonial rule to 
the emergence of a national private elite. 
3.1. Cotton under colonial rule beyond independence 
We do not know precisely when cotton started being cultivated in West Africa and in the 
territory that today corresponds to Benin (Kriger, 2005). Levrat (2008) and Beckert (2015) 
suggest that cotton has been produced on a small scale and traded in West Africa at least 
since the eleventh century. If the cotton boll was already spun and woven to make cloth, its 
production remained extensive, used small inputs, and mainly served the local market. This 
configuration remained stable for a long time, as Manning (1980) suggests in his report into 





The French colonial administration was the trigger that made farmers prioritise cotton 
instead of other crops, including food crops for subsistence. However, it took some time for 
that project to be consolidated and for France to become the main actor in the cotton sector 
in Benin. Cotton had become a strategic sector for France, which was seeking to become 
less dependent on US cotton, then responsible for 31 per cent of world production 
(FAOSTAT, 2020). But cotton production in French West Africa remained low because of 
the lack of concrete policy and investment from the colonial administration (Levrat, 2008, 
pp.51–56). In Dahomey, cotton production gradually increased, reaching its peak at 3,000 
tonnes in 1950, but palm oil and palm kernels remained the biggest export goods (Manning, 
2004, p.233). 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the French colonial administration strengthened 
the project of intensifying cotton production in the African colonies due to the shortage of 
cotton supply in the international market and the increasing dependency on US lint (Levrat, 
2009). In 1946, France created the Research Institute of Cotton and Exotic Textiles (IRCT) 
and, in 1949, the French Company for Fibre and Textile Development (CFDT) to develop 
the cotton industry in the French colonies. The IRCT and CFDT were designed to work 
together: one in the development of varieties through experimentation, and the other 
functioning as a technical cooperation organisation to promote the recommended ‘technical 
itinerary’,7 consisting of a formalised sequence of practices, based on previous agronomical 
research, that informs the most productive farming techniques for a given crop and context 
– in this case, the technical itinerary was drawn up based on IRCT findings (Clouvel et al., 
2007). Both organisations became important drivers of the development of the cotton sector 
after the country obtained independence in 1960. 
Dahomey became independent in August 1960, following a gradual and peaceful process 
that started with local elections in the 1950s (Magnusson, 1997; Morgenthau and Behrman, 
1984). After independence, the political configuration remained articulated around three 
ethno-regional parties (Decalo, 1973; Staniland, 1973), consolidated during the previous 
decade, but which could not bring political stability: between 1960 and 1969, Dahomey had 
eleven presidents, six different constitutions, and twelve coups d’état (Bierschenk, 2009, 
p.348). 
 





Meanwhile, the economy – and the cotton sector – seemed pushed to the background. The 
political forces continued to bargain, but this produced very little discussion on the major 
economic or constitutional issues (Staniland, 1973, p.501). Despite the political prominence 
of the national elite, the akowé, or ‘evolved’, successive civilian and military governments were 
not able to disentangle the ties with the country’s former coloniser. Instead, the signature of 
multiple cooperation agreements kept independent Dahomey dependent on resources from 
the former colonial power (Anignikin, 2010, p.35; d’Almeida-Topor, 2002). 
This dependence was reflected in the first national development programmes. Sotindjo 
(2008) demonstrates that there was a continuity of development plans before and after 
independence, with French financial support. In the postcolonial context, French experts 
continued to be regarded as enablers of change in the agricultural sector because of their 
longstanding experience on the ground (Keese, 2019, p.269). Notwithstanding 
independence, the same labour relations that had prevailed under French rule remained after 
independence, with land expropriation and coercive labour now tagged as ‘cooperativisation’ 
through the support of World Bank projects (Le Meur, 1995; Keese, 2019). In the cotton 
sector, the IRCT and CFDT continued to fund research and technical assistance, alongside 
the French Société d’Aide Technique et Coopération (Company of Technical Assistance and 
Cooperation) (Gergely, 2009; Kpadé and Boinon, 2011; Sotindjo, 2008). 
It is in this context that cotton projects appeared in the cotton sector in Benin, as a 
continuation of colonial rule. Dahomey signed with France, in 1963, its first cotton-related 
bilateral project, financed by the French Aid and Cooperation Fund and implemented by the 
CFDT. The five-year project focussed on the Borgou province, which corresponds today to 
the Alibori and Borgou provinces (see map on figure 5), and aimed to multiply national 
production fourfold. The Support to Cotton Production Project (1963–1969) can be 
considered to have made cotton the main cash crop in Benin. After several trials from the 
nineteenth century onwards of making Dahomey a reliable provider of raw cotton (Labouret, 
1928), the French succeeded in intensifying production and organising the industry through 
this project: production increased considerably from 2,000 tonnes in 1960 to 24,000 in 1969, 
and so did yields from 270kg/ha in 1961–1965, to 600kg/ha in 1965–1967, and 825kg/ha in 
1968–1970 (Kpadé and Boinon, 2011; Levrat, 2009; World Bank, 1972). Such increases 
became possible because of the introduction of new high-yield varieties and the provision of 
fertilisers. These elements combined increased outputs per hectare. Additionally, the project 
converted almost every farmer into a cotton producer by limiting access to farm credit 





institutional foundations that would shape the cotton industry over the next decades, 
organised around an integrated system in which one company – the CFDT – was responsible 
for the provision of inputs, rural extension services, marketing, and ginning (Clouvel et al., 
2007; Fontaine and Sindzingre, 1991). 
The implementation of the integrated system led to the creation of the National Agricultural 
Cotton Company (SONACO) in 1971 to replace the CFDT. The objectives of the company 
were ‘to prepare and execute cotton development programmes, which would include other 
crops cultivated by cotton growers, and to provide cotton growers with extension services 
and primary marketing facilities’ (World Bank, 1972, p.35). However, the overall 
management of the sector remained under the CFDT’s control. A joint venture between the 
CFDT and the government of Dahomey established that the government would fix the 
prices and provide the ginning facilities, whereas the French company would be responsible 
for buying and collecting seed cotton, processing, and exporting. Profits – or losses – from 
operations would be split 80%-20%, respectively. 
Against this background, enjoying favourable market conditions for cotton and the crop 
becoming more and more popular amongst farmers, the government requested a loan from 
the World Bank to consolidate the cotton sector. The Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (WB-
ZBC) took off in 1972. It was only the second World Bank project in the agricultural sector 
in Dahomey (the first one focussed on the development of palm products and food crops in 
the south). The objectives remained the same: to increase cotton production in both 
provinces of the north through the expansion of cotton fields and of the number of growers. 
Other crops, when in rotation, would benefit from the residual effects of fertilisers applied 
to cotton. The project would also provide institutional support for SONACO, build two new 
ginneries, rehabilitate roads, and prepare an agricultural diversification project (World Bank, 
1972).  
The project strategy was very clear. While the World Bank provided funds and experts, the 
collaboration with French institutions would ensure the operationalisation of the activities 
and reinforce the institutions the French had set up in Dahomey. In this context, the cotton 
sector was controlled by a consortium involving France and the World Bank, because 
Beninese actors were more concerned with political stability and lacked the necessary capital 
to change their position in that field. 
This configuration changed from 1972. Until then, the ethno-regional political forces had 





alternating in power, the three forces, headed by old generations of akowé, became unable to 
contain the claims of the young elite, headed by students organised in unions in the main 
cities. Senior military personnel, who had also been involved in coups and in government 
since 1963, joined patronage networks and the bargain for public resources (Allen, 1992a). 
Additionally, the country could not overcome the public debt crisis. The economic crisis, 
stemming from an increase in public expenditure on jobs and subsidies to the palm sector, 
caused political instability, which paralysed public institutions and impeded public action 
(Igue and Soule, 1992, pp.41–42). This situation fostered dissent among young akowé and 
members of the military, who could not see opportunities for promotion within the existing 
political structures, increasing inter-generational rivalries. The alliance of young ‘evolved’ 
with young military officials from the north of the country led to the putsch of 1972 that 
brought to power Major Mathieu Kérékou. In an interview with French television in that 
same year, Kérékou explained the coup by arguing that ‘Dahomey is too small to have three 
presidents’ (Institut National de l’Audiovisuel, 1972). The arrival in power of Mathieu 
Kérékou affected the power relations in the cotton sector, as cotton had become an object 
of struggle for the emerging postcolonial state. Table 2 summarises the projects of that period 
from independence until Kérékou’s coup d’État. 
Table 2: Cotton projects in Benin from 1960 to 1980 
PERIOD OF 




Support to Cotton 
Production Project 
Projet d’Appui à la 
production du coton 
France 





Projet Zou-Borgou de 




To increase seed cotton production in 
the Zou and Borgou regions, through 
increasing the areas under cotton and 








To provide technical assistance 
services to SONAGRI 
 
3.2. The emergence of the state as the cotton power 
Kérékou’s regime took some years to consolidate, time needed to establish and reinforce the 
alliances with students and the military and to co-opt the peasants from the north (Allen, 
1992a; Genné, 1978). In its first years, Kérékou’s regime seemed like ‘the natural continuation 
of the process of erosion of civil and political authority in the Dahomey’ (Decalo, 1973, 





Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology and put forward a rupture with French rule as the 
new national independence policy (Allen, 1992a, 1992b). In 1975, the Republic of Dahomey 
became the People’s Republic of Benin. 
This change in the command of the state had a direct impact on the structure of the cotton 
sector. The consolidation of Kérékou’s regime meant a rupture with the CFDT in 1975. The 
government dismembered SONACO (then managed by the CFDT) into two different public 
companies, each of them responsible for a segment of activities: SONAGRI for the 
organisation and supervision of production, and SONACEB for commercialisation, 
marketing, and export (Kpadé, 2011). Rural extension services were strengthened with the 
expansion towards northern departments of the Centres d’Action Régionale pour le 
Développement Rural (CARDER), created in 1972 (Ayo, 1984). The Groupement Villageois 
(GV), local cooperatives of producers, also gained importance in the same period. The GV 
became responsible for the organisation of production at the local level, from the distribution 
of fertilisers to the collection of harvested cotton (Fok, 2010). The earnings from cotton 
production were spent locally on literacy programmes, schools, and infrastructure (Kpadé, 
2011). 
This new political and economic context reshuffled the positions of power in the cotton 
sector. In this new configuration, foreign actors and cotton projects lost relevance. In 1973, 
a year after its launch, the WB-ZBC project was flagged as a ‘problem project’ by Washington 
when a supervision mission found that public companies were taking control over extension 
services, cotton marketing and ginning, and lint and seed sales: 
During the first year of implementation, Government decided to entrust 
immediately the responsibility for field operations of cotton extension 
services, ginning and primary marketing to SONACO, and lint marketing to 
the Société Nationale de Crédit Agricole et de Commercialisation (SOCAD), 
the agricultural export agency. This action was in violation of the agreement 
that the two French technical assistance agencies (CFDT and SATEC) would 
maintain control of field operations, under the SONACO umbrella, and that 
CFDT would retain control over cotton marketing, for much of the project 
period, though in all cases gradually shifting responsibility to Beninoise and 
Government institutions. The action resulted in a de facto suspension of 
disbursements for nine months… Most of SATEC and CDFT expatriate 
staffs left the project in 1974 [sic]. (World Bank, 1978, p.2) 
As a result, the World Bank temporarily suspended disbursements, but decided to keep the 
project running in order to remain present in Benin. In 1977, the World Bank released the 
remaining funds to pay for the debts that SONAGRI had contracted in the meantime. The 





first on institutional support through a Technical Assistance Project (WB-TAP, 1977–1982) 
(World Bank, 1977). At this point, the World Bank took over as the main development 
partner. France’s influence faded as CFDT was no longer responsible for overseeing cotton 
production, but France remained present in the meantime by co-funding the WB-TAP 
project, agricultural research, and infrastructure works. The project evaluation report 
considered WB-TAP another failure, as it only resulted in the drafting of the subsequent 
projects. World Bank evaluators claimed that the project was overoptimistic in a contested 
political context, failing to strengthen SONAGRI’s financial management and to reinforce 
the CARDER’s extension services (World Bank, 1978). 
As the government took control of the sector, its interventions gave cotton another meaning, 
diverging from the intensification path promoted by both France and the World Bank. 
During Kérékou’s first years, the cotton sector was no longer a priority for either the 
government or farmers. Kérékou’s agricultural policy focussed primarily on food crops, and 
a reduction in the purchase price of seed cotton discouraged farmers from remaining engaged 
in the sector (see in figure 6 the decline of area cultivated with cotton from 1975). Farmers 
prioritised subsistence crops over cotton, opting mainly for maize, a crop well-known by 
farmers and which requires less intensive labour (Kpadé and Boinon, 2011). Overall, during 
the early years of Kérékou’s regime, the agricultural sector lacked investment to accompany 
the government programmes in the villages (Ayo, 1984; Allen, 1992a). In fact, the whole 
economic programme failed. The regime created a plethora of parastatals and government 
positions that increased public debt to unprecedented levels (Allen, 1992b). As such, in 1979, 
Benin was in a deep economic crisis, similar to pre-1972 levels. Protests were held in 
Cotonou, while farmers continued to move away from cotton production to food crops. At 
the beginning of the 1980s, as a reaction to the situation, the government entered a phase of 
policy revision in which cotton would again become a key economic asset. 
The second decade of Kérékou’s regime was characterised by political openness, pragmatism, 
structural adjustments, and permanent crisis that ultimately led to its fall (Banégas, 2003). 
Despite the Marxist-Leninist state ideology, the social and economic policies never reflected 
this paradigm, it being more a rhetoric and public language to gain the support of students 
at the beginning of the revolution than a political and economic programme (Ayo, 1984; 
Allen, 1992a; Banégas, 2003; Genné, 1978). The economic crisis of the end of the 1970s, 
triggered mainly by public debt, precipitated the end of the regime. In the cotton sector, this 
entailed a reconfiguration of the positions in the field and the return of development projects 





Two World Bank provincial rural development projects, one in Borgou and another in the 
Zou department, were signed with the aim of putting the cotton sector back on the path of 
intensification and of the ongoing attempt to simulate the Asian Green Revolution in Africa 
(Fontaine and Sindzingre, 1991; Frankema, 2014; Harrison, 1987). These projects occupied 
a position in the cotton sector that was left vacant during the 1970s. With the power to 
reshape the rules, these projects developed certain aspects of the cotton industry that became 
institutional anchors for further developments. For instance, the projects introduced the 
necessary resources for building new infrastructure, such as ginning plants in the new cotton-
producing zones in the north, which presented more favourable climate conditions for 
cotton growing. The projects also strengthened the CARDERs and rural extension services 
by providing training and material support to the regional branches. With regards to cotton 
production, the World Bank projects stimulated the general use of chemical fertilisers, which 
were hitherto very low in African countries and corresponded to the Bank’s strategy for 
agricultural development in Sub-Saharan African states (Fontaine and Sindzingre, 1991; 
Morris et al., 2007). While the provision of agrochemicals provided a remarkable boost to 
cotton production, it also increased the cost of production and thereby farmers’ dependence 
on rural credit. The project also supported the liquidity of the rural credit scheme. As a result, 
the World Bank projects of the 1990s consolidated the input credit system, tying cotton 
production to rural credit on one hand, and rural credit to cotton production on the other. 
Table 3: Cotton projects in Benin in the 1980s 
PERIOD OF 




Borgou Province Rural 
Development Project 
(BPRDP) 
Projet de Développement 
Rural dans la Province du 
Borgou 
World Bank 
To improve rural incomes and promote 
exports by improving and diversifying 
production of the principal crops in the 
Borgou province, primarily cotton and 
maize 
1982–1992 
Zou Province Rural 
Development Project 
(ZPRDP) 
Projet de Développement 




To improve rural incomes by increasing 
the production of cotton and food crops 
1988–1993 
Borgou Province Rural 
Development Project II 
(BPRDP II) 
Second Projet de 





To consolidate and improve gains from 
Borgou I and to begin a programme of 
sectoral adjustment 
 
In contrast with the first attempt at intensification, national companies – instead of the 





the regime re-established the previous integrated system and merged all state-owned cotton 
companies into one: the Société Nationale de Promotion Agricole, SONAPRA. Only rural 
extension services remained separate and continued to be managed by the CARDERs 
(Kpadé and Boinon, 2011; Sinzogan et al., 2007). SONAPRA brought together all other 
services, from the provision of inputs to collection, marketing, ginning, and export. In 
addition, the company became responsible for managing the price stabilisation fund. The 
fund had been set up by the CFDT and served to protect the purchase price of seed cotton 
from oscillations in the price of cotton on the international market. By bringing the fund 
management under SONAPRA’s structure, the project sought to reduce the mismanagement 
that had left the CARDERs and SONAGRI with considerable debts (World Bank, 1982). 
Since that course correction, the cotton sector consisted of an organised industry with a 
guaranteed purchase price, through which farmers could access the agricultural inputs they 
needed but were without the means to acquire. As a result of the reorganisation of the sector 
and the greater availability of fertilisers promoted by the World Bank projects, cotton 
production increased considerably (see figure 6). Additionally, cotton became inescapable 
for both the government and farmers (Nansounon, 2012). The arrangements put in place in 
that decade endured and consolidated patterns of relationships between actors of the cotton 
sector that remained until the moment I carried out this research.8 
Paradoxically, while the cotton sector demonstrated some strength – resisting the oversupply 
crisis of 1984–85 that drew down most of the stabilisation fund – Kérékou’s regime became 
progressively unable to sustain alliances. Additionally, the country was undergoing a 
profound economic crisis in other sectors. The public sector never stopped growing 
(Kérékou promised a job for every graduate in the country) (Allen, 1992a), and the oil glut 
of 1982 made Nigeria close its borders, preventing both legal and illegal trade with Benin. 
The closing of the borders considerably reduced customs revenue, which composed the main 
source of cash for the government, since Benin had prioritised re-export of goods from and 
to its neighbours instead of investing in national production (Igue and Soule, 1992). Hence, 
the good levels of cotton production were not enough to circumvent a drastic reduction of 
export revenues that affected the government’s ability to pay the public debt (Zekpa and 
Dossou, 1989; Nwajiaku, 1994). Consequently, the crisis reduced the capacity of the regime 
to co-opt both old and new elites and thus hindered the postcolonial pact that provided 
political stability based upon clientelism and patronage (Bierschenk, 2009, p.343; Vittin, 1991, 
 





p.109). Kérékou was progressively losing the support of all factions, including the army, and 
simultaneously the dissident groups were making pro-democratisation alliances. According 
to Morency-Laflamme (2015), elite factionalism and large numbers of ‘passive allies’ were 
decisive factors in the calling of the National Conference that would provide the basis for 
the democratic transition. At this point, even Kérékou had declared his support for political 
reform (Banégas, 2003; Establet, 1997; Gisselquist, 2008; Morency-Laflamme, 2015). 
Figure 6: Cotton production, area cultivated, and yields from 1964 to 1990 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Levrat (2009) and Ton (2004) 
3.3. The multiplication of agents in the field after the democratic 
transition and the liberalisation of the cotton sector  
The National Conference of the Active Forces of the Nation9 held in 1990 was the first and 
most successful of its kind to be organised among French-speaking African countries 
(Gisselquist, 2008; Heilbrunn, 1993; Robinson, 1994). The conference marked Benin’s 
‘democratic renewal’; it gathered representatives from the very different social categories and 
established the rules for the elections to be held in 1991. Kérékou ran but lost the presidential 
ballot in the second round to Nicéphore Soglo. Benin’s experience is considered an example 
of democratic transition, being at once the only conference to overthrow a former dictator 
(Heilbrunn, 1993); an outcome of non-violent resistance (Bayer, 2018); and leading to 
democracy being widely accepted by the population as the best system of governance (90% 
 
















































































































































































of interviewees) and preferred over any other kind of government by 70% of interviewees in 
2005 (Gisselquist, 2008; IREEP, 2005). 
The democratic transition might have been exemplary, but national politics remained 
characterised by clientelism and supported by the patronage networks of before and during 
the regime, in which material benefits were closely related to access to political power 
(Banégas, 2003; Bierschenk, 2009). The exercise of power and its representations 
corresponded to traditional features, to a specific moral economy of power in which 
clientelist distribution is a civic virtue and a principle of democratic legitimacy (Banégas, 
1998, 2003). While the Beninese people seized the promise of democracy, the cotton sector 
was cut loose from the public sphere, becoming an experimental field for liberalisation. 
A vast programme of privatisation was intertwined with democratisation. In the agricultural 
sector, the strategy of the main international partners went from the support to state-led 
input supply to pushing for the adoption of neoliberal reforms (Fok, 2010; Morris et al., 
2007). The cotton sector in Benin became a ‘laboratory’ for a deep reorganisation, unlike any 
other in West African cotton-producing countries (Fok, 2010; Kpadé and Boinon, 2011), 
leading to, once again, a reshuffling of the positions in the field with the arrival of new agents. 
The first component to be privatised was the supply of agrochemicals in 1992 (Salé et al., 
2003). Ginning and commercialisation would be opened progressively from 1995 by 
auctioning SONAPRA’s ginning plants and authorising the building of new ones by private 
companies. The World Bank, in particular, supported the transition towards a market 
economy through the fragmentation of the integrated system. Such were the objectives of 
the last two World Bank provincial rural development projects, while a broader Agricultural 
Services Restructuring Project (1991–2000) would complete this process. 
In this emerging configuration, France’s position remained distant from the overall 
management of the sector but the country kept financing cotton research – a branch of 
activity that the French never ceased to support despite the retreat of the CFDT in the late 
1970s. The National Agricultural Research Institute (INRAB), created in 1992, became the 
main beneficiary of French intervention in the agricultural sector (see table 4 for a summary 
of cotton projects in that period). As we shall see in subsequent chapters, three projects 
implemented in the period 1996 to 2006 – PARAB (1996–2000), PADSE (1998–2005), and 
PARCOB (2001–2006) – made a major contribution to developing the technical capacity of 






Table 4: Cotton projects from 1996 to 2001 
PERIOD OF 
IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT TITLE 
DONOR/ 
PROVIDER  OBJECTIVE 
1996–2000 
Support to Benin’s 
Agricultural Research 
(PARAB) 
Projet d’Appui à la 
Recherche Agricole au 
Bénin 
France 
To support cotton research development 
1998–2005 Benin Organic Cotton 
Project (BOCP) 
The Netherlands 











To help farmers prepare and implement 
changes in their production systems and 






Projet d’Appui à la 
Recherche Cotonnière au 
Bénin 
France 
To support cotton plant breeding 
programme in Benin 
On the organisational side, the arrival of multiple private actors in input supply and ginning 
operations overwhelmed the sector. As a consequence, with the dismantling of the integrated 
system, the need for coordination became apparent. In 1999, cotton growers and ginners’ 
private associations agreed, backed by the government, to create the Association 
Interprofessionnelle du Coton (AIC) (Ton, 2004; Saizonou, 2015, 2008). The AIC is a private 
association composed of the three main segments of the sector: ginners, cotton growers, and 
input suppliers (the relations between which I examine in later chapters). The main objective 
of the AIC is to ensure the production of seed cotton through the effective supply of 
agrochemicals, collection, and transport, and the commercialisation of seed cotton, from the 
farms to the ginneries. The AIC is also responsible for negotiating subsidies with the state 
and defining the technical itinerary along with the INRAB/CRA-CF. As a result, the AIC 
became an important agent in the cotton sector, while the role of the state diminished. 
The progressive liberalisation of the cotton sector continued without decisive intervention 
from the government. Cotton production was increasing regularly, with continued expansion 
of cultivated areas. Private ginners, input suppliers, farmers, and the country as a whole 
benefited from favourable conditions in the world market, helped by the CFA Franc 
devaluation in 1994. Between 1994 and 1998, export of cotton lint doubled in volume and 
value, while the price of Beninese lint increased by 19 per cent (Ton, 2004). Similarly, the 
purchase price of seed cotton paid to farmers also doubled, from XOF 100 to XOF 225. As 
a result, cotton became more and more important for the country’s trade balance and 





merchandise export value (INSAE, 2019). It was also cultivated by 35 per cent of farmers 
and by 68 per cent of those living in the northern departments (Minot et al., 2001). Cotton 
constituted a reliable source of cash and an entry point for accessing agrochemicals that could 
be applied to food crops. This also means that cotton became an important social good in 
the villages, in particular in the Northern departments. Mongbo (1995) and Nansounon 
(2012) demonstrate that cotton contributed to generate social structures in the village, such 
as cooperatives and markets, as well as the linkages between the state and village economy 
and politics. Accordingly, rural living conditions improved in the 1990s, particularly for 
cotton growers, who benefited from the devaluation of the CFA Franc and the expansion of 
the sector (Alia et al., 2017; Minot et al., 2001; Siaens and Wodon, 2008). 
However, the growing dependence of farmers on cotton showed its risks in 2001, when the 
price in the world market reached its lowest levels since the Great Depression (Baffes, 2005). 
Cotton prices, like other commodities, present a downward secular trend (Harvey et al., 
2010), illustrated in figure 7 below. The decrease in cotton prices averaged 0.2 per cent per 
annum between 1960 and 1984 and accelerated to 0.9 per cent between 1985 and 2002 (EC, 
2004). Minot et al. (2001) estimate that the 39 per cent decline in 2001 resulted in a reduction 
in the rural per capita income of Beninese cotton farmers of seven per cent in the short run, 
and five to six per cent in the long run (Minot et al., 2001, p.465). Indebted farmers 
abandoned the sector while others diversified their production and remained within the 
sector because of the production system still depended on cotton for accessing fertilizers 
(Alidou and Niehof, 2013). Meanwhile, the price of agrochemicals increased more than the 
price of purchase of seed cotton. Input suppliers were unable to distribute fertilisers and 
herbicides via the formal networks before the start of the season. This situation encouraged 
the creation of ‘breakaway networks’ for input supply, along with the commercialisation of 
seed cotton (Salé et al., 2003; Sinzogan et al., 2007). The recently created AIC proved unable 





Figure 7: The long-term decline of cotton prices in the world market from 1900 to 2017 
 
Source: MacDonald and Meyer (2018, p.13) 
In this context of crisis, development projects again became relevant. The World Bank 
Cotton Sector Reform project (PARFC, 2003–2008) aimed to increase productivity and 
efficiency through a successful transition from a monopolistic production system to a system 
based on competition (World Bank, 2008, p.3). The main component was to provide support 
to the AIC in organising the sector and to help the association in concluding the privatisation 
of SONAPRA’s ginning plants. Alongside this, a French project, PARSC (2004–2009), was 
a complement to the PARFC. It focussed on providing training and funding for AIC staff 
to develop an internal communication unit. Table 5 presents main aspects of both projects. 
Table 5: Projects in support of the AIC at the beginning of the 2000s 
PERIOD OF 




Cotton Sector Reform 
(PARFC) 
Projet d’Appui à la Réforme 
de la Filière Coton 
World Bank 
To increase cotton sector productivity and 
efficiency through a successful transition 
from a monopolistic production system to 
a system based on competition 
2004–2009 
Support for the Cotton 
Sector Reform Project 
(PARSC) 
Projet d’Appui à la Réforme 
du Secteur du Coton 
France 
To support the AIC and the development 
of a high-performing sector co-managed 






While these projects supported the AIC and its coordination role, the continued decrease in 
prices in the world market since the mid-1990s exposed the vulnerabilities of cotton in the 
international trade architecture. It came to light that subsidies for farmers in developed 
cotton-producing countries were creating distortions in the global market. In particular, this 
concerned US subsidies, with the US accounting for 30 per cent of world cotton exports in 
2001/02 (Watkins, 2002). In that cropping season, US cotton subsidies amounted to 3.9 
billion dollars, causing a loss of 1.4 per cent of GDP and of nine per cent of export earnings 
in Benin (Watkins, 2002). In this context, while Brazil (another major world producer of 
cotton) opened consultations on US cotton subsidies, starting a dispute settlement process, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad, the biggest African cotton producing countries, came 
together and created the C4 group to voice their claims at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Cotton became a ‘hot topic’ at the WTO during the organisation’s fifth Ministerial 
Conference held in Cancún, Mexico, in 2003. Representatives from the C4 requested the end 
of subsidies and support from the international community for the development of their 
cotton sectors (OECD/SWAC, 2006, p.26). Paragraph 27 of the Conference’s final 
declaration suggests a sectoral initiative on cotton, in which WTO members ‘recognise the 
importance of cotton for the development of a number of developing countries and 
understand the need for urgent action to address trade distortions in these markets’ (WTO, 
2003, p.6). The declaration also invites the Director General to consult with development 
partners ‘to direct programmes toward diversification of the economies where cotton 
accounts for the major share of their GDP’ (WTO, 2003, p.6). 
Subsequently, the number of projects in the cotton sector in Benin exploded in the 2000s, 
with eighteen projects being signed in less than fifteen years, once again transforming the 
structure of the cotton sector. Indeed, the upsurge of projects meant the arrival of new 
partners in a sector where France and the World Bank had long been dominant. Germany 
and the United States became major actors, with the projects USAID-WACIP, USAID-
C4CP, and COMPACI leaving a solid footprint in the hosting context, as we shall see. The 
post-2004 period also saw SSC acquire a strong momentum with projects from China, who 
had surpassed the US as world’s largest producer of cotton, India, second world producer, 
Brazil, and Turkey. 
When the wave of projects coming from Cancún arrived in Benin (see table 6), both the 
cotton sector and projects were very different from their predecessors. Projects were more 
specific, and the cotton sector had a consolidated private and public national elite that 





Table 6: Cotton projects post-2004 
PERIOD OF 
IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT TITLE 
DONOR/ 
PROVIDER OBJECTIVE 
2006–2010 Cotton Made in Africa 
(CmiA) 
Germany 
To improve the living conditions of 
African smallholders and promote 











Producteurs de Coton 
The Netherlands + 
SNV 
To contribute to the sustainable 
improvement of the cotton sector in 






Amélioration de la 
Compétitivité du Secteur 
Coton 
The Netherlands + 
IFDC 
To develop and promote improved 
technologies to fight soil depletion in 
cotton producing systems 
2006–2013 




USAID + IFDC 
To strengthen small farmers’ capacity 
to reduce poverty through improving 
management of resources 
2007–2013 
Support for Textile 
Cotton Sector Project 
(PAFICOT) 
Projet d’Appui à la 
Filière Coton Textile 
AfDB 
To contribute to reducing poverty in 
rural areas through sustainable 
improvement of cotton subsector 
productivity 
2009–2013 
Support to Cotton 
Sector in C4 
Countries (C4-Brazil) 
Brazil 
To contribute to improving 
competitiveness in the cotton supply 






To help smallholder famers to 
increase their productivity of cotton, 
therefore increasing their income and 
improving their living conditions 
2011–2014 
Cotton and Organic 
Cotton around 
Protected Areas (CAP 
Bio) 
Coton et Cultures 




To improve the living conditions of 
the population living around the 
natural reserves while protecting the 
environment 
2012–2017 Support to Cotton 
Production in Benin 
China 
To support Benin in agricultural 
technologies, in having access to 





Programme for Africa 
(TAP Cotton) 
India 
To strengthen the competitiveness of 
cotton value chains by facilitating 
transfer of knowledge and technology 
from India 
2013–2015 COMPACI phase II Germany 
To contribute to improving the 
livelihoods of smallholder cotton 
farmers 
2013–2015 Cotton Farming 
Project 
Turkey 
To support cotton production in 
Benin through training and provision 
of equipment 
2014–2017 CAP Bio II Switzerland 
(Helvetas) 
To improve the living conditions of 
the population living around the 
natural reserves while protecting the 







To strengthen the capacities of 






Gestion Intégrée des 
Ravageurs par les 
Traitements sur Seuil et le 
Fractionnement des 
Récoltes pour une 
Production Cotonnière 
Durable en Afrique de 
l’Ouest 
2014–2018 Four Country Cotton 
Partnership (C4CP) 
United States 
USAID + IFDC 
To improve food security in targeted 






Practices for Cotton 
in C4 Countries and 
Togo (C4+Togo) 
Brazil 
To contribute to increased 
competitiveness in cotton value 
chains in C4 countries and Togo 
2015–2016 
Technical Innovation 





Innovations Techniques et 
Africanisation des 
Indicateurs de Durabilité 
de la Culture du Coton 
France + EU 
To sustainably improve 
competitiveness, value added, and 




in Cotton Producing 
Areas (TAZCO) 
Projet d’Appui à la 
Transition Agro-
Écologique des Zones 
Cotonnières du Bénin 
France 
To improve the incomes of family 
farms in the cotton producing areas 
of Benin 
3.4. The emergence of a national private cotton elite 
The story of the liberalisation of the cotton sector and the emergence of a national private 
cotton elite is also Patrice Talon’s story. In the 1980s, Patrice Talon, born in Abomey, was 
living in France, where he decided to join the import/export business with West African 
countries. In 1985, he founded the Société de Distribution Intercontinentale (SDI), 
specialising in the supply of agrochemicals to West African countries. In 1987, his company 
won SONAPRA’s call for bids to supply agrochemicals to cotton growers in Benin. His 
business grew progressively and when the state opened ginning activities to the private sector, 
Talon submitted a bid for three new factories, which he won along with other national 
entrepreneurs. Eight new ginneries opened between 1994 and 1997, while SONAPRA’s 
ginning factories (ten in total) were being progressively auctioned off. At the AIC, although 
he never became president of the board, ‘[Talon’s] voice was preponderant; when he speaks, 





ginners’.10 Throughout the 2000s, Talon bought shares in SONAPRA’s ginning factories and 
was the only bidder for acquiring them all. With thirteen ginneries and the control of the 
input supply market, Talon became Benin’s king of cotton. 
The importance of cotton in the Beninese economy put Talon in an influential position at 
the highest level of the state. Thomas Boni Yayi was elected President of the Republic in 
2006, openly supported by Talon. Boni Yayi’s promise was to reinvigorate the sector by 
providing high-quality inputs – agrochemicals and seeds – and reaching a total 600,000 
tonnes of seed cotton per year (Saizonou, 2015). At the beginning of the 2000s, the 
fluctuations in the price of cotton on the international market prevented the AIC and the 
government from fixing the purchase price at the beginning of the cropping season, 
constantly calling growers’ representatives to renegotiations. Falling prices on the 
international market trickled down to farmers, leading hundreds of thousands of farmers to 
become indebted and subsequently opting out of the sector. The ongoing crisis led to a 
vertiginous drop in production in 2005/06 – from 427,159 tonnes in 2004/05 to 190,886 
tonnes the following year (AIC, 2017). Boni Yayi’s promises required a deep restructuring of 
the sector and of the then weakened AIC. In 2007, Boni Yayi decided not to renew the 
framework agreement between the government and the AIC, practically supressing the 
private association and, by extension, bringing an end to his alliance with Talon. 
In the AIC’s place, Boni Yayi created a Transitioning Committee to manage the sector and 
to organise the call for tenders for the import and distribution of agrochemicals (World Bank, 
2008; Saizonou, 2015). Surprisingly, the Committee awarded the tender to SONAPRA, who 
had been barred from tenders since 1999, and to the Caisse Centrale d’Achats d’Intrants 
(CAI), a new state company run by public officials close to the president. However, none of 
these companies was able to provide the inputs to growers on time. 
The CEO of SONAPRA called the whole world, practically. He went to 
Estonia, in almost every country where you could find inputs. But he failed 
to find a single gram of fertiliser! He did not have a gram of input that could 
cost the price he had offered… There was therefore a total difficulty for [the 
2007] cropping season. In May, there was not yet a gram of input into the 
territory, as the cropping season started in June. The situation was completely 
blocked. They did not know what to do. And at the Ministers’ Council, Yayi 
Boni asked how to get out of this, and he was told: there is only one person 
who can save Benin, there is only one person, no one can do it but Talon. 
Nobody else!11 
 
10 AIC#8, 18/04/2018. 





In May 2007, the government decided to concede and asked for help from Talon, who 
retained enough fertiliser in his warehouses to save the cropping season. It is not clear 
whether he anticipated the situation or not, but he agreed to provide his stock under certain 
conditions: the re-establishment of the AIC, the reopening of SONAPRA’s privatisation 
process, the full engagement of the state in recovering the sector, and the privatisation of the 
CAI. In July 2008, Talon’s recently created ginning company, SODECO, acquired the totality 
of SONAPRA’s shares. Thus the liberalisation process led to the concentration of the sector 
in the hands of one businessperson. 
In this context, the donor community – which had grown as a result of the increase in the 
number of cotton projects post-2004 – created a specific task force to ‘analyse the ongoing 
reforms and react to the requests from the government and cotton stakeholders’ (Wennink 
et al., 2013, p.24). The task force succeeded in shaping the new approach to the development 
of the cotton sector that the government released in January 2009, following the 
reconciliation and re-establishment of the AIC. The Association launched in that same year 
the Sanitation and Recovery Project for the Cotton Sector12 (PARFCB) to reinvigorate the 
cotton sector, direct funded from the national budget, without donor’s commitment. 
However, Talon’s project for the revival of the cotton sector was unsuccessful in the long 
run. National production struggled to reach pre-crisis levels and even dropped to 136,958 
tonnes in 2010/11. On 29 April 2012, Boni Yayi’s administration suppressed the AIC and 
re-established SONAPRA, requisitioning SODECO’s ginneries and delegating to the public 
company the overall administration of the cotton sector and the provision of inputs. The 
rupture between Boni Yayi and Talon marks the apex of the crisis in an affair that includes 
misappropriation of public funds, attempted poisoning, and exile in France (Duhem, 2012; 
Zoumènou, 2012; ‘Bénin : le talon d’Achille de Boni Yayi’, 2012; ‘Bénin : Patrice Talon, 
itinéraire d’un ambitieux devenu paria’, 2012; Groga-Bada, 2013; Boko, 2016; Duhem, 2016b; 
Michel, 2016; Duhem, 2016a). In 2016, Talon made his great return to the country as a 
candidate for the presidency. He was elected president at the expense of Yayi Boni’s 
candidate, former prime minister Lionel Zinsou. In the first month of his term, Talon re-
established the AIC and allowed his company, SODECO, to retake control of the ginneries 
(Duhem, 2016a).  
 





Since 2016, Talon’s group has controlled all activities within the cotton sector – except 
production, to a certain extent – monopolising the supply of inputs, the collection and 
processing of raw cotton, and the export of cotton lint. The ICA-Group and SODECO 
owns 16 out of 18 ginning factories in Benin – and the other two sell their quota to 
SODECO. This means that Talon’s companies process and export all the cotton that is 
produced in the country. As the president, he also has control over the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (MAEP) and its Direction of Agriculture, who authorise 
the technical itinerary stipulating the way farmers grow cotton and the quantity of fertilisers 
they should buy, and INRAB’s cotton research.13 
Despite the recovery in the period when the AIC was on hold, cotton production never 
reached Yayi Boni’s promised goal of 600,000 tonnes during his years in office. However, 
following the reorganisation of the sector from 2016 under Talon, production reached 
598,000 tonnes in the 2017/18 cropping season. According to stakeholders, the success of 
the cropping season had little to do with an innovative agricultural technique, the object of 
most development projects. The national record was due to the effective and timely 
distribution of inputs and collection of seed cotton. In addition, the effective organisation of 
the 2016/17 cropping season attracted more farmers to join the cotton sector, increasing 
considerably the areas planted with cotton. Indeed, the increase in production in this season 
is a consequence of the expansion of fields, rather than improvements in productivity, since 
the national average yield remained around 1.1 tonnes per hectare. Figure 8 below shows the 
evolution of cotton production and area cultivated in Benin since the beginning of the 
liberalisation of the sector in 1990. 
 





Figure 8: Cotton production, area cultivated, and yields from 1990 to 2018 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Levrat (2009), Ton (2004), AIC (2017), and Ouin-Ouro (2018a) 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the development of the cotton sector in Benin since 
independence. The process of consolidation of the cotton sector as a social field shows that 
the positions of actors have changed through time, but also that projects have been a regular 
part of it. In the beginning, foreign partners governed the field through projects, creating the 
rules, defining practices, and reaping the benefits. Changes in other overlapping fields 
affected that structure. After years of political instability, the state took control of the cotton 
sector, imposing different arrangements and practices as it occupied the centre of the field. 
These arrangements did not last, and development partners again occupied a dominant 
position. If cotton projects strengthened public power at first, projects promoted 
liberalisation and therefore a new structuration of the field later on. This analysis has shown 
that Benin hosted many projects that had varying amounts of weight in shaping the 
development of the cotton sector. Figure 8 below illustrates the evolution of the number of 
projects and major events. The trajectory of projects also shows how connected or 
disconnected from the context and from international dynamics, such as fluctuations in the 
cotton price and initiatives in the international arena such as the C4, these projects can be. 
Given this background, I next turn my focus to the ways in which the host context came to 
incorporate project components in the constitution of the cotton sector. I begin in the next 































































































































































































Figure 9: Timeline of cotton projects and major national events 
 
Author’s own illustration 
COTTON PROJECTS
Independence of the Dahomey Set-up of Village Cooperatives SONACEB+SONAGRI=SONAPRA Creation of AIC C4 Initiative at the WTO Record of production and area cultivated
Set-up of the input supply system Cotton price collapses Sharp decline of cotton prices
Creation of SONACO National Conference Yayi Boni cancels agreement with AIC
MAJOR EVENTS Kérékou's Coup d'État Start of gradual privatisation of the cotton sector SONAPRA unable to provide inputs
Gov. takes over CFDT Input supply segment open to competition Talon saves the campaign and requests a new agreement
Marxist-Leninist Regime End of SONAPRA's purchase monopoly SODECO acquires 100% of SONAPRA
Change of Agricultural Policy focusing on food crops 1994-1997: 8 ginning factories built AIC recovery plan (PARFCB)
SONACO becomes SONAGRI+SONACEB CFA devaluation boosts production CVPC: new organisation of cooperatives
Expansion of CARDERs Yayi Boni supress AIC
Strengthening of GVs Talon elected President
Restablishment of AIC
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CHAPTER 4. THE WEIGHT AND DISTINCTION OF PROJECT INSTITUTIONS IN 
THE HOST CONTEXT  
As observed in chapter 3, the cotton sector has been the object of struggle for various actors 
throughout the years. Amongst this, development projects were regularly present and 
became part of the history of cotton in Benin. Since independence, foreign support took the 
shape of development aid that lived through the Leninist-Marxist regime of Kérékou, and 
beyond the progressive liberalisation that started in the 1990s. This history also shows that 
both the cotton sector and development projects have changed through time. However, the 
role of projects in these changes remains unclear. 
Although projects and cotton alike seem to have failed in making Benin a major world 
producer and cotton a consistent route out of poverty, it seems unlikely that projects have 
had no effect whatsoever in this context. Project evaluations assess the success or failure of 
projects on purely managerial indicators, such as timely implementation, disbursements, 
number of beneficiaries, etc., which reflect more the life of a project than its effects on the 
broader context. In other words, project assessments are project-centred (or donor-centred, 
as suggested by Manning et al., 2020). A context-centred approach could provide a different 
account of the effects of development cooperation throughout history. This involves leaving 
aside the success-failure binary and adopting a different perspective, observing projects from 
the point of view of host actors who navigate from one project to the other.  
From a historical perspective, project experiences, although ad hoc, constitute layers of 
experience that compose the repertoire of practices on which actors can draw to react to 
everyday challenges. In this chapter I focus on project experiences as a piece of the 
institutional repertoire. In the first section, I explore the life trajectories of key informants to 
locate and weigh project experiences. From there, I analyse the distinctive features of projects 
in comparison with other enduring institutions of the host context. In chapters 6 and 7, I 
explore where, by whom, and under what conditions project pieces are being re-used.  
4.1. Project footprints in life trajectories 
As a project manager myself, I had only known the host context through the lenses of 
projects, from within project arrangements. Somehow, while implementing or evaluating 
projects, my perception of the context appeared as a mise en scène. When I arrived in Benin to 
conduct field research, I was eager to observe the backstage area, the everyday life of project 
beneficiaries when they were not acting as ‘beneficiaries’ of any project. The idea was to 





footprints of past experiences in cotton projects. I was curious to know what happens behind 
the curtains of projects, and what elements there have been taken from the ‘onstage’ area. I 
first realised that projects did not appear to be as present in people’s lives as the volume and 
value of projects had led me to naïvely expect. I found out the different weight of projects, 
both across multiple groups of actors and within each one of them. I confirmed the 
assumption I had that ginners barely get involved, while nevertheless being a group of actors 
it is impossible to dismiss given their importance in the value chain and their influence within 
the AIC. The ginners I interviewed overlooked development projects or were not even 
acquainted with their dynamics. Likewise, high-level AIC and MAEP staff placed projects in 
a marginalised slot in their agenda, recognising them but not fully engaging with project 
activities, and even less with projects results past the period of implementation.14 This heavily 
contrasted with the narratives one can find in project documents, with the desired objectives 
and expectations of donors and providers that they will change the whole sector. In this 
section, I provide a different account of project stories by sharing the life trajectories of 
actors within the cotton sector who have been, in different degrees, involved in project 
activities. Their stories contribute to situating and weighing project experiences in their life 
trajectories. From their experiences, I also draw some common features of projects that 
sustain the project-context mismatch and that I examine in the second part of this chapter. 
4.1.1. George, a cotton farmer who is open to innovation but rarely 
participates in project activities 
Although farmers are the main and largest group of actors in the cotton sector and the 
designated final beneficiaries of projects, they do not get as involved in project activities as 
CRA-CF researchers and extension agents. The majority of cotton farmers who responded 
to the questionnaire (147 out of 208) had never participated in a project activity, while many 
others were not sure, and only one sixth of them remembered attending training (mostly on 
farm activities) provided by a development partner. Strategic meetings and country visits 
remained the kind of activities reserved for researchers and extension agents. 
 
14 During an interview with a high-level AIC staff member, I asked about a certain project that it was 
claimed had worked with the AIC. The interviewee suddenly interrupted me to call his assistant: he had 
just remembered that that project was organising the final restitution workshop that same day and that he 
needed to respond to the invitation with a letter saying he could not attend. He looked at me and thanked 
me for reminding him of that activity, which he considered important, something he would attend if he 





I met George during a tour with CRA-CF researchers in the Alibori department. In his fields, 
he hosts a demonstration plot that the CRA-CF uses to try out varieties of cotton. It was not 
easy to access his farm. We met him standing on the side of a gravel road, somewhere south 
of Kérou, waiting for us. He came into the vehicle with us and showed the way. After a short 
while he indicated that we should turn right and we entered the bush. We were going very 
slowly and it was shaky because of the dry land and ridges. Big cashew trees also posed a 
challenge for the driver, who had to find ways to circumvent them. About ten minutes later 
we saw the first fields of cotton. There we stopped. ‘Now we have to go by foot.’ We walked 
for fifteen minutes more among cotton plants. George had just finished harvesting, but the 
plants were still standing there, devoid of leaves and flowers. After a while, we saw his house, 
in the middle of the bush, a small building surrounded by a clear space where chickens and 
guinea fowls were kept. A cow was lying down under a tree not far away. As is common in 
the north of Benin when a guest arrives, George offered us water from the well in a big cup 
from which we all drank. Finally, he took us to the demonstration plot, situated a ten-minute 
walk from his house. We were all impressed by his fields of cotton. It was the end of the day 
and we had visited many other fields in the region, but none as tall and well managed as his. 
The CRA-CF team was excited by the idea of getting reliable results for their research. 
George was also very happy: it had been a good year. We exchanged phone numbers and 
agreed that we would meet again soon. When we were on our way back to the vehicle, George 
ran after us holding a live chicken in his hands. ‘This is for your dinner and to thank you for 
coming.’ A few months later, I met with George in Parakou. He had just received the final 
payment from the AIC and had bought a brand-new motorbike. We talked for a while and a 
few weeks later we met again in Kérou, the main village of his district. 
George had started farming cotton about six years before we met. Before that, he grew other 
crops, such as maize and soy, while his father was responsible for the cotton fields. Because 
of the crisis of production in the 2000s, his family stopped growing cotton, until Boni Yayi 
reinvigorated the sector by cancelling the debts of the farmers. From that time on, George 
became responsible for the family business. He grows cotton because ‘cotton comes with 
advantages… with cotton, they bring us the inputs we need. Without cotton, we can’t buy 
fertilisers because we need to pay cash, but with cotton we take it first and then one pays 
with the harvest.’ 
In 2018, George cultivated eighteen hectares of cotton – which puts him among the biggest 
cotton farmers of Benin. A portion of the cotton fertiliser he gets through credit is used in 





and the reallocation of fertiliser from cotton to food crops are the main motivation to 
continue in the cotton sector. If there were other crop chains with the same structure, he 
would opt for maize because  
it is very hard work to grow cotton. You need to make a lot to earn 
something, at least ten hectares… If you make two hectares, you will have 
debts… If we make cotton, it is because we don’t have a choice… If you 
grow maize, how are you going to do it? You don’t have the money to pay, 
we don’t have cash… It is hard… If we could find fertilisers through maize, 
we would do maize, it is easier than cotton and we cannot eat cotton. 
Despite this pragmatic relation with cotton, George took it seriously, as his farming output 
attested. He is one of those farmers that CRA-CF researchers and extension agents call 
‘farmers who are open to innovation’. The demonstration plot he hosts keeps him directly 
connected with cotton researchers and with agricultural techniques he would otherwise only 
access through the scarce rural extension service. In exchange, CRA-CF researchers 
recommend George when projects are looking for participants. ‘It is a way of paying them 
back’, an agronomist told me after our visit. 
In spite of being a model farmer, George has only attended one training session within a 
project structure, organised by the GIZ. 
It was in 2013… or 2014, or 2015… I don’t remember… they taught us how 
to plan, how to spend our money… I mean, they told us to write down what 
you put in your field as expenses, so one can know at the end if one has 
gained or lost… if you don’t write it down, you will never know if it is 
profitable. 
This experience emerged as an important but isolated event in his life, inasmuch as he did 
not adopt the management instructions he received. By contrast, in the exchanges we had 
had previously, he had said he applied different conservation agriculture techniques, some 
of which had only been shared by development projects. Indeed, for a couple of seasons at 
the time of our interview, George had been building compost pits, which he fills with the 
old cotton plants and with animal dung. He learnt this from the CARDER and the AIC, 
whose agents used his fields to demonstrate the technique to the farmers of the village. This 
was part of the AIC’s programme for the intensification of production, launched in 2017. 
Following the training, he adopted the technique and has had good results. Yet George also 
acknowledged the difficulties and the reasons many of the people who came to the 
demonstration at his field did not adopt it: ‘because it is difficult, and they lack material and 
livestock’. In his case, despite the satisfactory outputs, the organic fertiliser he gets from the 





George’s experience in the cotton sector demonstrates that cotton is an option by default 
even for the biggest farmers. Often, the biggest producers are also the ones who occupy 
leadership positions in the cooperatives, who are open to innovation, and who are well 
connected to extension agents and researchers. This suggests that farmers like George are 
the most prone to get involved in development projects. However, projects remain a 
marginal experience in his life. It is a distinguishable one, but innovations reach the field 
predominantly through the prevailing structures, such as the CARDER, the AIC and the 
CRA-CF. 
4.1.2. Gildas, a rural extension agent under pressure 
Gildas became a Vegetal Production Advisor (CPV) in 2007. Although his position requires 
him to provide advice on all crops, he has always worked in cotton-producing districts. He 
comes from the Donga department but has had most of his experience in the 2KP, having 
worked in the three districts that give the name to the region: Kérou, Kouandé, and Péhunco. 
As is the case with many of his colleagues, he has moved many times in the country, working 
in places in which he does not speak the local language.15 He took training to become a CPV 
in Parakou. This was organised by the AIC and the government through the CARDER. 
‘There were also some projects, such as COMPACI, WACIP too… and organic cotton’ that 
he completed during an interview in Péhunco in February 2018. He did not see a difference 
amongst projects at first: ‘they all run after the same objective which is how to better manage 
our soil to avoid depletion’. The last activity he participated in was about compost pits, ‘but 
it was with the AIC… with a foreign partner, was with C4+Togo on something to avoid soil 
erosion’. 
Gildas remembered well his experiences with development projects and indicated that 
development encounters were important in his life trajectory. As with many other extension 
agents who responded to the questionnaire, he has attended theoretical and on-farm training 
sessions, but he has not been involved in the planning of project activities, neither has he 
participated in a study tour abroad. 
 
15 The National Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis (INSAE) identified more than sixty 
sociolinguistic groups in Benin in 2002. These were then organised in nine groups (Amadou Sanni and 





His participation in project activities made him realise that training activities provided by 
prevailing institutions could be better. Specifically, he criticised the way the regular 
workshops organised by the AIC and the MAEP lacked transparency and engagement: 
When the AIC organises training, for example, they can take you from one 
place to the other, but they don’t tell you how they are going to pay you… at 
the end of the activity, they just give you the money and that’s it. With 
projects, the foreigner will tell you everything before the start of the activity, 
what we are going to eat, for example… And they put someone, be he 
foreigner or national, to supervise, to control, to see if the people are on time, 
if you have eaten… there is control… if you have eaten or not, eight o’clock 
is eight o’clock, you have to be in the room. 
When Gildas organises training for the farmers he supervises, he tries to reproduce what he 
experienced in project initiatives by bringing some rigour to the organisation of the activity. 
He has some room for manoeuvre when he works with his farmers, but he still lacks 
appropriate resources to implement the activities that are his responsibility. For that he has 
‘often blamed the government for assigning a job and not providing the necessary resources’. 
A few times he had to pay out of his pocket for the gas he needed to visit farmers under his 
supervision. In addition to the lack of resources, he seemed annoyed by the way extension 
agents were treated by the hierarchy: ‘they ask you for a job, you make it, and they don’t even 
appreciate it… They speak with you as though you were a child that they need to educate… 
that is also what I hold against them’. As a consequence, Gildas ‘prefers working with 
projects’, because ‘they bring the conditions that make it easier’. 
However, projects also have their flaws. For Gildas, these problems relate to the 
misappropriation of resources: 
Since 2007, the projects I have seen coming were to help us and help our 
parents to reduce poverty in Africa… but there is something I have always 
criticised: their finality. They start well, but they stop at the middle or they 
don’t finish well… That’s because we don’t put the good people there… 
They don’t attain their objective despite the money they have put into it… 
This means that the management of resources, both financial and human, is 
bad… Sincerely, I think most of the projects do not work. 
However, in his opinion, the failure of projects is not the problem of projects. Gildas believes 
that ‘a project’s success depends on the government’ and on the farmers’ willingness to 
change:  
when you go see a farmer and say ‘I would like you to do this or that’, he 
immediately says ‘how much are you going to give me?’… So you bring an 
innovation and he resists… only when he sees a neighbour doing it and 





As an extension agent, projects also go through him to recruit project participants. Gildas is 
well connected to CRA-CF researchers and part of a selected group of agents who are often 
called on to attend project activities and to recommend farmers who are ‘open to innovation’. 
However, projects are intermittent experiences in Gildas’s life trajectory. He takes part in 
project activities, but they do not predominate in his day-to-day work. Because projects and 
ordinary activities overlap, he is able to perceive the differences between working in projects 
and ‘for the state’, and this shapes his opinion and criticisms of the arrangements, 
relationships, and practices that he observes in both domains of action. 
4.1.3. Léo, a CRA-CF researcher who has seen a lot of projects come 
and go 
CRA-CF researchers were the group of actors most connected to development projects. For 
many years, the Centre was the main focal point for foreign support and agricultural research 
and a priority for donors. All CRA-CF researchers I interviewed and who responded to the 
questionnaire have been involved in projects at some point in their lives. They generally 
participate in training, but many of them also take part in study tours abroad, and in planning 
and strategic meetings, and have also contributed to scientific publications and studies. They 
were familiar with all projects and partners and with the mechanisms of a development 
project. 
Léo is one of these researchers who has seen many projects come and go. He had been 
working at the CRA-CF for more than ten years when I interviewed him for the first time in 
October 2017. Like many of his colleagues, he comes from a region where cotton is not 
predominant. He graduated in agronomic engineering from the University of Abomey-
Calavi, in the surroundings of Cotonou, and worked with other crops before joining the 
INRAB’s cotton research centre. At the time of the interview, he was based in Parakou, but 
he had previously worked for the CRA-CF branch in Bohicon as well, in the central region 
of Benin. 
When Léo arrived at the CRA-CF, the Centre was hosting PADSE (1998–2005). ‘At that 
moment, France had no problems, [they] had a lot of projects, unlike today.’ Léo considered 
PADSE a benchmark when I asked him about a project that has left a mark in his life. He 
told me that the technique the project introduced had a real impact on farmers’ finances, 
‘since they used less pesticides’. But he also acknowledged the project’s boundaries: 
There is a ‘but’ though… At that moment, the farmers were motivated. When 





money for doing that… But when the project ended, they did not have 
anything anymore and they ended up abandoning the technique. 
Other French projects were highlighted by Léo as better examples of sustainability. PARAB 
(1996–2000) and PARCOB (2001–2006) provided resources to the CRA-CF to develop their 
own varieties of cotton. These projects focussed on strengthening the capacities of 
researchers. They ‘enabled [them] to work well and to have the tools to work in all domains 
of plant breeding’. These projects also provided scholarships for CRA-CF researchers to 
pursue postgraduate degrees in France. 
After the end of PARCOB, ‘things got a bit tough’; the next project that came to his mind 
was TAZCO (2018–2021), the objective of which was to promote a transition to agroecology 
in cotton growing systems. Léo was convinced that the project was doomed to fail: ‘have you 
seen what they are doing? It is just a revival… it is sure that the people won’t adopt it’. On 
another day, Léo guided me in a visit to the project’s experimentation plot and criticised a 
tree the project team had decided to keep in the middle of the field: ‘have you ever seen 
anyone doing agriculture in the shade? Cut that tree down!’ 
Even though he disagreed with the choices that the new project had made, Léo 
acknowledged the French influence in Beninese agricultural research. For him, they remain 
the main partners in the cotton sector, in spite of the emergence of new actors from the mid-
2000s. After mentioning all French projects, he finally started talking about other partners:  
The French were the first partners… When the French retracted, we started 
cooperating with the United States through C4CP, which started with 
WACIP. WACIP replaced the French when they departed… and we were 
managing WACIP when C4-Brazil arrived. 
The way he started listing the projects he knew, it sounded like Léo did not draw any 
distinction among them. Indeed, he mentioned that all the projects that came after the C4 
initiative were ‘more or less the same’. Further on, he added: ‘you know that it is all money 
from the United States, right?’, making reference to the dispute between Brazil and the US 
over subsidies at the WTO when he mentioned Brazil’s cotton projects.  
Through project support, he has travelled to several countries in the region, and to Brazil 
and India. Development encounters have inspired Léo’s perspectives on the future of 
agricultural development. The latter comprises mechanisation and intensification and implies 
the end of subsistence agriculture. Indeed, Léo wondered ‘when [they] will have in Benin all 





admires for their intensification programmes. For him, if a farmer is not willing to intensify 
production, ‘he’d better stop growing cotton, otherwise he will remain poor forever’. 
Projects were a constant in his experience as a CRA-CF staff member. When he talked about 
projects overall, Léo considered them as partnerships that provide an opportunity to become 
open-minded and to put other countries’ experiences into the national perspective: 
[Development cooperation] allows you to get out to see what people are 
doing elsewhere and to compare this with one’s own experiences… it allows 
you to open up to the world… It is always good to be in a partnership with 
other people… And all of that can really help us improving our production… 
if we had a bit of material and if we were a bit serious. 
Because of the frequency with which Léo participates in project activities, they have become 
part of his day-to-day life, as though there were no interruptions, with each project simply 
replacing another one. In this sense, the distinction between project and prevailing 
institutions is almost imperceptible, because projects, as many of them as there are, are part 
of his day-to-day activities. As we shall see in statements from cotton researchers throughout 
this thesis, their frequent involvement allows them to have a broader perception on the 
overall contribution of projects, instead of a focus on the successes and failures of a single 
intervention. 
4.1.4. Amoussou, an AIC field coordinator who does not have a lot to 
say about projects 
People from very distinct backgrounds compose the AIC staff. The fact that the Association 
has been dissolved many times since its creation in 1999 has meant that the career path of 
the current staff is also intermittent. Many AIC agents in the field started their career as rural 
extension agents in the CARDER, and many others come from the MAEP. 
When I met Amoussou in November 2017, he was the AIC coordinator in an important 
cotton-producing district in the Alibori department. He was responsible for the coordination 
of 61 extension agents, who ensured that farmers followed the technical itinerary and 
collected data on cotton production. He has occupied that position since the beginning of 
2017. Before that, he worked at the AIC’s headquarters in Cotonou, until the AIC was 
dissolved by President Yayi Boni in 2012. In that period, Amoussou worked with the input 
importers’ association, but decided to pass the national examination in 2012 to become one 
of MAEP’s rural extension agent, a position he occupied in Alibori from 2012 to 2014. In 
2014, he was promoted and removed to a different location, until Patrice Talon re-established 





Most of Amoussou’s experiences with projects date from the period when he worked at the 
CARDER: 
The AIC invite us for training in Parakou now, but I don’t usually go… We 
participated in a training session about composting, on climate change as 
well… but I don’t know who pays for that… In the past, I used to know the 
projects better… there was PAFICOT… there were many projects when I 
was at the CARDER… You know, in general, the decisions about projects 
are made at the headquarters, in Cotonou… they make the decisions and 
invite us to participate… I don’t think I have a lot to say about projects. 
His best experience with a project was with PAFICOT (2007–2013), ‘because they supported 
us with materials, providing computers directly to the agents… they also provided vehicles 
to enable us to visit the farmers’. By providing material resources, which were ‘necessary to 
undertake [their] job’, the project addressed the ‘practical problems in the field’. 
Amoussou also mentioned several government plans and programmes that structured his 
previous activities. In 2017, the AIC’s intensification of production programme was the 
strategical framework that shaped his tasks. From the perspective of the AIC, the purpose 
of cotton projects is to support the realisation of missions under the Association’s mandate. 
This means that interventions are perceived as enablers rather than sources of change. The 
role that projects are expected to play in the host context led to the formalisation of the term 
‘technical and financial partners’ (partenaires techniques et financiers, PTF, in French), which is a 
very common piece of jargon among the AIC, the MAEP, and the CRA-CF. The term is 
self-explanatory and signifies the place of projects within the institutional ecology of 
traditional aid-hosting countries, which I examine in the next chapter. As Amoussou 
explained to me, host actors maintain ‘functional’ relations with PTF, which he distinguished 
from the ‘hierarchical’ relations within their own organisation. Furthermore, the functional 
relationships are established through the hierarchical chain: 
Here, the functional relationships come from the top. For example, you are 
a project and you went first at the top before coming here, they gave you 
authorisation and I am now obliged to work with you, so we maintain 
functional relationships… I have no direct order to receive from you, but 
from my boss who tells me ‘you have to work with him’. 
Amoussou also pointed out that functional relationships are temporary, but ‘they all 
contribute to the preservation of the permanent structures, which are aware of everything 
we do here’. Later on, during field research, I met with an AIC staff member based in 
Cotonou who explained this concept to me using similar words. In addition, in 





the need for prevailing institutions to coordinate the multiple short-lived initiatives and fit 
them in a long-term national strategy. 
4.1.5. Differences and similarities across actors’ experiences in 
development encounters 
When I first arrived in Benin to conduct field research, my main contacts came from my past 
experiences as project manager, especially when I worked for the Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency in the management of the Cotton 4+Togo project. The project worked mainly with 
INRAB and CRA-CF agronomists, hence they were my entry point to the cotton sector. At 
that time, I had a preconceived idea of their wide involvement in cotton projects because of 
my personal experience, but I did not imagine that they had been more involved than 
farmers. As I progressed with the data collection, I have to admit I felt frustrated every time 
I met a farmer who had not participated in any project activity or had not even heard about 
them. I thought that cotton projects, being so numerous, were much more present in 
farmers’ lives. I realised then how exclusive project experiences were – some being more 
than others, but none being able to have a wide coverage of actors, territory, and topics at 
once. 
In this context, CRA-CF researchers are the group of actors most well-acquainted with 
cotton projects. They were familiar with current and past initiatives, even if not directly 
involved. For example, when I asked an agronomist about a certain project, he was able to 
redirect me to the colleague who had worked on it. Individual involvement in projects varied 
according to the topic covered by the project, and the area and time of intervention, but 
project activities appeared to be part of their enduring context: there was always a project 
working with someone at the CRA-CF. This was very different from what rural extension 
agents, farmers, and AIC staff shared with me. For rural extension agents, projects emerged 
as an intermittent and irregular experience that they perceived as generally positive – except 
for the fact they did not last. As Gildas suggested, projects enabled him to be exposed to 
different methods of facilitating training and providing agricultural advice. The rules and 
resources that shape social relations within projects structures enabled that distinction. 
Similarly, due to not being as involved in projects as cotton researchers, farmers also felt the 
mismatch between activities carried out within and outside project frameworks, as suggested 
many times by George. The few farmers I met who had participated in project activities 
could barely mention more than two projects. In addition, they would often confuse projects 





indicates the marginalised place projects have in their lives and the exclusiveness of the 
initiatives. However, George’s experiences with projects also indicate that he accessed 
resources and information that were not available via the official channels. Furthermore, he 
had been exposed, via the official channels, to agricultural techniques that only projects had 
introduced, indicating that project arrangements do permeate prevailing institutions 
somehow, as I explore in chapter 6. 
Moving now to the perceptions of the group of actors who govern the sector, AIC staff and 
ginners maintain very functional relationships with projects – when they exist in their lives. 
For these groups, who occupy a dominant position in the cotton value chain, projects seem 
less important. Sometimes projects are there, sometimes they are not, but projects are often 
unimportant, with little footprint in the life trajectories of AIC and ginner staff alike. They 
remain welcome, but not as essential or desired as they could be for farmers, rural extension 
agents, and cotton researchers. 
To conclude this section, projects emerged – with variation across categories of actors – as 
fleeting and distinctive experiences when compared to the institutional arrangements that 
prevail in the host context and that have, therefore, more weight in shaping practices. In the 
next sections of this chapter, I focus on the different arrangements of projects by describing 
them against the arrangements and characteristics of the prevailing institutions of the host 
context. 
4.2. The distinct arrangements projects introduce into the host 
context 
The inability of projects to comprehend the complexities of the host context has been 
suggested as the main cause for the failure of projects to bring about structural change 
(Andrews et al., 2017; Burns and Worsley, 2015; Green, 2016; Ramalingam, 2013). The 
mapping of project experiences in the life trajectories of actors within the cotton sector 
demonstrates that projects enable different experiences, in the sense that these experiences 
are extremely different from the experiences that occur under the prevailing institutional 
arrangements. For example, only through projects has George, the cotton farmer, had access 
to specific knowledge about finance management, while projects enabled Gildas to be 
exposed to different methods of training that he could replicate when he delivered training 
as a rural extension agent. Léo, the most experienced in projects amongst the above, 





degree of dependency on project resources, which contrast sharply with those available 
outside project frameworks. Amoussou also noted the gap between the resources available 
within projects and within prevailing institutions, but the short-lived nature and specificity 
of projects seemed to lead to indifference, in face of the importance and durability of 
prevailing arrangements.    
Since institutional bricolage implies that actors piece together components that they gather 
from different institutional settings in order to respond to everyday challenges, and assuming 
that development cooperation projects are one of the sources of institutional arrangements, 
in this section I scrutinise the development cooperation ‘piece’. I explore the characteristics 
of project arrangements in order to define their shape and how they fit amid other 
institutional arrangement in the process of bricolage. 
4.2.1. Project institutional arrangements and their constituent 
elements 
The objective of every project is to enable different practices to take place in the host context 
by importing currently non-existing institutional arrangements or, in other words, pieces that 
can be used in the process of institutional bricolage. These arrangements are formed by the 
combination of rules and resources that a project introduces in the context. By doing this, 
projects expect to create dynamics that will prove beneficial to the host actors who will be 
responsible, at the end of the project, for reproducing, perpetuating, and scaling up the same 
institutional arrangements the project introduced. However, the gap between a project and 
a prevailing context’s rules and resources is so important that it makes the reproduction and 
perpetuation of project institutional arrangements practically impossible in the same terms. 
Rules of projects 
Most of the cotton projects in Benin are intended to change prevailing agricultural practice 
in order to reach the overall and common goal of increasing income and reducing poverty. 
(Only a few projects, such as the French PARSC, the World Bank’s TAP, and PARFC, 
worked solely with budgetary and institutional support without any agricultural practice 
component.) Therefore, every cotton project introduces rules that contrast with prevailing 
ones. But the rules projects introduce in order to change practices seem to be too distant 





The cotton sector is an organised sector, with a system of cooperatives, rural credit, and a 
formalised planting protocol, the technical itinerary (ITK).16 The ITK provides the rules for 
growing cotton: the planting calendar, the quantities and times of application of inputs, the 
time of harvesting and marketing. Cotton farming is therefore framed and regulated by the 
competent national authorities who elaborate, approve, and promote the ITK. Projects, by 
contrast, introduce rules for growing cotton that co-exist with the prevailing national scheme 
while being very different. 
At the level of farmers, a project usually imposes a planting protocol presenting a rupture 
with usual practices based on the ITK. The differences can vary from the distance between 
plants, the obligation to rotate with specific crops, the frequency of pest treatments, the 
quantity and type of fertilisers, and so on. These rules are necessary conditions for a project 
to attain the desired objectives, according to the strategy of implementation. For example, 
the global objective of PADSE (1998–2005) was to enable farmers to increase their incomes 
by changing agricultural systems. The project’s main innovation in the cotton sector was the 
introduction of staggered pest control (in French, lutte étagée ciblée, or LEC from now on), 
which became the project’s flagship component. LEC consists of the systematic observation 
of cotton plants to assess the level of infestation before the application of pesticides. The 
adoption of the technique leads to a general reduction in the use of pesticides, since the 
farmer would only apply the chemical when the population of a given pest crossed the 
corresponding pre-established threshold. The effectiveness of LEC depends on a monitoring 
methodology that requires regular visits to the cotton fields. Farmers need to scout their 
fields diagonally and count the number of pests in a sample of plants. If the number of pests 
observed exceeds the threshold, the farmer proceeds with the treatment. When implemented 
properly, LEC has significant potential to decrease farmers’ financial burden from the use of 
agrochemicals.17 Project reports demonstrate that the application of pesticides on demand, 
instead of systematically, as promoted in the ITK, reduced the cost of production 
considerably, while maintaining levels of production and the quality of the lint (Prudent et 
al., 2003). 
From this perspective and within the project’s structure, the project was a success: it 
demonstrated that LEC was a relevant technique that could have a long-term impact on 
 
16 Refer to Appendix A.7. for details on the technical itinerary in force when this research was conducted 
and on the functioning of the cotton sector. 
17 The AIC estimates the total production cost related to agrochemicals (including fertilisers, herbicides, 





farmers’ income by transforming cotton farming practices. However, these rules contrasted 
sharply with the prevailing arrangements that shape practices in the host context. Indeed, it 
is common for a farmer to only visit their fields when strictly necessary. Generally, their 
cotton fields are scattered over a vast territory, often far from the village, sometimes in a 
different district. The prevailing conditions in the context, such as the discontinuous 
locations of cotton fields, hinders their capacity to regularly visit them, since the majority of 
cotton farmers lack human and financial resources to hire field observers and pay for fuel, 
for example. This was one of the reasons that systematic treatments, scheduled every 
fortnight, regardless of the presence of pests, persisted in the official technical itinerary – and 
even with the simplification proposed by the ITK, some farmers have to skip windows of 
treatment because of the lack of means of transportation.18 
There is another level of change that project rules enable in the context, which are changes 
in meta-practices – practices that reflect on or refer to other practices (Messner et al., 2008). 
While the example of PADSE above demonstrated how different rules enabled the 
introduction of different agricultural practices, projects also create spaces in which actors are 
invited to act differently from usual, while doing the same kind of activity they usually do. 
These are changes that appear to be more abstract and less explicit than the imposition of 
rotation plans or planting protocols, because they refer to changes in behaviour and social 
interaction patterns. For example, there is a shared understanding that the agent the project 
hires needs to follow the norms of the project, to be accountable and serious.19 This means 
that when visiting a grower’s plot within a project’s framework, the agent needs to act 
differently as they would do when working for the national service, outside project 
frameworks: they might spend more time in the plot, take notes, and give more constructive 
advice to the farmer. Projects also require and enable them to increase the frequency of visits 
and to become responsive to growers’ demands and needs. When performing everyday tasks, 
however, the agent acts according to the prevailing rules, power relations, constraints, and 
possibilities. A former extension agent explained to me this distinction in practices between 
project and everyday activities as follows: 
I can’t say I work in the same way [in a project]. The project expects a result 
from me right away. I give it as soon as possible, in the best way I can. When 
it is the state [i.e. practice within the prevailing structure], I give myself a little 
more time, because I know that I will not be quickly evaluated, so I give 
 
18 CF#2, 10/11/2017; CF#3, 17/11/2017; and focus groups with farmers on 17/11/2017. 





myself a little more largesse, that’s true… I work less when I work for the 
state than when I work for a project… and it is not only about money, it is 
about knowing that there will not be any monitoring. I know that before they 
come here to assess my work, I will have done what I have to do. And the 
bureaucracy is so slow that I can allow myself time to have some fun.20 
Project bureaucracies appears to be more rigid and to require a higher level of engagement 
from actors. In turn, the distinct rules of projects seem to push agents to increase their 
performance. On the other hand, as suggested by Gildas, regular workshops organised by 
the prevailing structures lacked engagement and transparency. By these means, social 
interaction patterns also change, as a rural extension agent explained: 
When an expert comes with a project, whether a foreigner or Beninese, they 
will not rush it [bâcler le travail] … when he finishes, he comes to the field to 
check, and if you did not understand, he explains again. When it is with AIC 
[hence, outside project frameworks], when you do not understand, they come 
and they insult you in front of the farmers. Then you are frustrated and you 
do not want to do a good job anymore.21 
The changes in practices and meta-practices can also be explained by the fact that projects 
are rare and perceived as an opportunity to make gains – an opportunity to earn extra income, 
in particular. The agent must perform well because future opportunities depend on it and 
because they know that they are being assessed accordingly. In a context of scarce resources, 
these opportunities are not negligible. (I explore the effects on subsequent projects of the 
disparity of resources within and outside project structures in chapter 5.) 
At this point, it becomes clear that rules and resources intertwine to enable different 
practices. As suggested by Giddens (1984), it is the interplay between rules and resources 
that compose social structures. Thus, project rules require resources in the same way project 
resources require rules, because one gives purpose to and sustains the other. 
The extraordinary resources of projects 
In contrast to everyday activities, partners implement project activities with relatively 
abundant resources. The different level of resources available within project frameworks 
does not go unnoticed, being reflected in a set of activities that are conducted within both 
project and prevailing structures, such as farm work and training. 
Growing cotton is an activity that is usually done with scarce resources, both human and 
financial. The majority of farmers live below the poverty line and receive only a thin share of 
 
20 INRAB#8, 22/05/2018. 





the total income generated by the cotton industry (INSAE, 2018; Ouin-Ouro, 2018a). Hence, 
agriculturalists grow cotton with the means they already have at their disposal, and the level 
of private investment is very low (Ton, 2004). In this context, farmers make use of the 
workforce available in the household. This includes women and children, whose hands are 
particularly appreciated for harvesting, while farm management remains the business of the 
men of the village (Alidou and Niehof, 2013; Floquet and Mongbo, 2006). A farmer I met in 
the Borgou department had to reduce the surface he reserved for cotton precisely because 
of the lack of workforce. Further on, he acknowledged that the lack of resources was also 
related to technical knowledge, which hindered their ability to assess the benefits from the 
crop: 
You see, our problem is that the farmer has no resources… it is not in terms 
of financial means… It is about… I don’t know… means to verify the quality 
of the products that they give us. I told you, the state is supposed to check 
this, but who guarantees that they did and that this is going to be good for 
the farmers? Our organisations are not structured to make counter-expertise 
about the fertilisers, so we have to trust what is given to us. Now, the bills 
only increase. The date of expiry of the fertilisers we bought this year is 
September or even August [2017].22 
In contrast, a farmer who agrees to dedicate a piece of his land to project activities receives 
the corresponding quantity of agricultural inputs from the project, without fees. In addition, 
projects hire the workforce needed for ploughing, sowing, and harvesting. A team of experts 
ensures that the techniques are being implemented as planned in a kind of enhanced close 
supervision – while outside project frameworks a rural extension agent is expected to support 
360 farmers on average, according to research participants. By these means, projects 
considerably reduce the costs of producing cotton within project structures, creating a sort 
of different reality, far from the prevailing possibilities and constraints of the host context. 
As a consequence, farmers get higher profits within projects, since the farmers who grow 
‘project cotton’ still sell their production to the AIC at the government price. This is aligned 
with the purpose of projects, as explained by an extension agent in Kandi, for whom project 
resources support and incentivise host actors, so the project can be successful: 
The particularity is that when a project comes there is support that follows. 
There is the support and there are the incentives at the producer level that 
follow. To implement the project, WACIP for example, it has been said from 
the beginning that the pilot producers who will be identified, they will give 
them free fertilizer for their demonstration field. Then they say to the 
extension agents who follow these producers there, ‘when you come for 
 





training, there are per-diems paid to you’, and there are fuel supplements that 
are given to you every month. So, at the level of the agents there are 
supporting measures, at the producer level there are incentive measures. 
That’s how we work with these different projects.23 
Along the same lines, other project participants have pointed out the availability of resources 
as one of the main distinctions between a project’s activities and prevailing activities. When 
projects organise training, local trainers and participants receive more incentives to attend 
the activity: the trainers receive extra payments and participants a daily subsistence allowance 
that is considerably higher than in training within the prevailing structures. This has a direct 
impact on the way they deliver such training. An AIC extension agent working in Banikoara 
explained to me how he perceives this difference: 
The difference between the workshops? You need to know the donors’ 
world. There is support and motivation [with projects]. The growers engage 
more [because of] the availability of tools, which make the people 
motivated… However, when the INRAB organises, there is low 
motivation… the only ones to come are the ones who are volunteering, who 
want to adopt, who are interested. It is harder to implement because there is 
a lack of motivation. 
 
Me: What kind of motivation? 
 
I am talking about working tools. For example, when they organise a 
workshop on pit compost, they provide wheelbarrows, shovels, and boots to 
the workshop, to make [the pit]. On the other side [within the prevailing 
arrangements], we only tell the people, voilà how you do it, and the activity 
ends there. It is the sad reality, but it is the reality.24 
In this sense, project resources enable the creation of differentiated practices that are often 
better assessed by host actors when compared with similar activities organised within 
prevailing structures. In a focus group discussion, CRA-CF researchers linked to 
extraordinary project resources the speed of procedures within project arrangements that 
they observed and wished they had in their day-to-day work: 
In most of the projects that I have known, to reach the goals we go three 
times faster than when it is in the ordinary administration. At CRA-CF, we 
first have to have the signature of the chief, of the chief of the chief, and of 
the chief of the chief of the chief… and finally after a year, pfff, what must 
be done is not done. While in a project, generally, what I have found, when 
the decision is made, since the means are available, very often there is no 
blocking, very quickly you have your motorcycles, even if it is a tractor, very 
quickly you have it.25 
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In addition to improving the speed and quality of activities, project resources also increase 
their frequency. In some structures, training and other capacity-building activities only exist 
under project frameworks, because of the lack of resources that predominates. Such is the 
case for cotton research; there is no internal training strategy in the CRA-CF and the only 
opportunities for training and re-training (recyclage in French) are through project support: 
Outside project frameworks… I can say there is no training… at least not for 
the position I held. But for the agents who are in the field, there was training 
to show them how to implement the tests and to re-train them… It’s only 
the projects that come and who can organise this training.26 
By these means, the budget disparity has created a sort of dependency on project support in 
regards to realising certain day-to-day activities. In particular, this affects cotton research, 
which has been the main beneficiary of development projects in the cotton sector since the 
1960s. In the period 2000 to 2011, the average annual budget for cotton research was 477,000 
USD dollars (Allagbé and Stads, 2014), which is marginal compared to the means a 
development project brings to the cotton sector. For example, in 2009 the cotton sector in 
Benin was hosting eight different projects and one of them alone, PROCOTON (2006–
2013), had a budget of one million dollars per year. In this regard, project resources provide 
opportunities for knowledge development, innovation, and dissemination of good practice 
from research to farmers. A ‘project is an investment avant tout’27 and an investment that it is 
difficult for host actors to access via prevailing institutions.  
Not surprisingly, the injection of human, material, and financial resources enabled the 
appearance of different practices in the cotton sector. Projects introduced practices related 
to conservation agriculture, integrated pest management, the empowerment of women, 
cooperative management, and so on. In this sense, the extraordinary resources of projects, 
inseparably from their rules, played in favour of sector development by expanding the 
repertoire of practices and meta-practices available in the host context. 
However, the gap between the arrangements available within and outside projects caught my 
attention. I wondered how such different practices, leading to the desired change projects 
envisioned, could continue beyond the limited time frame of interventions or even scale up 
to include more beneficiaries without project resources. These constitute the flip side of 
projects, a factor which works against them, which is their exclusive and short-lived nature. 
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4.2.2. The exclusive and short-lived nature of project components 
Exclusivity and a limited time frame are innate characteristics of projects. As pointed out by 
Gildas, working with projects is better because they bring the conditions to make work easier, 
but the problem of projects is that they are not meant to last indefinitely nor to benefit 
everyone or every region. Thus, project arrangements are restricted in time and exclusive to 
the ‘target’ regions and beneficiaries. This limitation in time and space makes the 
development cooperation institution temporary and specific.  
Project physical boundaries: Limited space and scope 
In the Beninese cotton sector, most projects share the same global objective of reducing 
poverty by increasing the income of farmers. This objective was formulated from a common 
diagnosis that has persisted throughout the years and across most projects: the predominance 
of poverty in rural areas among cotton farmers combined with institutional weakness. This 
diagnosis led to two large domains of intervention. The first aims to change prevailing 
agricultural practices to increase yields and thereby farmers’ incomes. The second targets 
institutional strengthening through budget and material support. These two broad areas of 
intervention often overlap, according to the understanding of the partner on these issues. 
For instance, Brazil’s approach sought to strengthen institutions through building the 
capacities of researchers, extension agents, and farmers in regards to better agricultural 
practices.  
The first domain of intervention has consisted mainly of sharing innovative agricultural 
techniques. These could focus on soil fertility, phytosanitary treatments, mechanisation, etc. 
The improvement of soil fertility has been the main domain of project intervention since the 
2000s. Projects have attempted to transform traditional practices through the diffusion of 
techniques that combine chemical with organic fertilisers, by suggesting crop rotation, direct 
seeding under mulch, and so on. On phytosanitary treatments, several projects, since the 
1990s, have been sharing integrated pest management techniques, such as LEC and the use 
of neem oil as a natural pesticide. Mechanisation has also been introduced via projects and 
has been at the heart of recent projects implemented by France, China, and India. 
The support for institutional strengthening can be sorted into projects that provide financial 
and material support to national institutions and projects that aim to develop knowledge 
through institutional support, especially those addressed to agricultural research. Financial 
and material support predominated in the early years of development projects in the cotton 





World Bank projects of the 1980s and 1990s, and more recently PROCOTON (2006–2013) 
and PAFICOT (2007–2013), had their main focus on institutional support through the 
provision of material and financial resources and the delivery of specialised training on 
organisational management. 
Although these domains of intervention are important to the development of the cotton 
sector, they do not address all the causes of poverty among cotton growers. Farmers’ main 
concern remains the high cost of the factors of production and the low purchase prices of 
seed cotton. The prices of inputs and of purchase remain structural problems and challenges 
that projects do not address. 
In addition to being limited in scope, projects also need to restrain their geographical and 
populational reach. There is a strong bias in the preparation of an activity, which is that 
projects select participants whose profiles allow the project to achieve its objective – as 
Amselle (1988) suggested by demonstrating that projects that were successful were so 
because they worked with well-off farmers first. A rural extension agent explained to me the 
participant selection process, which does not necessarily reflect the configuration of the host 
context, but rather the project’s own framework: 
Well, [the projects] choose… it depends on the criteria they have defined. If, 
for example, the project aims to have worked with 45% of women at the end 
of the project, then, you see, the project says: ‘ah, when you choose six men, 
there should be four women, in the village’. So the project comes with their 
criteria. Or the project tells you: ‘the farmers you choose should be farmers 
who own oxen, because the technology I want to implement… the organic 
manure, is mainly cow dung or crop residues, so the producers who have 
oxen, I can take them, because I know that in terms of availability of cow 
dung, the problem will not arise’. The project can also say that it is going to 
work with farmers who have a slightly improved yield… at 1,200 kilogram 
per hectare, so it is going to take farmers in that category. So, it depends on 
the criteria of the objective we are aiming for. This is how it works.28 
Besides selecting farmers that fit with the project objectives, projects also need to limit the 
spaces of intervention, which makes them exclusive. Activity in recent project illustrates well 
the magnitude of the gap between project beneficiaries and the overall number of farmers. 
In October 2016, the C4+Togo (2014–2019) organised a capacity building activity addressed 
to cotton growers, the objective of which was to train the farmers on no-till seeding and on 
sustainable soil management. Seventy farmers attended the workshop, which is a relatively 
large number for a training activity that included theoretical and practical work in the 
 





demonstration field. The participants came from nineteen districts located in seven 
departments. By these means, the project sought to cover the main cotton producing areas, 
since the majority of participants came from the northern departments. Yet the number of 
participants was insignificant when put into the perspective of the cotton industry. In 
Banikoara, for example, 21,525 farmers grew cotton in 2018, and four of them attended that 
workshop. From the Alibori department, the biggest cotton producing region, sixteen 
growers out of 57,423 participated. Even if all sixteen participants adopted the innovative 
techniques of soil management back in their plots, this change would be a modest 
contribution to the project’s overall objective of improving Beninese cotton competitiveness 
in the international market. Eventually, their practice could inspire their neighbours or 
members of the cooperative, and in a few years a larger number of farmers in Alibori would 
see the soil becoming more fertile. But that is a bet that does not fit in project documents, 
time frame, or resources. Through the selection of participants and regions of intervention, 
project activities become an exclusive experience reserved for a few.  
The spatial boundaries of projects can also become visible in the field. Brazil’s C4+Togo 
project (2014–2019) disseminated no-till farming with cover crops in the cotton farming 
system. CRA-CF staff started testing the technique during the implementation of the first 
Brazilian project, from 2009 to 2013. The second phase of the project created on-farm 
experimentation fields to try out Brazilian techniques and to take them closer to the reality 
of farmers. These demonstration plots were located in volunteer farmers’ fields, who agreed 
to dedicate a piece of land to the project, in which cotton farming would be shaped by the 
project’s arrangements. In the project plan, one third of the plot was reserved for cotton, 
while the other two thirds were split between food crops (such as maize and beans) associated 
with cover plants, and an area is left fallow. The cotton plot was also split in two. In one part, 
the project applied conventional methods, while next to it, project techniques were adopted 
to demonstrate the contrast. Figure 10 shows the model of this planting protocol and its 





Figure 10: The C4+Togo demonstration plot model as presented at the WTO in 2019 (left) and the plot in Parakou a 
few weeks before harvest in 2017 (right) 
      
The rotation and combination with other crops were necessary conditions of project success 
but contrasted excessively with prevailing schemes. For instance, cotton growers allot, on 
average, one third of their fields for cotton (Weiss, 2013, and interviewed participants), which 
corresponds to the rules established by the C4+Togo planting protocol, but it is not common 
to leave any piece of land fallow for an entire season. Letting the land rest was an essential 
variable in regards to getting the expected results. Similarly, the use of cover plants is a 
fundamental aspect, but very unusual in Beninese cotton farming. The idea of growing plants 
that are neither food nor cash crops is alien in the host context. 
In addition, the imported technique would only work in Benin if the fields were secured, to 
prevent herds of pastoralists passing through and eating the cover plants. Hence, the project 
installed a two-meter-tall metal fence to protect the demonstration plots from cattle. It is 
unusual to see such equipment in the Beninese rural landscape. Farmers do not secure their 
plots because they do not have the means to do so; even barbed-wire fences are out of reach 
for farmers.29 In addition, the fragmentation of their fields increases the costs of 
implementation and of opportunity. Yet project staff and researchers hoped that the good 
results, when they became visible, would be enough incentive to convince the farmers to 
invest in securing their plots. 
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Figure 11: Cotton within and outside project spaces: a fenced plot in Toura marking the project boundary and the exclusive 
access to a project’s resources 
 
The fence, as shown in figure 11 above, was a prerequisite for the project to attain its 
objectives within this context and it delimited the physical space of project arrangements and 
practices. Within the fence, abundant resources and differentiated rules enabled distinct 
practices that project implementers expected to see replicated beyond the fence. However, 
besides creating exclusive spaces, project experiments are also limited in time, meaning that 
the conditions allowing for these experiments, the fence and the results, are short-lived. 
Temporal project boundaries: Irreconcilable temporalities of change 
In addition to being restricted in scope and space, projects arrangements do not last – and 
are not meant to. The expectation is that the positive changes happening within projects 
boundaries will continue and will scale up in the host context. However, different 
perspectives from the host context see projects as considerably short-lived experiences that 
contrast with the long-term pace of change. 
The projects that development partners have implemented in the cotton sector in Benin 
from 1963 to 2018 have, on average, a duration of 4.5 years. This period starts with the 
official launch of the project and the signing of the cooperation agreement. However, the 
period of actual implementation of a five-year project is rarely five years. On one hand, 
managers start implementing activities a few months (or years) after the actual starting date. 





few months or implementing a follow-up project. Host actors are blunt about the inability 
of projects to contribute to structural changes: 
It should be noted that it is hard for a four, or even five-year project be able 
to bring something that could really impact the cotton sector – since it’s an 
annual crop, we only grow it once a year, so everything we bring to it is 
evaluated from year to year.30 
Indeed, when it comes to agricultural projects, seasonality is an important factor that drives 
the realisation of activities. The cotton campaign in Benin starts in May every year. According 
to the technical itinerary, farmers can start seeding from the end of May until the end of July 
– the dates vary in the different departments and should follow the first rains as a rule of 
thumb. The harvest happens from October to January, when the sector enters its 
‘commercialisation’ phase with collection, purchase, and processing of seed cotton. Project 
activities must fit in this calendar. When organising training, for example, there must be 
plants in the field, lest there be no results to show. 
Despite the acknowledgment of seasonality, projects propose a temporality of change that 
does not fit with the temporality of the context. Project time frames are submitted to 
exogenous rules: those of donors and providers. In this context, in the second half of 2017, 
CRA-CF researchers were expecting to host a new project, TAZCO (2018–2021). The 
signing of the agreement was delayed between Cotonou and Paris, and instead of happening 
in July 2017, Benin and France officially launched the project in January 2018. In order not 
to miss an agricultural year, staff from the French Development Agency (AFD), the 
implementing agency, rushed to Parakou in August 2017 to seed their experimentation plot 
– hence later than the advised planting period. When I visited the plot in October 2017, the 
CRA-CF staff could not say which technology the project would share, because they had not 
been involved in the design process. ‘[The project] is for a transition to agro-ecology… They 
came here two months ago and planted all this that you see here… but we don’t know the 
[planting] protocol. They came with the protocol ready and did this.’31 To ensure the project’s 
success, it was crucial to plant before the end of the sowing season. In the first year, the 
project needed to grow both cotton and the cover crops that would be used in the next 
season. Had they missed the planting season, the effects of planting on mulch on the fertility 
of the soil would only be perceived from the third year and the impact on cotton yields only 
from the fourth year onwards. But TAZCO is a three-year project only. The project’s period 
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of implementation does not fit with the temporality of observable changes in agricultural 
practices. 
These contrasting temporalities of change undermine project processes and methods of 
implementation. One year later, I visited TAZCO’s plot again. The CRA-CF had appointed 
an agronomist to work as a focal point and to manage the experiments. The designated staff, 
however, did not stay long and at the time of my visit the TAZCO project did not have a 
focal point in Parakou anymore. The lack of local supervision was visible on that day in July 
2018, when some women, hired by the project, were sowing maize under the supervision of 
a CRA-CF agent. Like Brazil’s C4+Togo, TAZCO aims to disseminate the use of cover crops 
and direct seeding on mulch, the same techniques that the CRA-CF was testing a few meters 
away within the C4+Togo fenced plot. Nevertheless, the plots do not look alike. Surprisingly, 
the agronomist who conducted the visit did not know much about what was going on and 
why the soil in the TAZCO plot was so dry. According to him, the cover plants were not 
being disposed correctly on the soil. He explained to the TAZCO agent how they should be 
doing it, but the latter just nodded reluctantly and did not seem too engaged or determined 
to work differently. ‘You should have a look at our side’, the agronomist said between ironic 
laughs while leaving the TAZCO plot. 
The TAZCO experience demonstrates that the short-lived feature of projects changes the 
pace of implementation, subsequently affecting project results. Although CRA-CF 
researchers appreciated the speed in accessing project resources, the imposition of limited 
time frames is a concern which make them question what happens after the project: 
The problem of temporality is for me very important and the flow of 
resources that comes with the projects often forces the coordinator, or the 
actors of a project, to finish in the time allocated to them and to show [the 
results] quickly… even though they have a line of sustainability, which is 
difficult to fill at the end of the project.32 
The time constraints of projects do not match the need for agricultural research to develop, 
experiment, and disseminate. The adoption and dissemination by the CRA-CF of new 
varieties and techniques require at least two years of trials in their experimentation fields, 
plus a season of pre-dissemination in farm trials with selected farmers. By contrast, some 
projects ‘skip that procedure and go straight to work with farmers to share their own 
technologies’,33 neglecting the fact that changes in the official ITK need to be first suggested 
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by the CRA-CF. For a project manager, ‘the people are in a rush… it should not be like 
that… we need to try the techniques first, but there is a restlessness in project 
implementation’.34 
Thus, the different temporalities are perceived as an obstacle for a project alone to transform 
the prevailing structures. From this perspective, projects are often seen as failures by host 
actors, because 
even when it works and it takes root… when the project disappears, that is 
the time we let go what we were doing. Only a few continue with the 
innovation that the partners wanted us to do.35 
Because projects are limited in time and space within the host context, they end up creating 
islands of prosperity, with few or weak connections to prevailing arrangements. While the 
institutional arrangements that projects introduce enable good practices within the context, 
these dynamics remain too specific and bounded by the time frames of project 
implementation. In other words, the pieces that projects introduce into the context to be 
part of actors’ repertoire appear, at first and within their own physical and temporal 
boundaries, to have shapes that do not fit alongside the other pieces available in the host 
context. 
Conclusion 
Cotton projects have been a constant in the Beninese cotton sector since the 1960s. They 
have shaped the lives of actors to different degrees, appearing and disappearing in people’s 
life trajectories with varying levels of intensity. The mapping of project footprints in life 
trajectories demonstrates that projects have introduced distinct experiences when compared 
to the activities that are organised by and framed within the prevailing structures. This occurs 
because every project introduces into the local context the necessary tailor-made 
arrangements to enable the achievement of its desired objectives. The resulting experiences 
of projects, apparently positive according to different perspectives from the field, 
nevertheless have limits: they are short-lived and exclusive, hindering each project’s ability to 
become part of the prevailing context in the terms expected in project documents. In this 
sense, the examination of project institutional arrangements, or pieces of bricolage, 
demonstrates that a project is more designed as reflection of itself than based on the 
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characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the context. Indeed, the mismatch is such that it makes 
one wonder whether projects are designed to self-accomplish, within their own boundaries, 
or to trigger similar dynamics in the prevailing context, beyond project periods of 
implementation and direct beneficiaries. 
In spite of being a very different piece in the institutional bricolage process, project 
experiences remain a source of components from which actors can draw when reacting to 
everyday challenges. For instance, Léo and other agronomists who are more acquainted with 
projects draw upon past project experiences when they engage in subsequent ones, and 
Gildas demonstrated that he reproduces meta-practices when delivering training within the 
prevailing institutions. In the next chapters, I examine the project piece from a historical 
trajectory to understand changes in the arrangements that projects have introduced into the 
cotton sector (chapter 5), and the traces projects have left in prevailing arrangements 
throughout history stemming from the long-term interplay between projects and the host 







CHAPTER 5. HISTORY IN THE MAKING: THE PRODUCTION, REPRODUCTION, 
AND CHANGE OF COTTON PROJECTS 
In chapter 4, the life trajectories of host actors revealed that projects are too short and too 
specific when compared to the enduring dynamics of the context. Additionally, the rules and 
resources that projects introduce are too different from the prevailing social structures of the 
sector in which they intervene. However, these kinds of experiences, admitting their 
particularities, have been being produced and reproduced in the cotton sector for at least 55 
years, with ruptures and continuities. On one hand, projects, donors, and project teams 
change constantly, each one providing a singular experience. On the other hand, some host 
actors participate in various projects in their life trajectories, carrying elements from one 
project to another. Such recurring experiences leave footprints that can be observed within 
subsequent projects, thus making this the path from ad hoc to durable as enduring 
institutions. 
In this chapter, I focus on the trajectory of cotton projects in order to identify the 
construction and consolidation of a pattern of aid and development cooperation. In such a 
continuous flow of development encounters, earlier experiences have a distinct weight. They 
set the ground for subsequent projects, shaping the way actors engage with them and, in this 
way, transforming project processes. Therefore, in the trajectory of projects, I pay particular 
attention to continuities and ruptures. The aid paradigm has changed considerably from the 
first to the last batch of cotton projects, but some principles and practices have endured. In 
this sense, the arrival of Southern cotton projects in a traditional aid-hosting context sheds 
light on the possibilities and difficulties of transforming development practice. 
In the first section, I describe the main characteristics of the first cotton projects and how 
later projects consolidated certain elements that construed a tradition of aid. In the second 
section, the study of Southern cotton projects illuminates the weight of earlier experiences 
and the challenges of transforming regularised practices. 
5.1. The birth and consolidation of traditional cotton aid 
As the concept of institutional bricolage suggests, based on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, 
early experiences have particular weight in shaping human action and, therefore, subsequent 
experiences. In this section, I first focus on earlier projects, then on the continuation of 





5.1.1. The constitution of aid traditions 
In this sub-section, I describe how the first cotton projects pursued colonial plans of 
intensification of cotton production and produced a pattern of aid. Then I focus on an 
example from cotton research to illustrate the creation of a pattern against which subsequent 
initiatives are assessed. 
Colonial continuities 
The Republic of Dahomey signed with France the first international development project on 
cotton in 1963, three years after independence. The objective of the Cotton Development 
project (1963–1969) was simple: to multiply by four the production of cotton in Dahomey. 
In that period, there were no concerns in the project narrative about alleviating poverty or 
increasing the autonomy of farmers, as we could see in the following decades. In fact, the 
project provided a legal framework that enabled French companies to continue extracting 
resources from the former colony after independence and to reduce their dependence on US 
cotton (Levrat, 2009). Since the eighteenth century, the expansion of cotton production 
around the world has been promoted by the interests of industrialists in the Global North, 
who aimed to develop pools of production of raw cotton to provide the quantities and the 
quality they needed at the lowest cost possible (Beckert, 2015). The development of the 
cotton sector in Dahomey was no different. 
In this sense, the French Company for Textile Development (CFDT), created in 1949, 
continued to operate in Dahomey, being the only investor, promoter, processor, and 
exporter of cotton. An older cotton farmer shared with me the receipt (figure 12) he received 
from the CFDT for his first sale of seed cotton in 1971. In that year, he grew cotton in a plot 
within his father’s field. More than 10 years after independence, the French were still in 
charge of the cotton sector, including purchasing and commercialisation, but also research 





Figure 12: Ten years after independence, Beninese farmers still sold cotton to the CFDT (receipts from 1970, 1971, 
and 1974) 
   
From the interviewee’s perspective, the purpose of the cotton industry in Benin was very 
clear then and now: to provide a commodity to the ‘white people’: 
[In the 1970s], the white people came to buy cotton. It was the French 
Company. The French came to buy, and they even had their own buyers, and 
their own extension agents… now, we see that it is still the white people who 
buy it. Because [our production] does not stay here… Now, the Beninese are 
only organisers. But the cotton, in reality, it goes out there. You see?36 
In 1972, France became a guarantor and co-donor of the second cotton-specific project in 
Dahomey to pursue the objective of increasing cotton production, with the French Cotton 
Development Project (IDA, 1972). In this period, the development of the cotton sector was 
entirely dependent on foreign financial and human resources channelled to the host context 
via development projects. Indeed, project activities were carried out by staff from the CFDT 
and SATEC, and project funds paid for extension services, marketing, and collection, and 
for the construction of ginning plants. Thus, the progress towards intensification was 
hindered when Kérékou took control of the sector in 1973, dismissing foreign staff and 
causing the suspension of project disbursements (as we have seen in chapter 3). Without 
 





projects, there were no more resources to support the development of the cotton sector, and 
production fell. 
However, the Beninese economy – and Kérékou’s regime – in the 1970s remained dependent 
on foreign resources (Anignikin, 2010; d’Almeida-Topor, 2002; Sotindjo, 2008). By the end 
of that decade, the government started negotiating a series of World Bank rural development 
projects (Zou, Borgou I, and Borgou II) that introduced the required resources to reorganise 
the sector, build ginning plants, fund rural extension services, promote the use of 
agrochemicals, and ensure the functioning of the input credit system. The French continued 
to support the cotton sector, but prioritised agricultural research development instead (I 
describe French support for agricultural research in the next section). 
The first decades of international support for the development of the cotton sector in Benin 
had some similar characteristics. First, they involved the inflow of financial resources that 
were not available in the host context, but which were necessary for pursuing the plan of 
increasing and intensifying cotton production. The sharp contrast of financial availability 
between activities within and outside project frameworks created patterns of dependency vis-
à-vis foreign support. Indeed, by the end of the 1980s, in spite of the transfer of 
responsibility, national institutions were only able to function by means of projects. The Zou 
(1982–1992), Borgou I (1981–1988), and Borgou II (1988–1993) projects were essential to 
ensuring the functioning and operationalisation of ginneries, extension services, and 
marketing. For example, around 40 per cent of the CARDERs’ budget was from foreign 
donors (World Bank, 1991). As an illustration of such dependence, the CARDERs enjoyed 
considerable operational and planning capacity when compared with the central services 
provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, precisely because the World Bank projects used the 
centres to implement their international development projects (World Bank, 1991). 
Second, the activities implemented under these projects’ frameworks all took place in the 
host context. The objectives were to build institutions and make them run effectively. It was 
not yet about developing skills and competitiveness, but to make the sector profitable. 
Foreign experts were based in research centres and others would travel the country to 
disseminate agricultural techniques. In this sense, the initiatives took a one-directional aspect, 
being characterised by the transfer of knowledge and resources rather than knowledge 
development, exchange, and institutional cooperation. As I show in the next sections, later 





These early experiences created a baseline against which subsequent initiatives would be 
assessed. In the next sub-section, I focus on agricultural research, which was the area that 
received most of cotton projects and continued in 2018 to be the main institutional focal 
point of foreign initiatives. 
The case of cotton agricultural research 
Agricultural research in Benin was deeply shaped by France, before and after independence. 
In 1946, France created the Research Institute of Cotton and Exotic Textiles (IRCT) to 
support the development of cotton production in the colonies alongside the CFDT, which 
focussed on the production and commercialisation of cotton (Levrat, 2008). In 1984, France 
merged the nine tropical agricultural research institutes, including the IRCT, into one single 
structure: the French Agricultural Research Centre for International Development (CIRAD) 
(CIRAD, 2019). Since the 1950s, the IRCT – until 1984 – and CIRAD have provided 
continuous support to Beninese agricultural research institutions. 
Until 1977, IRCT stations were the only agricultural research institutes in Benin (World Bank, 
1977). In February of that year, the Beninese government created a national agency in the 
Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperative Action (MDRAC) to support all research 
activities in Benin, with continued support from the French (World Bank, 1977). In 1981, 
agricultural research was transferred to the Ministry of Higher and Technical Education and 
comprised multiple research stations that specialised in different crops, including cotton 
(World Bank, 1981). In 1984, the Agricultural Research Directorate, again under the 
MDRAC and with French support, became responsible for organising cotton research and 
development. In 1991, the agricultural research units were still dependent on external 
funding, which covered about 31% of Benin’s budget for crop research (World Bank, 1991). 
In 1992, within the context of democratisation and liberalisation under Structural 
Adjustment Plans, the government of Benin created the National Agricultural Research 
Institute of Benin (INRAB). The INRAB was organised in stations that were specialised 
either in a region or in a crop, such as the Agricultural Regional Centre on Cotton (which 
would become later the Agricultural Research Centre on Cotton and Fibres, CRA-CF) in 
Parakou. Throughout the 2000s, the INRAB’s budget remained dependent on external 
donors. Foreign contribution, especially through projects, represented more than 60% of the 
overall budget from 2002 to 2008 (Allagbé and Stads, 2014). Projects continued to provide 





Throughout these years, agricultural research presented a common diagnostic that justified 
foreign support: insufficient funds to operate and, consequently, dependence on foreign 
donors. France was still the main donor and partner. Hence, French organisational culture 
has shaped the organisation of agricultural research in Benin. For example, the IRCT divided 
their work into three divisions: agronomy, entomology, and phytosanitary, which is the same 
organisational structure that the INRAB and the CRA-CF present today.  
The footprint of French involvement went beyond organisational culture, however. The 
French built most of the facilities, such as research labs, stations, and headquarters. During 
the interviews that took place in the INRAB’s facilities, it sometimes felt that it was 
problematic to question French support. The French were the main promoters of cotton 
and agricultural research in Benin and, by those means, they became the institutional 
reference point. That was my feeling when a CRA-CF researcher talked about the French 
while answering a broad question on the origins of cotton in Benin: 
It came from the French colony… French settlers, they were the ones who 
really developed cotton and at one point they built research centres… the 
first research centres were built by the colonisers. Even the building where 
we are now… [he looks around], they were the ones who did it.37 
The footprint of French support also took an abstract form, being also observed in the life 
trajectories of CRA-CF researchers. Many researchers have been involved in partnerships 
with CIRAD, including academic exchanges in France, and scholarships to pursue 
postgraduate degrees in French universities. The cooperation with the French became the 
benchmark for any other international partnership, to the point that it was not necessarily 
relevant to distinguish their initiatives, because they are ‘old partners, working there since 
[their] ancestors’38 and ‘the CRA-CF is their home’,39 after all. 
French support for the CRA-CF had some consistency throughout the years. PARAB (1996–
2000) and its sequel PARCOB (2001–2006) focussed on plant breeding and were very well 
assessed by CRA-CF researchers. During the implementation phase, France placed CIRAD 
researchers in Benin to work daily with Beninese agronomists. The proximity created a 
permanent space for sharing knowledge, both scientific and organisational. In addition, 
despite not being a cotton producing country, French experts have longstanding experience 
in tropical agriculture. Therefore, Beninese researchers did not perceive the differences of 
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ecosystems in France and Benin as a problem. French experts are respected, and Beninese 
researchers acknowledge and legitimise their work. 
There are French specialists who are in institutions, in international 
organisations and who work in the inter-tropical zone, that is to say in West 
Africa for example, or in Central Africa… So, they have researchers from 
CIRAD who have been working in our areas here for years, who have plenty 
of experience in our region… 
They are the connoisseurs of the field - at least that’s how we consider them, 
so all they say is like gospel… it was like that. From the scientific point of 
view, technically speaking, they brought us a lot… it’s a pleasure to acquire 
this knowledge since we know that it will serve us later, even if they go away.40 
Although the French projects were on a smaller scale than the World Bank projects, their 
support contributed to perpetuating the patterns that early projects introduced. Indeed, these 
projects consolidated the idea of a project being the source of core resources, indispensable 
for the normal functioning of institutions, and locally managed. Alongside the provision of 
resources, projects set up a management system. This system became the model that, on one 
hand, Beninese researchers seek to imitate in managing the national budget, and on the other 
hand, that they expect to find when a subsequent project is launched. In this regard, when 
commenting on the French way of managing projects, a CRA-CF researcher stated: ‘the 
French are not very different from us. The means comes first… The French system is good, 
when we have the availability of funds and materials before the start of the activity, because 
we can ask for reports afterwards.’41 
Similar to the cotton projects of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, French support for cotton research 
created a pattern of development cooperation. This pattern was defined by the provision of 
the human and financial resources necessary to the functioning of agricultural research. This 
example also shows that models of management and certain types of activities also became 
the norm. Later projects can be assessed against this baseline. 
5.1.2. Continued tradition in subsequent projects 
From the 2000s on, there was a considerable increase in the number of projects and partners 
intervening in the cotton sector in Benin. The diversity of donors, in particular, provided an 
opportunity to transform the method of implementation and the nature of projects. 
However, projects reproduced the patterns of previous initiatives. In parallel, the consistency 
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of managerial models through time enabled host actors to develop strategies to engage in 
project activities. 
New projects, traditional mechanisms 
During the 2000s, the number of partners and projects escalated. Until 2006, the cotton 
sector in Benin had known only France, the World Bank, and the Netherlands as providers 
of development cooperation. By 2009, in addition to the previous partners, GIZ, USAID, 
SNV, Brazil, FAO, Helvetas, and the African Development Bank had introduced new 
projects to the cotton sector. The International Fertilizer Development Centre (IFDC) also 
became an important player by taking part in projects with different providers, such as the 
United States, via USAID, and the Embassy of the Netherlands in Benin. 
While France and CIRAD continued to support agricultural research through PARCOB 
(2001–2006), France and the World Bank also started to provide support to the AIC, which 
had been created a few years earlier in 1999. At that time, the production of cotton in Benin 
had been growing vigorously for almost ten years. The increase stemmed mainly from the 
expansion of fields cultivated with cotton, while yields remained constant, which reduced the 
effect of the production boom on rural income. The World Bank’s Support to Cotton 
Reform Project (PARFC, 2003–2008) appraisal document states that 
the extent of poverty in the faster growing cotton sector is also a testimony 
to the fact that mere expansion in agricultural output is not a sufficient 
condition for poverty reduction, which requires higher productivity and 
employment of resources that poor people depend on for their livelihood. 
(World Bank, 2001, p.2) 
From this diagnostic, the Bank provided a credit of 18 million USD to ‘provide the necessary 
support to private sector operators and their institutions to fill the void left by the 
privatisation of the SONAPRA’s ginning activities’ (World Bank, 2001, p.4). The AIC was 
the implementation institution and the main beneficiary of funds that aimed to cover 
technical advisory services, training, and acquisition of vehicles, equipment, furniture, and 
other materials – as illustrated in figure 13. Another share would enable the Association to 
implement technical services programmes through rural extension activities, apart from the 
CARDERs’ regular services. Around a quarter of the total budget was allocated to the 
strengthening of the farmer’s federation, FUPRO, which represented the cotton growers at 
the AIC, while smaller shares were allocated to the improvement of ginning operations and 





Figure 13: The World Bank PARFC project provided necessary equipment to the cooperatives. In this picture, two 4x4 
vehicles with the project’s insignia await maintenance in the headquarters of the departmental union of cooperatives of cotton 
farmers of Borgou 
 
Alongside the PARFC, France launched the Support for the Cotton Sector Reform project 
(PARSC, 2004–2009). The project intended to support the AIC through two components. 
The largest part of the budget was allocated to the realisation of technical studies on cotton 
sector development (Saizonou, 2015; Ton, 2004). A smaller share enabled the AIC to set up 
a communication team. A former AIC staff member declared that only a few studies have 
been carried out, largely because of the difficulties of getting AFD staff to approve the hiring 
of external consultants, for reasons that were never clear to him.42 At the end of the 
implementation period, the remaining budget was reallocated to the communication section, 
allowing the staff to be hired for two more years until the end of 2009. 
Although the World Bank and the AFD used different funding mechanisms (credit for the 
former, grants for the latter), both projects consisted of direct financial support that enabled 
the AIC to function. This scheme reproduced the kind of support found in earlier projects, 
when foreign support also provided the essential means for the institutions to function. This 
pattern has endured with slight changes with the arrival of new partners. 
In the post-2004 period, marked by a new push for cotton projects following the WTO 
discussions, the main initiatives were COMPACI (2006–2010), PROCOTON (2006–2013), 
and WACIP (2006–2013). These three projects aimed to develop the cotton sector either by 
creating parallel chains of production – as is the case for the COMPACI – or by enabling the 
functioning of existing institutions through financial and technical support. WACIP and 
 





PROCOTON, especially, aimed to support – but in fact to enable – processes that already 
existed or were supposed to exist in order for the sector to function. 
The West Africa Cotton Improvement Programme (WACIP) was a USAID regional project 
implemented in the C-4 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali). The objective was 
to strengthen the capacity of farmers’ organisations to reduce poverty by improving 
agricultural practices and natural resource management. The project also provided support 
to the ginneries, but the emphasis was on cotton production. The main activities built on the 
existing rural extension institutions to disseminate conservation agricultural practices by 
increasing the number of workshops and follow-up activities with selected beneficiaries. 
Such activities represented around 60% of the project’s budget allocation in Benin 
(Development and Training Services, 2010, p.16). The project worked with the CRA-CF, the 
AIC, and the MAEP in the dissemination of an alternative technical itinerary in which organic 
and chemical fertilisers were combined.43 According to the project evaluation, the initiative 
‘used more local than US expertise’ even though US experts contributed to the development 
and review of training materials and delivered some activities in the field (Development and 
Training Services, 2010, p.14). The local expertise was mobilised through the hiring of former 
government staff in hosting countries as project managers and focal points.  
The Cotton Producers Organisations Strengthening Programme (PROCOTON) was funded 
and implemented by the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV). The objective was 
to support the village cooperatives by providing material resources and by organising training 
on the effective management of organisations (Wennink et al., 2013). The logic of 
intervention was based on diagnostic studies which found that cooperatives presented 
serious managerial failures that compromised the earnings from cotton production. 
Therefore, the financial resources that the project introduced aimed to provide the financial, 
human, technical, and material resources that the cooperatives needed to realise their 
mission.  
 





Figure 14: Chairs PROCOTON provided to the cotton farmers’ cooperative of Borgou 
 
 
These projects left a mark in the local context. Cooperatives’ representatives and extension 
agents also remembered the ‘good times’ of PROCOTON, when the headquarters were 
equipped (by providing chairs to cooperatives, as figure 14 illustrates), and the staff had 
opportunities to be trained.44 In this sense, the project continued to provide that necessary 
support without which the organisations could not fulfil their role. 
Even though WACIP and PROCOTON set up project teams in Benin to manage the funds, 
they continued to provide the means for national institutions to function. PROCOTON did 
not resist the sectoral reforms though. In 2009, farmers’ organisations were reorganised and 
the project’s partner cooperatives disappeared to give place to new structures. In contrast, in 
2014, USAID and the IFDC launched WACIP’s follow-up project, the Four Country Cotton 
Partnership (C4CP, 2014–2018). The project’s objective was to scale-up WACIP’s successes 
by focussing on enhancing the links within the cotton value chain. 
C4CP (214–2018) adopted a different logic of intervention: ‘faire-faire’.45 This involves sub-
contracting local and national organisations to implement project activities. For example, the 
National Association of Women Farmers of Benin (ANaF) was contracted to get involved 
in the project activities. The Association became an implementation partner and participated 
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in the elaboration and dissemination of training materials. According to the members who 
were involved in the process, 
faire-faire is a new methodology, different from the usual… Here, the Beninese 
are the ones who direct the activities… The endogenous practices are there. 
We tried to arrange that, to adapt to our reality, and disseminate through 
workshops where we shared our experiences… it is an inclusive project.46 
For the ANaF and former C4CP managers, the project strategy was based on the lessons 
learnt from the lack of sustainability observed in WACIP. While transforming prior project 
arrangements, C4CP went one step further in replicating the financial provision pattern of 
development projects. At the time I met the ANaF team and the managers C4CP had hired, 
the project had just been terminated. The Association was looking for new external donors 
in order to replicate the training and use the material provided during the project. The project 
managers had already been hired in other development projects. 
To summarise, the provision of resources remained the norm with the arrival of new projects 
and partners from the 2000s on. There have been some changes, however. On one hand, the 
cotton sector in Benin was in a different stage of development that required a different kind 
of support (as I discuss in the next chapter), with more focus on capacity-building than on 
direct budget support. On the other hand, the aid architecture had also evolved. Projects 
became smaller and more participatory mechanisms emerged within project spaces. 
Additionally, the focus of the initiatives in the rural sector went from state-led initiatives in 
the 1970s to other themes, such as poverty alleviation, sustainable livelihoods, gender equity, 
and good governance, from the 1990s (Ellis and Biggs, 2001). This meant that project 
support would go directly to the private sector, farmers’ organisations, and ginning operators, 
instead of public entities. Nevertheless, if the receiver-end changed, the essence of projects 
continued to be the provision of resources, as projects continued to introduce the means 
that were lacking in the host context. The historical reproduction of this pattern shaped the 
way host actors engaged in project processes, affecting and transforming them. 
PARFC and the hazards of ownership 
Projects provided more than essential resources to make the organisation of the cotton sector 
function. Because of the gap between the financial availability within and outside project 
frameworks, projects became points of attraction to host actors, who tried to insert their 
activities within project resource frameworks, as the example of the ANaF above testifies. 
 





The attractiveness of project resources affected project processes and impact, including in 
the organisation of the cotton sector itself. The example of the PARFC illustrates such 
experience. 
The PARFC (2003–2008) was an important support mechanism for the AIC, especially in its 
early years. It provided the means for the Association to function by providing the required 
financial, technical, and material support. Contradictorily, the project also contributed to 
aggravating a major institutional crisis that undermined AIC actions in the field for almost a 
decade. In that period, the AIC was composed of the three segments of the cotton sector, 
which were the cotton farmers, the ginners, and the input suppliers. Each of these ‘families’, 
as they are called in Benin, was organised in unions from the local to the national level. 
Representatives of each family organisation sat on the AIC board. The growers were 
represented by the Federation of Unions of Farmers (FUPRO), the ginners by the 
Professional Association of Ginners of Benin (APEB), and the input suppliers by the 
Professional Group of Importers and Exporters of Agricultural Inputs (GPDIA). To 
strengthen the AIC, the PARFC aimed to support each of these organisations (Saizonou, 
2015; Ton, 2004). 
The FUPRO, although created from the initiative of cotton growers, assembled other 
farmers who do not grow cotton (FUPRO, 2016). The fact that the FUPRO was responsible 
for representing cotton growers at the AIC created issues of representativeness. Indeed, 
during the implementation of the PARFC, the FUPRO’s president was a producer of 
pineapple. He nevertheless represented the cotton growers at the AIC board. His position 
gave him power over the allocation of the resources introduced by the PARFC to strengthen 
cotton farmers’ organisations. The cotton growers, however, contested the decisions made 
by the FUPRO. According to their understanding, the project should benefit cotton growers 
only. Hence, the problem of representativeness and of resource allocation increased with the 
introduction of PARFC resources:  
The resources of these projects, who will eat, who will not eat, that was what 
created the difficulties between farmers… As cotton growers were supported 
by the PARFC via the FUPRO, there were a number of resources available 
to them. These resources placed at the FUPRO were used in several activities 
that were not necessarily cotton-based.47 
 





The rush for project resources compromised project processes and the achievement of 
objectives. The cotton growers decided to create new cooperatives and unions to claim 
representation at the AIC. Alongside project resources, farmers and input suppliers had been 
in conflict since 2001 because of the increase in the price of fertilisers (Saizonou, 2015). The 
dissident groups of farmers organised informal networks of input supply with the support 
of suppliers, outside the input credit system managed by the AIC (Sinzogan et al., 2007). In 
addition to the institutional crises, world cotton prices decreased in 2004 and Beninese 
exports also suffered from the depreciation of the USD/XOF exchange rate (World Bank, 
2008, p.6). In 2005, more than ten farmers’ organisations claimed a seat at the AIC, while in 
2006 the national production of cotton reached its lowest level48 since liberalisation (AIC, 
2017). The final evaluation of the PARFC assesses the project as ‘moderately unsatisfactory’, 
in elements such as borrower performance (World Bank, 2008). 
From the perspective of AIC members’ and farmers’ representatives, however, the project 
enabled the strengthening of farmers’ organisations and the consolidation of the AIC. This 
was possible mainly because of the ‘fresh cash’ that the project made available.49 The 
provision of equipment and financial resources remained the most appreciated aspect of the 
project. Indeed, without projects, the cooperatives lacked resources to conduct their mission, 
and to organise training, field visits, and so on. A cooperative member’s statement 
demonstrates this expectation towards projects: 
We have to train the farmers because we always want to do better and better. 
So without training, it is not possible… There is where the [development] 
partners should support us. For example, now, if we could find a partner for 
the UD-CVPC that could help us to improve, to bring the information… we 
could build a library… There is also the technical material, it becomes a 
trademark, that lasts from generation to generation… but without the 
material, it cannot happen… We really want to develop, but we lack the 
means.50 
From his perspective, the project is the best way through which he can access funds and 
implement the activities under the cooperative’s mandate. In this sense, the organisational 
problems that the PARFC triggered seemed less important than the benefits of having funds 
available, even if they were used to conduct activities that were not planned within the project 
framework. 
 
48 190,866 tonnes was produced that year, against 427,159 tonnes in 2005 (AIC, 2017). 
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In this section, I have described how both donors and host actors perpetuated traditional aid 
patterns, in spite of changes in the aid paradigm and practices. From 2009, the cotton sector 
in Benin began to host projects initiated by providers from the Global South. South-South 
cooperation processes, which claim to be different, were inserted into a context that already 
had a tradition of development projects and expectations towards this kind of experience. In 
the next section I examine the challenges that Southern projects faced when introducing new 
project processes in Benin. 
5.2. South-South cooperation and the introduction of new practices 
in a traditional aid-hosting context 
South-South cooperation (SSC) is not a new dynamic in the international development 
cooperation architecture. In the 2000s, SSC gained momentum due to the rise of some 
developing countries as economic powers and emerging donors – to borrow Mawdsley’s 
(2012) expression. Southern providers of development cooperation started implementing 
projects in the cotton sector in Benin in 2009. They brought to a traditional aid-hosting 
context distinct development practices that contrasted, to some extent, to what had been 
done before. The mismatch of expectations and practices sheds light on the weight of past 
experiences and on the possibilities of transforming regularised development cooperation 
practices. 
5.2.1. The first batch of Southern projects 
Benin started to host their first Southern cotton project in 2009, 45 years after the first cotton 
project in the sector. From 2009 to 2018, Benin hosted five Southern cotton projects, which 
presented similarities and differences. The rationale behind the projects that Brazil, China, 
India, and Turkey implemented was built on a claim of context-similarity between provider 
and host which constitutes one of the basic SSC principles. Hence, all Southern cotton 
projects came with a similar objective of sharing their national knowledge, experiences, and 
technologies with Benin, all four providers being major cotton-producing countries. In this 
section, I describe how these countries came to implement cotton projects in Benin, before 
I examine the perspectives of host actors. 
Brazil’s Cotton 4 initiatives 
The Brazilian C-4 Project (2009–2013) was the first SSC project to be implemented in the 
cotton sector in Benin. Brazil and the countries of the C-4 group started negotiating the 





global trade in cotton at the WTO. Two parallel processes within the WTO encouraged 
Brazil – and other countries later on – to implement cotton projects in African countries. 
On one hand, Brazil requested consultations on US subsidies to cotton producers, starting a 
dispute settlement procedure at the WTO that put a spotlight on Brazilian agricultural 
development and diplomacy. On the other hand, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, the 
main West African cotton producing countries, created the C4 group and requested that the 
WTO address cotton market issues specifically. The Director General of the WTO followed 
up on their request via the creation of the sub-committee on cotton development. 
In 2004, the C-4 group sent a request to Brazil for a technical cooperation project, while the 
Brazil-US dispute settlement continued. At that time, Brazil was already one of the five 
biggest producers and exporters of cotton worldwide. National production of cotton lint 
went from 0.3 million tonnes in 1996 to 2.6 million tonnes in 2019 (ABRAPA, 2019), 
overcoming thereby two decades of crisis in the cotton sector. The increase in cotton 
production in Brazil stemmed from the expansion of farms to the drylands of the Brazilian 
Cerrado, a region that has a similar geography to the Sahel. In addition, technological 
innovations and important public investments in agricultural research supported the 
geographical expansion and the upsurge of cotton production. In this context, the Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) led the technological advancements that have 
made Brazil a global agricultural power (Cabral, 2016). Such development boosted Brazilian 
development cooperation initiatives in agriculture (Cabral et al., 2016; Milhorance, 2014, 
2013). After five years of negotiation and exploratory missions (Menezes, 2013), the project 
was signed in 2009 with the objective of improving the international competitiveness of C-4 
countries through the sharing of Brazilian cotton farming techniques (Plan Políticas Públicas 
and Articulação Sul, 2015). 
The C4 Project (2009–2013) was the first Brazilian regional technical cooperation project 
with African countries (Plan Políticas Públicas and Articulação Sul, 2015). The activities were 
concentrated in Mali, where a Brazilian expert from Embrapa was based and an existing 
experimentation site reformed to accommodate entomological laboratories and to host 
training activities. The INRAB was the Beninese partner institution and CRA-CF researchers 
the main beneficiaries. The project did not reach farmers, extension agents, or AIC staff 
directly, except via the booklets of best agricultural practices jointly elaborated by researchers 





In the meantime, the dispute settlement between Brazil and the US progressed at the WTO. 
Despite several appeals from the US, the WTO found consensus in favour of Brazil against 
US subsidies. The refusal of the US government to comply allowed Brazil to retaliate by 
increasing import tax for more than one hundred US goods. In 2010, the US and Brazil 
agreed on annual compensation of 147 million USD to Brazilian growers (WTO, 2019), 10% 
of which Brazil’s government decided to allocate to projects in the C-4 countries, in order to 
share Brazilian knowledge and technology. Finally, Brazil and the US agreed on a final 
payment of 800 million USD, of which 80 million were allocated to SSC projects in African 
and Latin American countries. The allocated funds contributed to the conclusion of the C-4 
project and to the elaboration and implementation of its sequel, C-4+Togo (2014–2019), 
launched in 2014. 
China, India, and Turkey 
China, India, and Turkey joined Brazil as Southern providers of development cooperation in 
the cotton sector in Benin in 2012. China and India are cotton world powers, being 
respectively the first and second world producers of cotton (ICAC, 2019). In addition, China 
was also the biggest importer and India the biggest exporter of cotton linters in 2017 (ITC, 
2019). Turkey has a smaller production, but it is also one of the major cotton producing 
countries and known for high yields and lint quality (Robinson, 2012; ICAC, 2019).  
In China, cotton is a traditional crop, but intensive cotton cultivation began only during the 
second half of the twentieth century (Dai and Dong, 2014). In that period, farmers adopted 
intensive farming technologies (such as plastic mulching, super high plant density technique, 
and grain-cotton double-cropping) that enabled national production to reach more than eight 
million tonnes in the 2000s (ICAC, 2019; Dai and Dong, 2014). 
The central feature of China’s bilateral initiatives on agriculture with African countries is to 
combine projects with business operations to enable financial sustainability after the end of 
the project (Buckley, 2013; Xu et al., 2016). Benin and China launched the Support to Cotton 
Production in Benin project (StCP, 2012–2018) in 2012, which aimed to support cotton 
production and competitiveness. A demonstration centre in Benin was built in Parakou to 
host training and to experiment with Chinese varieties of cotton. The project also sought to 
support the mechanisation of Beninese agriculture and to develop trade relations between 
China and Benin (Aguehoundé, 2018). In 2018, the project was extended to its second phase, 





In India, more than six million farmers grow cotton across three different agro-ecological 
regions, under irrigated and rain-fed conditions (Kranthi, 2013). The production of cotton 
in India has increased considerably since 2002 and the adoption of genetically modified 
cotton. The production of cotton lint went from 2.3 million tonnes in 2001 to 6.7 million 
tonnes in 2014 (ICAC, 2019). In 2017, India became the main trade partner of Benin, 
importing the biggest share of Beninese cotton lint (ITC, 2019). 
In 2009, a visit to India by Yayi Boni, then President of Benin, consolidated India-Benin 
diplomatic relations. During the visit, India’s prime minister announced a line of credit for 
the purchase of agricultural equipment (High Commission of India, 2019). Donation of 
medical materials and visits of Indian experts followed promptly. In 2010, Indian 
agronomists visited Benin to prepare the launch of the Cotton Technical Assistance 
Programme for Africa (C-TAP, 2012–2017), which also involved the other C-4 countries, in 
addition to Nigeria, Uganda, and Malawi. The objective of the project, launched in 2012, was 
to strengthen the competitiveness of the cotton value chain by facilitating the transfer of 
knowledge and technology from India (DCTD, 2015). The main activities of the project 
involved organising training and study tours to India for researchers and public officials from 
recipient countries, short-term fellowships in Indian research centres, and in-country training 
(Sharma, 2016). 
Turkish development cooperation has a lesser Southern imprint, as it blends OECD-DAC 
and SSC principles (Hausmann and Lundsgaarde, 2015). Similar to emerging countries, 
Turkey’s development cooperation expanded its geographical and thematic scope during the 
2000s. In 2012, Benin sent a request to Turkey for a technical cooperation project to access 
Turkish knowledge and experience on cotton yield and lint quality (TIKA, 2015). Unlike 
China and India, the strength of Turkish cotton lies in its high yields and in the quality of the 
lint, ideal for textiles. The increase in national cotton production was very important to 
support the growing textile industry without affecting the trade balance. For its importance 
in the manufacturing sector, the government has supported farmers by increasing the 
bonuses for seed cotton and the availability of certified seeds to revive the sector (USDA, 
2018). Production has oscillated in past years, but since 2011 has stabilised at around 750,000 
tonnes (ICAC, 2019).  
In 2012, Yayi Boni became the first Beninese president to visit Turkey. On that occasion, 
Yayi Boni addressed a request for a technical cooperation project to allow Benin to benefit 





Following the signing of cooperation agreements, the Cotton Farming Project (TK-CFP, 
2013–2015) was launched in 2013. This project involved training workshops and study tours 
in Turkey and Benin. In addition, CRA-CF researchers tried Turkish varieties of cotton in 
their experimentation fields. 
The rationale behind the projects that Brazil, China, India, and Turkey implemented in Benin 
is the same: to share their national knowledge, experience, and technologies with Benin. In 
contrast with traditional donors, Southern providers tend to focus their projects in areas in 
which they excel nationally. All four Southern providers of cotton projects in Benin are major 
world cotton-producing countries. This explains the focus on knowledge sharing through 
training and study tours. The experimentation with varieties of cotton stems from the 
narrative of shared geographies, which is embedded in the SSC context-similarity claim. 
The Southern batch of projects also targeted the same beneficiaries and institutions. 
Although farmers were identified as indirect beneficiaries, the INRAB was the main partner 
institution. Brazil’s follow-up project, C-4+Togo, aimed to reach more farmers, following 
the recommendations from the evaluation of the first phase and the requests from host 
countries. The second phase of China’s Support to Cotton Production in Benin also intended 
to work more closely with farmers in the northern departments. Yet the MAEP and the 
INRAB remained the prioritised interlocutors. In the next section, I move to the perspectives 
of host countries on these projects. 
5.2.2. South-South cooperation seen from the field 
The Southern projects touched the groups of actors in the cotton sector to varying degrees. 
Even though the activities involved farmers, those I interviewed barely remembered 
interacting with stakeholders from the South or were not able to distinguish them from 
Northern projects. CRA-CF researchers and extensions agents, to a lesser extent, were the 
ones who got more involved in these projects. Their perspectives on Southern cotton 
projects provide insights into the weight of such projects in the development cooperation 
field, and on similarities and differences between Northern and Southern projects, and 
amongst Southern providers alike. 
Cotton growers 
When I arrived in Parakou and started meeting cotton growers, I was eager to listen to what 
they had to say about their experiences in SSC cotton projects. One of the first interviews I 





village cooperative as someone very well connected with foreign actors due to having 
participated in multiple projects. In addition, he has been hosting CRA-CF experiments in 
one of his plots and producing the official seeds for national distribution. In the middle of 
the interview, he finally mentioned Brazil, but it was a misleading hint: 
I met a Brazilian team two years ago. They do organic cotton… I was part of 
the farmers’ cooperative, so I met them as a person in charge of implementing 
organic cotton in our area… [They were] Brazilians and Germans. It was just 
a coordination meeting. They came here and they looked for us. I don’t know 
why it didn’t continue after that.51 
That was the first mention I heard from farmers about an interaction with an expert from an 
emerging country. Yet his statement did not match the inventory of projects that I had begun 
compiling. I was almost sure that Brazil was not promoting organic cotton in Benin. We 
continued the interview, talking about how he learnt to grow cotton and about the training 
activities that he had attended. He enjoyed this opportunity to clarify the organic cotton 
training he received: ‘In fact, [the training] that I mentioned earlier was to maintain the 
fertility of the soil without using agrochemicals… to see the advantages and disadvantages 
of organic cotton and chemical cotton’.52 Following this, he proceeded to give a detailed 
description of the techniques that he learnt during the activity. These were the use of cow 
dung, crop residues, and cover plants as organic manure, and of natural enemies for the main 
cotton pests. These techniques were being shared by different projects in the past ten years, 
but I had been informed by previous interviewees that it was Brazil’s C-4 project that 
introduced the use of cover plants in the cotton producing system. It appeared then that the 
SSC experience was not a distinguishable experience, but one among many. 
We continued chatting after I turned off my recorder. We talked about Brazil again, when I 
said where I am from. That rang a bell: he said that he had attended a workshop with Brazilian 
experts on cover plants. When I asked why he did not mention this experience during the 
interview, he said that he had forgotten. We scheduled a second interview a few months later 
to talk specifically about development cooperation projects. 
In the second interview, the distinction between project techniques became much clearer, 
but the difference between Southern and Northern paradigms and practices remained 
blurred. At first, he could not remember the organisation who facilitated the meeting on 
organic cotton, but he recognised the name of CapBIO Helvetas (2011–2014) a few minutes 
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later. He remembered very well the meeting and the rules for cultivating and selling organic 
cotton. His interest lay in the conservation measures that he could apply in his plot. Yet he 
did not adopt any aspect of organic farming techniques due to the constraints it imposes 
(such as leaving the field unseeded for five years). Then, we moved to the Brazilian project. 
His participation in a training activity of the C4+Togo project happened in October 2016. 
The training was about the benefits of no-till farming and the use of cover crops to improve 
soil fertility. The C4+Togo project considered farmers only as secondary beneficiaries. The 
activity lasted for one week, but cotton growers only participated in the last day. In addition, 
the farmers who attended were the ones that usually work with CRA-CF researchers. 
The people did a whole week to train the CPV [extension agents]. We, the 
producers, we were called on the last day to visit the [experimentation] field. 
[The extension agents] were the ones who were in charge of managing us… 
That’s was the experience I had. It was the Brazilians who carried out the 
project… I don’t know if it’s C-4 or if it’s C-3 plus Togo… There is a C4 
Project there… it was the reason we were there… But they targeted us, those 
who make the basic seed, to show how we can keep our soil fertile when we 
grow cotton with chemical fertilisers. That’s what I remember from that 
experience… but there was no training with modules or documents or stuff 
like that.53 
The limited reach in regards to farmers of the C4 project was also a characteristic of the other 
SSC projects. In the questionnaire I conducted with 208 cotton growers, only two 
participants mentioned participation in Southern projects. Among extension agents, the SSC 
footprint is more important. 
Extension agents 
Extension agents were more involved than farmers in SSC projects, especially in Brazil’s 
C4+Togo Project. China, India, and Turkey’s projects did not provide broad enough 
opportunities to mark the life trajectories of extension agents. None of the extension agents 
I met had taken part in activities organised by these projects. Brazil’s second project, in 
contrast, intended to work more closely with extension agents to enable the dissemination 
of the agricultural practices that researchers started experimenting with in the first C-4 
project. 
Thereby, Brazil’s cotton projects in Benin involved extension agents in training activities and 
study tours in Brazil and neighbouring countries. For some of them, the project provided 
the only opportunity they had to travel to another country within the framework of their job. 
 





Additionally, extension agents were not usually the target population for international travel 
within project frameworks. 
The C-4 started in Benin in 2010… or in 2008, 2010… in that period, they 
trained us in Parakou… it was only after that that there were activities in 
Bamako… In 2016 I was sent to Bamako again. Recently, in 2017, I attended 
training in Brazil. I did three months there… I had the opportunity to visit 
the cotton-producing areas of Brazil… where I understood that cotton in 
Brazil is really developed. I understood that cotton is a cash crop that can 
really allow us to value the resources in our countries.54 
Study tours in the provider country emerged as a characteristic of SSC projects, because this 
was not an activity ever carried out by traditional donors. (USAID projects could have 
organised the same kind of activity in US cotton farms, but never did.) This distinction of 
SSC projects is in line with the claim of context similarity that forms part of SSC principles, 
while being absent in the North-South development architecture. It enables SSC initiatives 
to overcome some barriers in the knowledge sharing process, such as the scepticism of 
beneficiaries towards foreign practices. 
When we see an expat, all that the expatriate will tell us, whatever he is saying, 
we’ll say ‘it remains to be verified’. Or we can tell him: what happens abroad 
is not the same that can happen here, because there is the climate that differs 
and there are also the means. So, we get to show them that what’s going on 
in their home, it’s not the same that can happen here… 
The only training I did with Brazilians I enjoyed so much, I always talk about 
that… They do everything they can to show you how they do things there 
and how we do things here. Then it is up to you to see how you can balance 
things so they can work out… The Germans do not show what’s going on 
there. They only come to tell us ‘you should do this’, ‘you are going to do 
this’, and they do not come directly themselves. They take Beninese experts, 
doctors, experts from other countries who come to work. They just do the 
follow-up.55 
From the perspective of extension agents, there is more distinction between Northern and 
Southern cotton projects. At the level of CRA-CF researchers, such differences become 
clearer. 
Cotton researchers 
All CRAF-CF researchers I met during fieldwork had participated in international 
development project activities through their career paths. Most of them had also been 
engaged in Southern cotton projects. Their perceptions of Southern providers demonstrate 
 
54 MAEP#3, 07/02/2018. 





the diversity of SSC in the field and both the similarity and distinctions between Northern 
and Southern projects. 
Researchers do not see the Southern providers as a homogenous bloc when it comes to the 
methods of implementing projects. This also stems from their pre-conceived perceptions of 
country partners. The Chinese, for example, ‘worked too much in isolation’56 and their 
experts lacked legitimacy, as a researcher explained: 
About the Chinese, it is better to be honest… Ah, it’s hard to work with 
them. Well, at first, those with whom we interacted, we felt that they were 
not specialists in the field… There are basic elements in science that if you 
are a scientist and you do not know or try to contradict, we take you as 
someone who is not of the area. So that made us question whether they really 
were experts in the field… Those who were here did not allow me to do the 
experiments necessary to draw some notions of their method of work, even 
though it was very interesting for me. So, at least those we were dealing with, 
it was very, very, very difficult to work with them.57 
By contrast, researchers perceived the Turkish project as technically advanced. The main 
aspect of the TK-CF project was the transfer of Turkish varieties to Benin, since they are 
known for the quality of their lint. The Turkish varieties presented some elements that could 
enhance the ones the CRA-CF had developed. However, after conducting experiments, they 
found that the Beninese varieties were better adapted to the local context. 
We couldn’t say what we wanted to have. When you come to a research 
organisation, it has to be win-win. If you come, and we see that what we have 
here is better, this means that we don’t have anything to take from you58. 
In the statement above, the interviewee implies that the relationships with Turkish experts 
were not horizontal. Later on, he completed his argument more precisely: ‘[Turkish experts] 
came to teach us directly the good stuff. But we cannot bring something to cotton research 
and say it’s good. It’s good there, but here at home, we have to test to see if it’s good.’59 This 
perception indicates the reproduction of top-down relationships within Southern projects, a 
point in common with traditional aid patterns, echoing other research on SSC in practice 
(Cesarino, 2013; Taela, 2017). In one activity specifically, researchers complained that the 
Chinese were not open to their suggestions and did not pay enough attention to the 
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characteristics of the host context. Such practice challenges the SSC principle of 
horizontality: 
[INRAB#2] In the planting protocol that they did, we provided some 
amendments [but what we said] didn’t have much weight. If we say that we 
will make such density, and they propose [a different] density, we say no. At 
the implementation, because we were not there – we have other tasks too – 
they did what they wanted. 
[INRAB#3] They didn’t consider the changes we proposed… 
[INRAB#2] While there is a reality here in Benin that we know, and they 
don’t.60 
Another common trait of Southern and Northern projects was the provision of material 
resources. Indeed, despite the focus on knowledge sharing, the provision of equipment and 
the construction of infrastructure also characterised Southern cotton projects. In Benin, this 
was mainly the case for the Chinese, Turkish, and Indian projects. The Indian C-TAP project 
built a ginning factory for the exclusive use of the CRA-CF. Within the StCP project, China 
provided trucks and built a training centre. Brazil’s C4 and C4+Togo also planned to provide 
equipment to the mobile rural extension units, but this never materialised before the end of 
the period of implementation. 
This shared trait with Northern providers stops at the level of the availability and 
management of financial resources, as a project coordinator explained: 
It’s not the same approach. Often, they come with their money and they 
spend their money. The Chinese come with their money, they spend it. The 
Turkish, they come with their money, they spend it. The Indian, they come 
with their money, they spend it… the Brazilians, they are even more serious, 
because they do not even come with money [laughs] it’s from [Brazil] that 
they say what to do with the money. It’s more serious.61 
The relative lack of resources and the extent to which the host country had to financially 
contribute to project activities drew the attention of host actors. Hosts assessed the new 
system that Southern providers introduced by comparing it to the way traditional donors 
used to do things, which had become the taken-for-granted way of managing projects. Thus, 
an interviewee enjoyed the training he attended in India, but regretted the long travels and 
the lack of resources for the project: ‘not even the money of the Brazilians… it is not a lot’.62 
Similarly, a project coordinator had to deal with the dissatisfaction of participants who 
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criticised the small vehicle in which they went for a long monitoring mission in the bush 
within a C4+Togo project activity. According to a project expert who had navigated across 
multiple paradigms of aid, the Beninese counterpart expected the project to provide the 
vehicle, even though they were assigned this task in the project document. He explained 
during an interview that the resistance to taking part financially in projects usually makes the 
donors give the funds instead. This strategy did not work with Brazilians though, to the 
surprise of participants. 
In addition to the relatively smaller number of resources that Southern providers introduce, 
the principles of management also distinguish them from traditional donors. CRA-CF 
researchers were used to having a budget available for conducting project activities in the 
field that gave them more room for manoeuvre. The fact that none of the Southern partners 
transferred the budget to the national counterpart was a rupture with what had been done 
before. For them, the benefit of the French system, and the availability of funds, is that it 
makes them more accountable. However,  
the disadvantage is that the means are not really used to do the real work… 
at times we can misappropriate it to do something else with. That’s when the 
Brazilian system becomes advantageous, because it wants to see the work 
done before cashing the money. The disadvantage there becomes the 
advantage here. Since you must necessarily get involved before you have the 
money. I still believe that this system is good because the project brings an 
innovation that we want to share. The very fact of doing it is to our advantage, 
so when the guys act like that, I think they are partially right too, because we 
have to seek our own well-being.63 
Similarly, Southern projects did not set up project teams in Benin or hire local staff to the 
same extent as other projects used to. China’s StCP project team was small and composed 
of Chinese expatriates that hardly interacted with their Beninese counterparts, as we have 
seen above. Brazil’s C-4+Togo hired one assistant in 2018, one year before the end of the 
implementation period, to support the financial management of the project. The managerial 
approach went against their tradition, as a project participant argued: 
From a logistical point of view, their style of management does not consider 
our traditions here… I take a simple example, in training, there are trainers 
whom you invited, there are also producers whom you invited. You see? 
Now, in our traditions here, the trainer will be paid more than the producer. 
Already as a basic principle. But in their project, we found out that it’s the 
opposite. Producers are paid more than trainers.64 
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When the researcher above mentions the disrespect for traditions, he was not referring to 
Beninese customary rules. The tradition here is the tradition of development projects; this is 
the usual ways projects have been managed and implemented in Benin since the 1960s. 
According to project managers, farmers were paid more because they were coming from 
their villages to the city of Parakou. Conversely, the participation of researchers as trainers 
was included in the budget as working hours. Yet researchers expected to be paid separately, 
according to the arrangements in other projects: ‘all other projects are not like that. The 
payment to the trainers is put aside in the budget, hence whatever the situation, the trainer 
is paid more than the participant.’65 
These perspectives on SSC practice emerging from host countries mean that the volume of 
resources and the methods of managing projects that Southern providers introduced did not 
meet the expectations of host actors. From their perceptions, shaped by previous 
experiences, a project represents the provision of resources, illustrated by the motto ‘no 
project, no job’ that appeared during the first projects between 1960 and the 1980s (Mongbo 
and Dossou-Houessou, 2000). This is what Beninese practitioners expect before engaging in 
a development cooperation project, but they did not find it in Southern projects.  
5.2.3. When SSC project processes meet traditional aid expectations 
Some of the processes that Southern cotton projects introduced into Benin contrasted with 
previous experiences that had regularised practices in the cotton sector. The encounter of 
traditional aid and SSC principles created a mismatch of practices in the development 
cooperation field that affected project implementation, creating both obstacles and 
opportunities. 
The mismatch of development practices 
The shared management and funding of projects were one of the main characteristics of 
Southern cotton projects in Benin. As we have seen above, hosts expected projects to 
introduce the resources necessary to conduct project activities. Some projects also requested 
contributions from the host country, but this usually comes in the form of work hours and 
by making available durable resources, such as meeting and training rooms. In contrast, 
Southern projects anticipate a deeper financial engagement from the host country, a feature 
that goes against the history of development projects since the 1960s. For the construction 
 





of China’s StCP project training centre, for example, the CRA-CF provided the land and the 
connection to water and electric suppliers, which cost around XOF 197 million 
(approximately USD 335,000).66 But delays in the construction site combined with 
misunderstandings about the Chinese model of development cooperation that we have seen 
above hindered the relationship with host actors. 
In the case of India’s C-TAP project, the government of Benin was also responsible for the 
provision of electricity. However, CRA-CF staff encountered difficulties in the request to 
allocate funds from the national budget to the project, which delayed the operationalisation 
of the research ginnery: 
The problem we had was that we asked the council of ministers at the time 
of the former minister, who had authorised it… but in the implementation, 
we still have problems. We never managed to do it. So, now we have the 
generator, and we can start working with that, because at the country level, 
you have to apply [for funding] in September and hope that it’s funded in 
September of the following year, because it’s the national budget.67 
In order to enable CRA-CF researchers to start using the ginnery immediately, the C-TAP 
project bought a generator to be used as a temporary solution. Both parties decided to extend 
the period of implementation to give time to the Beninese counterpart to finish furnishing 
the ginnery. According to the project focal point, the problem was that the Beninese 
contribution was not planned in the project document. The request for funding came late 
and resulted in the delays, thereby affecting the project implementation. 
In Brazil’s C-4+Togo project, the Beninese financial contribution was in the project 
document, but it has affected project processes, nonetheless. The 2018 meeting of the project 
steering committee took place in Lomé, Togo. The Beninese delegation was composed of 
three INRAB staff members, including CRA-CF researchers. The Beninese delegation 
requested Brazil to cover the costs related to transport to Lomé, while on the Brazilian side, 
it was expected that these costs would be covered by the Beninese counterpart. In the 
management model that Brazil introduced in the Beninese context, every activity is subject 
to bargaining. The officer in charge of the project in Brazil responded to the Beninese request 
by returning the question ‘what about your contribution to the project?’.68 Despite being 
reluctant, the Beninese counterpart agreed to pay for gas. Later, during an interview, one of 
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the participants regretted the Brazilian model: ‘they don’t bring any money… that is a 
problem’.69 
The consolidated expectation is that a project brings financial resources. This is what 
experienced Beninese practitioners expect, but they do not find it in Southern projects. One 
of the staff members who provided part-time support to the C-4+Togo project shared with 
me his impressions. He is Beninese and has worked for many years with other international 
development partners before working with Brazil. For him, C-4+Togo was unable to 
mobilise national funds because they did not invest time in playing the political game. In 
addition, the introduction of new patterns of relationship is often misunderstood by the local 
counterpart. 
The missions come [from Brazil], the minister does not come. That means 
we do not worry about meeting at least one authority. We do everything 
between us. In other projects, people will try to meet the head of state, to 
show that it really is a matter of interest – it’s about cotton after all! For 
example, when the representative of Embrapa comes here, we could bring 
him to the presidency, so that the first authority knows what people want to 
do, that it is important. And it can even get people to contribute, you see. 
Because the contribution of the counterpart, really, in Benin, it is not easy… 
In the last mission I had to go to visit a field, I was with a small vehicle, a 
very small vehicle. When we were done, the people said: ‘You Brazilians, you 
cannot take something bigger? So that people are comfortable?’ Because, in 
principle, Benin has to provide the logistical means… in such cases, other 
countries would have said: ‘no, no, take the vehicle you want, we pay for it, 
that’s it’. We can see how easy it can be there. It is because of the mentality… 
Sometimes [the Beninese counterpart] has the vehicle, sometimes they even 
have the fuel. But when they know that when they resist a little, people give 
it, they are tempted to do that with any kind of partner. With Brazil, it did not 
work. I even saw Embrapa researchers who agreed to go on a mission in 
vehicles that were falling apart…70 
The introduction of processes that are distinct from usual practices affects project processes 
and outcomes. The mismatch between Southern and traditional practices, replicated by host 
actors, leads to delays in project implementation, misunderstandings about arrangements, 
and even resistance to participating in project activities. Paradoxically, this mismatch between 
host and provider practices also creates opportunities for course correction and, eventually, 
to fitting outcomes through unexpected ways. 
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Fitting results through unexpected ways 
The delays in the construction of the training centre planned in China’s StCP project, for 
example, led both parties to reassess the overall objective of the project. 
[The Chinese] quickly realised that the transfer of technology is not easy, that 
we, we have our technology and they, they have their technology, and that it 
is not necessarily a problem of technology, it is much more about other 
problems that would be good to solve. After the analyses, on their side as 
well as on our side, it was about how to improve the technologies that exist 
here, trying to see what are their shortcomings, the strengths, and weaknesses. 
Then comes the focus on the mechanisation of agriculture. How are we going 
to mechanise agriculture so as to conserve soils and achieve the expected 
results in a sustainable way?71 
In the second phase of the project, the Beninese counterpart succeeded in shaping the project 
objectives according to their own interests. They would still use the facilities of the training 
centre, but the project leadership shifted: 
We are going to recruit a mechanic and a specialist in mechanisation to work 
with the [Chinese] to inculcate our new vision of mechanisation. It is no 
longer the systematic ploughing; it is the minimum ploughing. Our mechanic 
will work with them to still get something out of this experience.72 
The implementation of Brazil’s C4+Togo project also went through unplanned paths. The 
project planned to build five demonstration fields across cotton producing areas. This was 
to assess the benefits of direct seeding, cover plants, and crop rotation in cotton farming 
systems. It represented a big step from the first phase of the project. In addition, this made 
C-4+Togo become the most important SSC initiative in the cotton sector in Benin, with a 
large presence in the field. These plots needed to be secured with fences – which are unusual 
in the Beninese rural landscape – because the cattle of pastoralists particularly like the cover 
plants. To ensure that the animals would not compromise the experiments, the fences were 
a necessary condition of the successful implementation of the project. However, the 
mechanisms put in place for the execution of activities were inadequate. The funds for the 
construction of the fences should have come from Brasilia, following complicated 
administrative procedures that involved the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) because of the lack of specific legislation on cooperation projects in Brazil (Ferreira 
and Moreira, 2018; Inoue and Vaz, 2012). The Beninese counterpart had to proceed with the 
construction of the fences and present the invoices to the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. 
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But the non-conformity of the paperwork sent to Brasilia created an imbroglio that 
compromised the realisation of activities and undermined the relationships between the 
partners. In August 2018, the CRA-CF was still waiting for the reimbursement for the 
services they had paid. 
Since August [2017], we have had no funding. All the work that has been 
done from August to December, was supported by [Benin]. All the salaries 
from January until now were paid by us. To escape Brazilian bureaucracy, I 
am obliged to include the cost of the activities in the internal budget of the 
CRA-CF and to consider that the project will not reimburse us… because if 
you look at the mechanisms of the project, they cannot pay me back.… They 
say I had to made a request first to get the authorisation to make the 
expense… But I have already made the expense! I might start crying and 
begging for money… And now I have already written the name of the project 
on the expense, so I cannot change it anymore.73 
As a result, the project activities that had been planned to take place in the 2017/18 cropping 
season in Benin were all cancelled. The Beninese counterpart acknowledged the importance 
of the techniques that the project was supposed to share, but the project was at a dead end. 
The solution found was to incorporate the costs in the internal budget, despite the resistance 
to doing so. 
I asked my administrative advisor to allow us to add project activities as 
internal activities… Everyone recognised that [the project] is good. If the 
donor does not want to fund it because of these procedural problems, we 
forget that and then we take it nonetheless… anyways, the activities will bear 
the logo of C-4+Togo, but in reality, there is no such thing… So, we need to 
find a way to mobilise funds to finance ourselves and let the project do 
whatever they want. If it’s to make people travel, just do it whenever they 
want; if it is to come to train people, they just need to come here and train 
the people… but we must not remain dependent on the project… In the next 
steering committee, we will tell them that we will work without them from 
now on. If they join, it’s good, if they do not come, it does no harm. We are 
going to do it anyways. We have the means to do it, so we’d better do it.74 
Through unexpected paths, host actors incorporated project activities, signalling ownership 
of the project’s main product. In addition, Benin intended to have 20 instead of five 
demonstration fields in the country sharing Brazilian techniques, thereby scaling up project 
outreach. The combination of relevant techniques and a favourable political context made 
this possible. In June 2018, a Presidential decree (Government of Benin, 2016) entered into 
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force and increased the funds for agricultural research, giving researchers more room for 
manoeuvre within the cotton sector and autonomy from international partners. 
The C-4+Togo project continued its own path towards completion. In the WTO’s 31st 
Round of Consultations on Cotton Development assistance, the Beninese delegation praised 
Brazilian support and recognised the contribution of Brazil to the development of the cotton 
sector. With regards to the C4+Togo project, the Brazilian coordinator expected to finish 
the project by the end of 2019 and turn the page with a new bilateral project with Benin with 
a focus on lint quality standards, thereby continuing to write the history of development 
cooperation projects in the cotton sector in Benin. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the trajectory of cotton projects in Benin, including the 
continuities and ruptures in their mechanisms. As a consequence of their recurring presence 
in the host context, development projects have become an institution that donors, providers, 
and hosts have built. The first experiences of development cooperation in the cotton sector 
were a continuation of French colonial rule in Dahomey. The first project aimed to enable 
the French to continue administrating the production, transformation, and 
commercialisation of cotton. The projects that followed meant to build upon the previous 
project and scale it up. Although the objective was to develop cotton production in 
Dahomey, in fact the projects provided the indispensable resources for the cotton sector to 
function and make cotton an export crop. Thereby, the functioning of the cotton sector and 
of annexed activities, such as agricultural research, became dependent on external support. 
Later projects continued to provide the resources, especially financial, that the structures of 
the cotton sector lacked, thus creating a pattern of development practice. From 2009, more 
than four decades after the first cotton projects, providers from the Global South arrived in 
a context marked by traditional aid. South-South cooperation is based on principles that 
require distinct processes and relationships. However, host actors have the same expectations 
towards Southern and Northern projects alike, based on past experiences, all within the 
traditional aid setting.  
While the trajectory of Northern cotton projects confirms the consolidation of a tradition in 
the host context, the history of SSC cotton projects sheds light on the level of consolidation 
of such practices. The mismatch of practices that the arrival of Southern providers created 
affected project processes and outcomes. This indicates the large gap between changes in 





relationships, and host actors embodied traditional practices when engaging with Southern 
cotton projects. Additionally, the trajectory of projects shows the determining role of hosts 
in shaping project experiences. This raises questions on the way development practitioners 
could envision the transformation of development practice that I discuss further in chapter 
8. In the next chapter, I move from the effects of projects on subsequent projects to the 






CHAPTER 6. PROJECTS NAVIGATING THE CONTEXT: BUILDING THEN 
TRANSFORMING PREVAILING INSTITUTIONS 
The effects of projects can be observed in subsequent projects and in other institutional 
settings in the host context. In chapter 4, the depiction of projects from the perspective of 
the host context shows that a project alone is too short and exclusive, which diminishes the 
ability of projects to change the prevailing institutions of the hosting context. Yet because of 
the recurrence of this kind of experience, projects introduce arrangements that become part 
of the repertoire of dispositions upon which project beneficiaries draw when facing situations 
outside project boundaries. In chapter 5, I explored how actors deploy these pieces in 
subsequent projects, which affect project processes and their potential impact. But actors 
also draw from projects to shape prevailing institutions. In this chapter, I demonstrate under 
what conditions development cooperation arrangements navigate across social fields, from 
projects to enduring structures. 
I approached this question by asking many participants whether they thought that cotton 
projects were successful in Benin. The most common answer was that projects were good, 
but their effects did not last. When I asked that same question to an experienced agronomist, 
who had been a focal point for multiple cotton projects, he drew my attention to the 
importance of assessing projects against the host context, instead of against the indicators 
designed by the project itself. He explained that there is a distinction between the projects 
that were implemented in the 1960s and 1980s, that came to set up the cotton sector and 
make cotton an export crop, and those, much more numerous, that came later, especially the 
wave of projects following the C-4 initiative at the WTO in 2004, the purpose and impact of 
which were more diffuse. Indeed, the first batch of projects came to build the cotton sector, 
while the second, post-2004, came to transform it, to make it more competitive in the 
international market. It was very important for me to keep this distinction when I started 
drafting this chapter. His statement stressed the idea that not every project is the same and 
that such distinction is determined more by the host context than by project design itself. 
This provided a lens for understanding how the enduring institutions of the context 
incorporate project elements. 
I begin this chapter by analysing the role of earlier projects in setting up cotton as an export 
crop. Then I turn to a later period, when the prevailing institutions of the cotton sector were 
consolidated as a social field and hosted multiple initiatives, selecting the pieces to assemble 





6.1. Effects of early projects in a nascent industry 
Early cotton projects left a mark on the host context because they enabled the setting up of 
cotton as an export crop. They introduced the necessary resources and arrangements and 
disseminated the agricultural practices required to intensify production and make cotton the 
main cash crop of the country. In this section, I examine the effects of the first projects and 
take the example of their contribution to cotton research as an illustration. 
6.1.1. The first projects and the making of the cotton sector 
As I show in chapter 3, at the time of the first cotton projects, cotton production in Benin 
was small. The many attempts of the French colonial administration to intensify production 
had failed until the 1950s. Production levels were low mainly because products derived from 
palm trees continued to be the main economic asset of Dahomey (Manning, 2004) (for 
example, the first World Bank project, in partnership with France, focussed on the palm 
sector). After independence in 1960, the French launched the first cotton project in 1963 to 
continue the colonial project of intensification of cotton production. To increase cotton 
production, the Cotton Development Project (1963–1969) focussed on implementing and 
organising rural extension services and the input credit system. The project, inserted within 
the international agenda for African agricultural development through intensification, 
attained its desired objective of multiplying Benin’s cotton production by four through the 
expansion of cultivated lands and the successful introduction and promotion of a more 
productive variety of the plant (World Bank, 1972; Levrat, 2009).  
In that period, in the absence of cotton-specific national structures, the CFDT was the main 
actor of the cotton sector in Dahomey. Two of the older farmers I interviewed assigned to 
French experts the source of their agricultural knowledge related to cotton. ‘Not only did 
they come to buy cotton, they also taught [them] how to grow it.’75 When I asked whether 
their practice had changed since they learnt how to grow cotton from the French, they said 
no. The only aspect that had changed was the recommended quantity of agrochemicals and 
that, at that time, all inputs were given for free, while nowadays they have to pay, making the 
farmer responsible for the correct use of inputs.76 
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From this perspective, the project played a central role in creating and enforcing this system 
of production, in order to make cotton the main export good of Dahomey. This objective 
required the standardisation of cotton production through the dissemination of established 
technical packages via rural extension services. This in turn entailed a restructuring of local 
rural arrangements. The project disregarded the existing farmers’ cooperatives, through 
which farmers accessed credit, and set up an organisational structure by crop instead. In this 
new institutional setting, only cooperatives of cotton producers could have access to the 
input credit system. It drastically reduced the options for farmers to grow the crops of their 
choice – which usually tended to be subsistence crops (Mongbo and Dossou-Houessou, 
2000). As a result, in the new system the project imposed, every farmer needed to grow 
cotton in order to be able to get the necessary inputs to grow food crops. This became the 
norm in the Beninese agricultural sector until the present, as cotton remains the only way to 
access fertilisers via credit. 
With this new organisational structure, production continued to increase alongside the 
expansion of cotton fields until the mid-1970s, when a drought hampered the cropping 
season. The creation of SONACO in 1971, the first national cotton company, anticipated 
the rupture with the CFDT in 1975 and the transition to a nationally owned structure. 
However, even though SONACO became responsible for the organisation of the sector, it 
remained dependent on CFDT staff, who perpetuated the arrangements introduced during 
colonial times. Subsequent development projects continued to provide the materials and 
human resources required for the functioning and development of the industry, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter. 
One of these projects was the first cotton-specific World Bank project, launched in 1972. 
The World Bank drafted the Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (1972–1977) in order to support 
the French enterprise of intensifying cotton production. Thus, the French companies, the 
CFDT and SATEC, were responsible for the extension services and for the 
commercialisation of seed cotton (World Bank, 1972). However, as the government took 
control of cotton-related activities, the project was terminated in 1977 and considered a 
failure because of the political changes. Notwithstanding, the project built the third ginnery 
in Dahomey, which allowed the country to match the ginning capacity with increasing 
production levels. 
While the project stagnated, the government proceeded with a restructuring of the sector 





of the village cooperatives, and the creation of the CARDER in 1975. However, following 
the sharp decline in cotton outputs and, as a consequence, in public revenues, the 
government prioritised cotton again and the World Bank prepared the Technical Assistance 
Project (1977–1982) to design larger rural development initiatives. Within a favourable 
political context, the series of World Bank rural development projects in the 1980s 
contributed to the cotton boom in that decade, when production went from 15,000 tonnes 
to more than 300,000 tonnes at the beginning of the 1990s, at the end of the Second Borgou 
project (Levrat, 2008; Ton, 2004). 
These projects provided the means for SONAPRA, created in 1983 from the merging of 
SONAGRI and SONACEB, to organise the sector, ensuring the payment for purchased 
cotton and delivering inputs and collecting cotton efficiently. Both Borgou projects also 
strengthened the CARDERs’ rural extension services by building regional branches and 
hiring personnel. All these elements incentivised farmers to join the cotton sector. In 
addition, the projects built ginning plants in the northern departments and transformed 
agricultural practices with the widespread dissemination of agrochemicals (NPK, Urea, and 
pesticides). Within the context of a push for an African Green Revolution (Fontaine and 
Sindzingre, 1991; Frankema, 2014; Harrison, 1987; Morris et al., 2007), the first Borgou 
project spent more on agrochemicals than on the construction of ginneries, insofar as that 
the quantity of NPK applied in cotton farming systems was multiplied by 3.8 and of 
pesticides by 6.4 (World Bank, 1992). This dynamic continued with the Second Borgou 
project, which involved an increase of the costs related to agrochemicals while the project 
costs related to labour increased at a much lower rate (World Bank, 1994).  
These projects enabled the intensification of cotton production, an objective that the French 
colonial administration sought forty years before. They are acknowledged by local actors as 
having done so: 
These are development projects that developed the sector. They worked a lot 
on rural extension, agricultural advice, and capacity-building… They actually 
had an impact on the results, because the production was multiplied during 
the time these projects were being implemented and we got results on the 
next decade. So, it was very good.77 
It is not surprising that partially successful projects (from the donor’s perspective) left a mark 
on the institutions of the cotton sector in Benin in the 1970s and 1980s. These projects 
 





introduced the necessary resources and arrangements for the intensification of cotton 
farming and the making of cotton as the main export crop. As the interviewee above 
explained, in order to analyse the footprint of projects ‘we need to distinguish the nature of 
the projects’78 and put it in the perspective of the host institutions. In the case of the first 
projects, they contributed to building such institutions almost from scratch, and they were 
able to do so by imposing new arrangements on the host context. 
At the time of liberalisation in the 1990s and change of paradigms in the rural development 
sector, cotton was already the main export good of Benin, the only organised agricultural 
sub-sector, and an object of struggle for the national elites due to its having become an 
important source of public revenue (World Bank, 1989). The privatisation of input supply 
activities first, then of ginning few years later, created a new environment that required a new 
organisation, hence the creation of new structures which required assistance. In this context, 
the World Bank launched the Cotton Sector Reform Project (PARFC) in 2003 to support 
the continuing operationalisation of the cotton industry. The financial resources the project 
brought to the AIC in the form of budget support led to an unprecedented crisis among 
members (as I have presented in chapter 5). A member of staff from the AIC acknowledged, 
however, that the project was essential in enabling the nascent organisation to run: 
It is true that there was some fresh money, say, to have resources to structure 
[the Association] – because the AIC was at its beginning when the World 
Bank project was implemented. There was almost nothing then. The 
implementation of manuals of procedures, everything that is organisational, 
it was with the support of the World Bank that it was put in place. Even the 
first technical AIC staff had been recruited thanks to these funds… For 
example, to establish that the AIC had to charge an amount for every 
kilogram of seed cotton sold, it was a study funded by the programme. And 
how this amount should be used is a study that indicated that. So, it is 
practically this programme that has put in place the whole structure of the 
AIC, that is undeniable.79 
Similarly, France implemented PARSC (2004–2009) to provide resources to the AIC. The 
project enabled the creation of a communication section within the Association and planned 
to conduct studies and analyses to provide insights to and instruct the AIC’s work. Most of 
the studies and analyses were cancelled because none of the tenders matched the 
requirements, but the staff hired to lead the communication section performed as expected, 
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especially though the production of many outreach products, such as newsletters and other 
regular publications. 
The role of these projects and of the first wave of projects in the 1970s and 1980s in building 
the sector and ensuring its functioning demonstrate their weight in the history of the cotton 
sector, especially at critical junctures (the initial push for intensification and the rebuilding 
after liberalisation, for instance). In other words, the development projects I have discussed 
in this section introduced the resources and arrangements needed to achieve the objective of 
making cotton the main cash crop and export good of Benin and maintaining it as such. The 
building of a high-performing cotton research centre followed the same logic. 
6.1.2. Projects and the building of cotton research 
In the 1990s, Beninese agricultural research, including the CRA-CF, was consolidated. In 
spite of the dependence on external funding, experienced agronomists composed the CRA-
CF, most of them having graduated from the University of Abomey-Calavi, renowned for 
its curriculum in agronomical sciences and nutrition. The three divisions of the Centre 
(production, pest management, and genetic improvement), inherited from the French model, 
performed well, especially with regards to the dissemination of planting protocols through 
the ITK and the experimentation with and accreditation of agrochemicals. However, the 
activities in the genetic improvement division were limited to trials of foreign varieties of 
cotton in order to identify and promote the most productive ones. There were no plant 
breeding programmes, even though this constitutes one of the main activities of an 
agricultural research centre. In this context, two French projects starting in the 1990s 
implemented practices and processes that the CRA-CF needed but lacked in order to become 
a high-performing agricultural research centre. These projects have left a strong footprint in 
the prevailing context despite their innate ad hoc features. 
The Support to Benin’s Agricultural Research Project (PARAB, 1996–2000) was the first 
project France launched after the liberalisation of the cotton sector. It was implemented by 
CIRAD and involved the placing of two French researchers in CRA-CF branches to work 
closely with local researchers, with the objective of strengthening cotton research. The 
project adopted a ‘participatory genetic improvement approach’ which started with random 
crossing of fourteen varieties from Togo, Cameroon, Senegal, Australia, the US, and 
Argentina, selected according to their features (Lançon et al., 2004). The resulting cultivar 
was tried out in four plots, one in the Okpara CRA-CF experimentation centre and three in 





the programme (Bruno et al., 1999). Each farmer planted 1,000 plants and selected 200 
according to the criteria of productivity established by the project. The volunteering farmers 
also participated in technical activities led by the experts. At the end of the project, three 
groups of varieties had been created, according to their performance in the three ecosystems. 
Besides plant breeding, the project also provided long-term scholarships for Beninese 
agronomists to pursue postgraduate studies in France. A follow- and scale-up project enabled 
the continuation of this practice for another five years. 
While cotton research was the main target of PARAB, the Cotton Research Support Project 
(PARCOB, 2001–2006) aimed to expand project scope and targeted beneficiaries. In 
addition to the continuation of the participatory plant breeding programme and the general 
support provided to the CRA-CF (scholarships, refurbishment of buildings, and placing of 
French experts), the project promoted methods of ‘agroeconomic diagnostics’ among 
farmers in the main cotton-producing zones and aimed to strengthen the multi-stakeholder 
coordination of knowledge diffusion. By these means, the project contributed to promoting 
the work of CRA-CF researchers in the field. (I was surprised when I realised that PARCOB 
was a well-known initiative in the northern regions when I conducted fieldwork more than 
ten years after the end of the project in 2017/18.) 
PARAB and PARCOB’s impact was widely recognised by CRA-CF researchers. These 
projects emerged as the most successful projects they have experienced – though not every 
aspect of them. The introduction to Benin of a plant breeding programme was the main 
contribution. For key informants, there is a before and an after PARAB and PARCOB in 
Beninese cotton research, as a senior researcher of the Centre explained: 
In the past, we used to make adaptations from foreign varieties, but since 
1996 the centre has conducted its own cotton breeding programme… It was 
with the French that we set up this programme. Now, we have multiple 
varieties in our Centre and three that are promoted.80 
Indeed, the national cultivars of cotton that the CRA-CF started to develop in 1996 were 
introduced in the official technical itinerary in 2014.81 Before that, only one variety was 
promoted for all the producing zones of the country. The gap between the beginning of the 
programme and the actual distribution of national varieties demonstrates that the project 
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effects lasted beyond their own time frame. The processes that the projects introduced were 
incorporated into the prevailing structures. 
However, at the moment of the closure of PARCOB, the sustainability of the project’s results 
was the main concern of the stakeholders gathered in Cotonou for a restitution workshop in 
2006. In the final report (Lançon and Hougni, 2006) the participants criticised the lack of 
government support and the vulnerability of the local staff who had been involved since 
PARAB. The final recommendations endorsed an increase of the CRA-CF’s budget and 
three new projects to work on academic exchange, multi-stakeholder platforms, and cotton 
quality. None of these projects were approved, but the project’s effects endured, 
nevertheless. 
The question about the durability of these projects was at the heart of a debate among 
researchers during a focus group discussion. In the discussion, members who have benefited 
from these initiatives praised the durability of processes beyond the project structures and 
the need to distinguish these from other cotton projects. Conversely, other participants 
challenged their views, highlighting the limitations of development projects: 
INRAB#4: In fact, [PARCOB and PARAB] are not projects like the other 
projects, it is a specific research project… we were able to train people in this 
project, so that’s what made it durable, unlike other projects, development 
projects, you see, this kind of project, the strategy is not necessarily the 
same… at our level, we still continue to reap the benefits of these projects 
that have passed, so we continue the actions in this same direction. 
INRAB#6: In the framework of PARAB, PARCOB, for example, as we have 
the need to select and create varieties, despite the fact that the project is gone, 
it continues… people have been trained – because it is specific. In other cases, 
if in the end people do not adopt it, it is because they do not need it. 
INRAB#8: I do not agree. I do not agree, because, look, in PARCOB, 
PARAB there, those whose skills needed to be improved and who saw their 
skills improved, we can count it at the ends of the fingers. It’s a very small 
research team. So the mechanism is such that, with or without the project, 
there would be a plant breeding section, which would have resources that 
would always be allocated to the tests, to the selection.82 
In the exchange above, the participants put forward some elements that explain the 
perpetuation of the processes that PARAB and PARCOB introduced. First, there was an 
inescapable need to have a plant breeding team within the CRA-CF. Second, the area of 
intervention of these projects was very specific, but so was the final targeted population (a 
 





handful of researchers). This means that the project did not need to reach a large number of 
people in order to have an impact. Third, the project found a consolidated anchoring 
structure – the CRA-CF – to host and carry on the activities beyond the lifespan of the 
project. This allowed a relatively modest project (USD 340,000 over five years) to durably 
introduce new processes into the Beninese agricultural research institute. 
As the research participants above declared, these processes continued, but not without 
adaptation to the context conditions. Even though PARAB and PARCOB introduced new 
practices and processes that became durable, such processes had to adapt to the host 
context’s arrangements and resources. In 2018, I followed CRA-CF researchers’ work on 
cotton breeding, and they pointed to the scarce resources they enjoyed as the main obstacle 
to carrying out all the protocols and methods in the same way they were established by the 
projects. They were not able to conduct as many field visits as required, and the authorised 
period of each visit did not allow them to supervise all experimentation fields. Therefore, the 
resulting practice was an adaptation of the project experience to their prevailing conditions 
– or a combination of project elements with the tools and components available beyond the 
project time frame. 
In spite of adaptation, the consolidation of a plant breeding programme by the French set 
the standard and framework for later projects intervening in this same area. Once a 
mechanism is in place, the adoption of new components can be scrutinised before being 
considered for adoption and adaptation – instead of being incorporated without a baseline, 
as in the first projects. Thus, when the Turkish Cotton Farming Project started in 2013, 
aiming to introduce new cotton varieties in Benin, the local varieties that the CRA-CF had 
developed since 1996 ‘were much better than the Turkish ones’.83 Thanks to PARAB and 
PARCOB, ‘it is hard to bring a variety from elsewhere that can be competitive in [their] 
system. [Cotton breeding] is the sector where CRA-CF has invested the most in the last 20 
years’.84 Such developed expertise allowed the Beninese researchers to unpack the project 
‘package’ that Turkey offered. Although the Turkish varieties of cotton were known for high 
yields and quality of fibre, the Beninese researchers were particularly interested in their 
earliness at boll opening and harvesting. These characteristics could be an asset to help 
farmers face the challenges emerging from climate change and late rainfall. PARAB and 
PARCOB have given CRA-CF researchers the ability to unpack technologies and select what 
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they take from them, thereby doing bricolage as an everyday response to changing 
circumstances (Cleaver, 2012). 
The example of plant breeding development in cotton research also confirms what my 
informant told me about the differences between the projects pre- and post-2004. While 
PARAB and PARCOB contributed to setting up a method of functioning, later projects have 
had to fit in the structures that earlier projects contributed to building.  
6.2. Project effects in a consolidated sector 
It was a very different host context that donors and providers found from the 1990s on when 
compared with the first projects of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The agricultural practices 
that earlier projects introduced into the cotton sector were consolidated. From that moment 
on, projects became less and less dominant in the field. However, following the creation of 
the C-4 initiative at the WTO in 2004, cotton gained weight in the international development 
cooperation system. The multiplication of projects and partners increased the supply of 
arrangements from which local actors could draw in order to respond to changing 
circumstances. If this led to confusion with regards to each project’s identity and their 
singular contribution, the upsurge also contributed to mainstream concerns that many actors 
of the sector had shared for a long time but that remained unaddressed. This section focusses 
on the conditions under which development partners implemented cotton projects, when 
the latter was a consolidated sector within Beninese economy and society. 
6.2.1. PADSE and the attempt to change consolidated cotton farming 
practices 
With regards to agricultural practices, we saw that the colonial power and the first cotton 
projects encountered difficulties in transforming the way farmers grow cotton. Such changes 
required many interventions and a deep restructuring of rural institutional arrangements to 
tie rural credit to cotton farming. In the 1990s, the World Bank projects, with French 
support, had succeeded in intensifying production by introducing new varieties and 
promoting the use of agrochemicals. 
Within this context of increasing use of agrochemicals and of the projectivisation of aid, 
which reduced the size and scope of programmes, we see appearing the first initiatives that 
diverged from the path of intensification. In 1996, the Beninese Organisation for the 
Promotion of Organic Agriculture (OBEPAB) started experimenting with organic cotton 





support this initiative from 1998 (OBEPAB and KIT/NIPS, 2004). Despite low yields and 
prices at the beginning, Benin became the first African country to be a producer of organic 
cotton (Levrat, 2009). However, production of organic cotton never took off in the following 
years. It remained small-scale in comparison with conventional cotton.85 
Also in 1998, French researchers introduced an alternative pest management technique. In 
that year, local researchers started experimenting with staggered pest control techniques 
(LEC) in Benin (Togbé, 2013), but the technique reached farmers only a decade later through 
PADSE (1998–2005), a French project led by the AFD and CIRAD. The objective of the 
project was to diversify and improve farming systems with a clear focus on the cotton sector, 
since cotton was the main crop in the recipient areas. The project worked with the 
CARDERs, the INRAB, the CRA-CF, and the AIC, from 1999. The introduction of LEC 
and the capacity-building of agents on the technique was the main component of the project. 
As presented in chapter 4, the LEC consists of a pest control technique that involves the 
application of pesticides only when the infestation of the plant reaches a threshold. This 
technique contrasts with the pest management instructions of the ITK, in which seven 
treatments are scheduled in advance every fortnight regardless of the condition of the plants86 
– whether they are infested or not, farmers are instructed to proceed with the treatment. 
Based on the ITK, farmers place their orders for pesticides according to the size of their 
cotton fields. Considering the prices fixed by the government for the 2017/18 season, the 
cost related to pesticides alone corresponded to 45% of the debt a cotton farmer contracted 
in the input supply system. In addition, the application of such substances has potential 
negative effects on human health, especially in the absence of personal protective equipment 
(Adechian et al., 2015; Glin et al., 2006; Gouda et al., 2018). 
Therefore, the LEC had the potential to bring great benefits for farmers. The moderate use 
of pesticides could have an immediate effect on their profits, by reducing the cost of 
production; and in terms of their health, by decreasing contact with agrochemicals. The 
technique kept its promises during the implementation of the project, and the term ‘LEC’ 
became popular among cotton growers in the districts that hosted activities. Yet the 
technique was never incorporated into the ITK nor officially incentivised through extension 
services. The promotion of the LEC required the training of ‘observers’ to carry out the 
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diagnostic in the fields, count the population of pests, and, based on that, advise farmers 
regarding the application of pesticides. The observers were also responsible for 
accompanying groups of LEC farmers in the application of the technique. According to 
Togbé (2013, p.37), ‘the very success of the LEC depends on the reliability of the scouting 
and, in the absence of a professional scouting service, this rests on the intrinsic performance 
of each farmer, i.e. on individual competence’. Therefore, the success of the project relied 
on multiple factors that extrapolated the scope of the project, such as the ability of agents in 
transferring the technical knowledge to farmers, the extra resources for LEC extension 
agents, the availability of specific pesticides for different cotton pests, and the willingness of 
farmers to carry out all the steps by themselves without project incentives. 
The incorporation of the LEC into the ITK could have had a great impact on the cotton 
production systems. In the long term, it could also have increased the quality of the lint, thus 
benefiting the industrial elites as well. From the perspective of actors based in Cotonou, the 
reasons for the failure are to be found in the complexity of the LEC and its constraints. 
Hence, for one AIC staff member, the poor instruction of farmers was the cause, since the 
technique was too complicated for them:  
Because it requires, first, the know-how of the producer in the identification 
of the pests, they must come to make observations in the fields, they cannot 
come to treat anyhow. He must observe, count, to see the number of insects 
present and the types of insect present. So according to the types of insect 
that he will find in the field, he will have a different product. It’s not easy. 
Now, the [conventional] method says: you do seven treatments every two 
weeks… the first three treatments and the first two treatments you use such 
and such a product. He just goes and he applies every two weeks, it’s easy, 
huh? But the other [method] says: you have to make observations every week, 
if there is a problem, you make the treatment… it’s not easy. The producer 
does not have the time – they have a lot of things to do and they are not so 
organised, it’s also a bit of a spontaneous organisation… and there is also 
ignorance.87 
He also highlighted that the extra work that the technique imposes, for example the need to 
scout the fields every week, discouraged many of the farmers from adopting the technology. 
Indeed, in many cases, farmers have their fields dispersed around the district and only visit 
their plots when strictly necessary. 
Another reason mentioned regarding the failure of the LEC was the lack of LEC-specific 
pesticides after the end of the project. When the LEC was promoted, PADSE introduced 
 





new packages of pesticides that were branded as LEC-specific. At the end of the project, the 
input importers stopped the provision of LEC products, significantly less expensive than 
traditional products, leaving the groups of LEC farmers with no other choice than reverting 
to conventional pest management practices. Many agents informed me that the unavailability 
of LEC products was the main bottleneck preventing widespread adoption. This was the 
common argument that I heard from farmers, farmers’ organisations, researchers, extension 
agents, AIC staff, and public officials. 
However, according to an LEC specialist, the adoption of the method does not depend on 
the availability of specific products. In fact, the method is rather a démarche, in which the 
farmer observes his field before the treatment. An LEC agent insisted that a farmer does not 
need specific products to adopt the technique, ‘because the LEC means targeted control. If 
a farmer observes his plot before treating, he is already doing LEC’.88 
For the former LEC agent, the LEC failed precisely because the project linked the method 
with specific products. To counter this widespread and consolidated idea that linked the LEC 
with unavailable pesticides, the CRA-CF hosted a regional project to disseminate the LEC 
without specific products. The GIRCOT project (2013–2016) was funded by CORAF, a 
regional platform of agricultural research institutes and was part of a larger initiative, the 
Regional Integrated Cotton Protection in Africa Programme (PR-PICA), which is funded by 
multiple private and public donors (COS-Coton, 2015; Sawadogo, 2015). GIRCOT was 
implemented in six different countries and aimed to develop sign cards and practical guides, 
and to organise capacity-building activities addressed to growers and extension agents. 
However, the prolonged dissemination failed again in mainstreaming the LEC in the official 
ITK, in spite of its popularity among farmers, as a former LEC agent explains: 
Many do not know PADSE. In the cotton [sector] we talk about LEC, and 
when we say LEC, immediately we must refer to PADSE… that was a thing 
at the time. The benefits are still there… The gains of the project are there. 
Farmers know, only that we, the decision makers, have to make the decision 
to continue the technology. Then the farmers will follow… they are ready to 
continue.89 
Since the CRA-CF is responsible for drafting and suggesting modifications to the ITK, I 
asked him why the LEC remained excluded from the conventional methods being 
disseminated. He explained that ‘they can put forward a technology… but without support 
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it will not work’. Indeed, the conflict of interest was obvious: ‘input importers didn’t sell 
enough products during the project. They would not accept the introduction of a technology 
that would allow farmers to use less agrochemicals’.90 A senior researcher confirmed this 
divergence of interests: 
The project enabled farmer to buy less products. When that became an issue 
between input importers and farmers… [he raised his two hands as in a scale 
to show the difference in weight of farmers and input importers] Do you see? 
[laughs] The input importers won… It was a big money business!91 
Another agent mentioned the power asymmetries that govern the elaboration of the ITK: 
‘maybe [the AIC] plays a double game with us. Anyways, we don’t have the force to 
contradict input importers’.92 Although the adoption of this method required important 
changes in farmers’ agricultural practice, decision makers opted to neglect it instead of 
providing incentives in that sense, lest the LEC would compromise their revenues and 
control over the cotton sector. 
To summarise, the powerful actors of the sector hindered the large-scale adoption of a 
technique that could improve the life conditions of farmers. However, the LEC example also 
shows that structural changes are more complex than just a matter of elite interests. For 
instance, the widespread adoption of the LEC required changes in traditional agricultural 
practices that even farmers, as the main beneficiaries, were not completely ready to adopt. 
In the trajectory of projects, PADSE stands alone as the first challenger initiative to the 
continuous spread of agrochemical use in Benin. However, at the turn of the century, the 
increase in projects and partners enabled the introduction of more conservation agriculture 
techniques. 
6.2.2. Expanding the toolbox: The multiplication of projects, partners, 
and opportunities 
The years that followed the creation of the C-4 group at the WTO correspond to the increase 
in cotton projects in Benin. In 15 years since the set-up of the C-4 Sectoral Initiative on 
Cotton at the WTO in 2004, Benin hosted twenty-two projects in partnership with nine 
different countries and organisations – prior to that period, Benin had hosted only 10 
projects, with three different partners, in 45 years. The number of projects from 2004 to 
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2018 corresponds to more than two-thirds of the total of projects development partners 
implemented in the cotton sector in nearly 70 years. 
These projects arrived in a moment in the country’s institutional history when the institutions 
of the cotton sector were consolidated. Hence, from the country’s perspective, it is possible 
to distinguish them from the projects that preceded, as suggested by a cotton researcher: 
All projects that arrived after 2004, 2005, or 2006 are part of the C-4 initiative 
with the objective of helping the sector to compete in the international 
market… So, their goal is clear enough: there was no question of coming to 
give resources to the actors on the ground, no, it was not that. The question 
was which lever we should emphasise so that the cotton that is produced is 
competitive in the international market. Every actor, every project has tried 
to contribute to specific goals under this overall goal.93 
Indeed, the post-Cancun batch of projects shared the same focus on fighting soil depletion 
through the dissemination of sustainable soil management practices among farmers, whereas 
previous projects had focussed on providing the required means for the functioning of 
national organisations. The development goal remained the same throughout the periods, 
however: to reduce poverty in rural areas by increasing cotton production and, thereby, 
farmers’ income. Therefore, all projects differed slightly, while disseminating one common 
idea: the combination of organic and chemical fertilisers to preserve and restore the soil, 
either by the adoption of compost, animal manure, cover crops, or seedlings under mulch. 
A high-level AIC staff member observed this phenomenon as follows: ‘there are lots of 
projects, and each one comes with a different technique, thinking it is the best one’.94 
Despite varying techniques, improving soil fertility remained a common goal. The level of 
redundancy and repetition was high, raising the challenge of coordination among partners 
and of achieving the singular relevance of each project. The multiplication of projects and 
the similarity among them surprised a project manager, who wondered ‘whether there were 
differences between what [they] and the others were doing’.95 When I asked an experienced 
extension agent about the real differences between projects, his statement ended up 
illustrating the similarity instead of the differences between the initiatives, all of which 
worked on soil depletion: 
the difference is that at the level of IFDC, integrated soil fertility 
management, we apply certain concepts in relation to different plants that can 
improve soil fertility. While with GIZ, it’s much more conservation measures. 
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So, there are mechanical methods of soil conservation that have been taught 
to the farmers also. We did a lot. I also worked with the project… we call it 
WACIP. Do you know WACIP? It’s an American project… in WACIP we 
also worked on cotton to increase yields. So the main fertiliser is often organic 
manure, and this organic manure can be cow dung or crop residues… so 
that’s what they do, their approach.96 
The West African Cotton Initiative Partnership (WACIP, 2006–2013) was a project funded 
by USAID and implemented by the International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC), a 
US-based organisation specialising in the development of agricultural fertilisers. As I 
presented in the previous chapter, WACIP’s objective was to reduce poverty by rendering 
agriculture sustainable and strengthening small farmers’ capacities through the improvement 
of better management of resources. Between 2006 and 2009, the IFDC was also 
implementing a project funded by the Netherlands, which aimed to improve the 
competitiveness of the cotton sector, including the objective of promoting technologies to 
fight soil depletion in cotton-producing areas. GIZ’s ProSol project, also mentioned by the 
interviewee, only started in 2016 and is expected to run until 2021. Although the project 
focusses on a variety of crops, it inevitably benefits many cotton growers because of the 
prominence of the crop in the regions where the project is implemented. 
In the above-mentioned statement, it was not clear whether the agent was making a 
difference between IFDC-Netherlands and WACIP/IFDC, or if he was mixing up the two 
projects – something I observed in many interviews with actors in the field, especially farmers 
and extension agents. This is not to imply that these projects had no importance in hosts’ 
life experiences. To the contrary, some initiatives – such as WACIP (2006–2013), COMPACI 
(2009–2012), PROCOTON (2006–2013), ProSol (2016–2021), and GIPD (2007–2012) – 
became very popular among actors in the field because they prioritised reaching farmers and 
extension agents directly. Indeed, the abundance of initiatives marked a period of vast 
resources and opportunities. 
When we were recruited in 2007, it was really good, it was a good time, 
because at that moment there were projects and programmes. We had the 
WACIP project, funded by the World Bank [sic] that regularly supported us. 
We were recruited, we had no experience, we were called all the time for 
training. But, with time, WACIP finished, and the PAFICOT project came, 
always on cotton. It went on with the same activities that WACIP was doing.97 
During this period, we, field agents, we did not complain.98 
 
96 MAEP#5, 07/04/2018. 
97 MAEP#7, 21/11/2017. 





However, the multiplication of partners and projects, and the similarity between them, 
confused some actors in the field, who mixed projects, providers, and periods of 
implementation, as though every project were more or less the same. Indeed, differently from 
the statement above, USAID funded WACIP – not the World Bank – and PAFICOT was 
not a follow-up initiative, but a regional project that the African Development Bank 
implemented across cotton-producing West African countries. Because the majority of these 
initiatives were implemented in the same period and worked on the same object (soil 
depletion), some features of projects, such as sponsors and logos, dear to donors and 
providers, became almost irrelevant in the lived reality of the field. This is not to imply that 
national stakeholders disregarded the importance of projects. From the receivers’ 
perspective, every project was good, even though they could not distinguish the differences 
between them. 
Post-2004 projects received positive feedback from beneficiaries because they represented 
opportunities for extra resources and because they addressed soil depletion, a problem that 
researchers, extension agents, and farmers faced in the field. In addition, the regularity of 
projects lent a consistency to the sector while it was going through a profound crisis. The 
period of the upsurge of projects also corresponded to a decade of institutional and political 
instability that compromised the delivery of agricultural inputs and the payment to farmers 
for the cotton sold. Many farmers abandoned the sector due to the low yields provoked by 
soil depletion and administrative uncertainty. As a consequence, the production of seed 
cotton decreased to its lowest levels since it was introduced as a cash crop by the French in 
the 1950s, reaching only 131,000 tonnes in 2011, against an average of 370,000 tonnes in the 
period 2000–2005 (AIC, 2017). In addition, the search for fertile lands in the main cotton-
producing areas had been pushing farmers to invade protected areas, reclaiming land in 
forests far from their villages (Chougourou et al., 2008; Vodounou and Onibon Doubogan, 
2016). This expansion has also become a source of conflict among farmers, as well as 
perpetuating conflicts between farmers and pastoralists (Bierschenk, 1995; Lesse et al., 2016). 
An improvement in soil fertility was to the benefit of all stakeholders: farmers would no 
longer need to seek fertile land, and improved agricultural techniques could also increase the 
quality of the lint, being the main interest of lint exporters. 
Given this context, cotton growers acknowledged the need to change their agricultural 
practices. They were the ones who noticed the depletion of the soil and felt the harms of 
agrochemicals on their body, land, and finances. Yet farmers faced many obstacles to 





example, several projects disseminated the use of animal manure as an organic fertiliser. 
However, only a few farmers were able to adopt this practice because many of them lacked 
enough livestock to use as a source of organic fertiliser. A farmer who was acquainted with 
this technical option exposed some barriers: 
Ah, we do not have any [animal manure] … Because we count a lot on the 
Fulani [pastoralists], but the Fulani do not stay on the spot, they are obliged 
to go to the protected forests… Those who are fortunate enough to have 
[livestock] and to store fodder, they can benefit from that. But that’s not 
enough… also, the things of the toilets there, when you empty your toilets, 
some producers use that now. This also enriches the soil, but many do not 
like it [laughs].99 
Practical obstacles and meanings hindered the adoption of soil conservation and restoration 
techniques more than a lack of knowledge. Indeed, many farmers were aware of alternatives 
to chemical fertilisers, but only a few were able to apply them. For example, another source 
of natural manure is to make compost with crop residues. Yet the adoption of this technique 
requires extra resources which are often lacking among cotton growers. A farmer in the 
Atacora department adopted the technique, but acknowledged its difficulties: 
In this technique, you have to make a pit. You put the stems, the poop of the 
animals, and you put the water. In three months after it will rot and you will 
spread it on the field, even if you have not used the fertiliser, it can work. I 
do that… The only thing is that it’s a bit difficult. You have to have materials 
to be able to do so. When it’s going to rot, you have to have wheelbarrows 
with which you will pick up. It is not easy, but it is good.100 
These techniques are well known by farmers, extension agents, researchers, and AIC staff. A 
member of the Beninese Organisation for the Promotion of Organic Agriculture (OBEPAB) 
claimed that their organisation introduced composting and animal manure in the cotton 
sector in Benin during the 1990s.101 However, farmers, extension agents, and AIC staff linked 
these techniques to more recent projects such as WACIP, COMPACI, and ProSol, which 
are all part of the post-2004 batch of projects. Meanwhile, agronomists argue that they have 
been testing these and other alternative fertilisers with different partners for years.102 For 
instance, current CRA-CF experiments involve the association of food crops with cover 
plants that can be disposed on cotton fields to protect the soil and restore nutriments. 
Researchers associate the introduction of this technique with Brazil’s C-4 project, but the 
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CRA-CF has been implementing it with different partners and expected to disseminate it 
further to reach more farmers in the following years. 
It is clear that the upsurge in projects contributed to spreading knowledge of conservation 
agriculture among the actors of the cotton sector. Even though final beneficiaries could not 
distinguish each project individually, these initiatives were well received and benefited from 
positive perceptions in the field, which potentially could favour the transformation of 
dominant agricultural practices.  
6.2.3. Changing the cotton sector with project contributions 
The post-2004 batch of projects focussed on the introduction and dissemination of 
alternative agricultural techniques. However, the way farmers grew cotton continued to be 
determined by the technical itinerary (ITK): the official guidelines for cotton production, 
elaborated by researchers and agreed by MAEP’s Direction of Agriculture and the AIC 
before reaching farmers through rural extension services. Indeed, due to its institutional 
weight and influence over agents and farmers, the ITK has a determinant impact on 
agricultural practices, which suggests that it is the main tool for transforming practices on a 
large scale: a change in the ITK would become the norm and disseminated through all 
extension agents across the country. However, international partners are not directly 
involved in its elaboration nor in its promotion. The most significant changes adopted in the 
ITK since the post-2004 boom of projects related to the increase of the dosages of 
agrochemicals and to the introduction of regional varieties of cotton. None of the 
conservation agriculture techniques shared by development projects and well known to many 
actors and decision makers of the sector were considered. It is thus not surprising that these 
techniques are still seen as secondary options by farmers, extension agents, AIC staff, and 
researchers. 
This static situation would start to change from 2016. Patrice Talon, ‘king of cotton’, was 
elected in March 2016, just before the beginning of the cotton cropping season, and in April 
re-established the AIC –suppressed by his predecessor Thomas Yayi Boni – to organise the 
sector and ensure the timely provision of inputs. In that same year, the AIC launched a self-
funded initiative that they called ‘Intensification of Cotton Production’. The programme 
worked with volunteer farmers who would adopt changes in their agricultural practices. The 
main aspect of the programme was an increase in the use of agrochemicals (50 kilograms 
extra of NPK) while incentivising farmers to combine these with organic fertilisers. The 





programme but remained a suggestion to the pool of volunteers. The sources of organic 
manure in the programme were the same that some development projects had been sharing 
for a decade: animal dung and crop residues. In addition to producing their own manure, the 
volunteers also received a bale of organic manure for free. As an official policy disseminated 
through the prevailing structures, the programme reached 15,363 farmers in the 2017/18 
cropping season (AIC, 2017, p.20). 
The good results of the 2016/17 season encouraged the AIC – which was then fully running 
again – to continue and expand the programme in the next season. In the second year of the 
programme, Beninese farmers produced 597,000 tonnes of seed cotton, and the average yield 
exceeded 1,200 kilograms per hectare (instead of 830kg/ha in 2016). This was the highest 
amount of cotton Benin had produced in a year since the introduction of the crop. 
When the results were published, I was eagerly looking for explanations that linked 
development projects to the intensification programme, and thereby to the unprecedented 
growth in production. Instead, the collective voice of the AIC, farmers, and researchers 
suggested that the main factors of success were the favourable climate conditions that they 
enjoyed during that season, the effective distribution of agricultural inputs, and the provision 
of food fertilisers through the same cotton input supply system – which contributed to 
reducing the reallocation of fertilisers destined for cotton to food crops. Some of these 
reasons do stem from the intensification programme but have little to do with development 
projects. A CRA-CF researcher, in an attempt to take credit for the good results of the 
harvest, implicitly stated that changes in the functioning of the cotton sector are nurtured in 
the long term, and that these cannot be linked to a development programme alone nor to a 
national policy such as the AIC’s intensification programme: 
Well, in fact, last year they had committed to intensification. But in reality, 
it’s not intensification, it’s support for the adoption of technologies, it’s 
support for the adoption of the technical itinerary, because talking about 
intensification sounds like they invented something… but they didn’t, neither 
in approach nor in technology… they invented nothing. It was us [cotton 
research] who have put in place the new dosages of fertilisers that were 
adapted to the different regions… Also, we have worked with USAID on the 
use of compost, green manure, all that to boost production, so if their so-
called intensification programme is asking the producer to use the dosage of 
fertiliser recommended by the research, with fertiliser formula recommended 
by research, and bring organic manure to the soil… there is no project. What 
has increased production is that we have increased the dosages of 





manure, hence the total amount of fertilisers brought to the cotton plant 
increased.103 
Notwithstanding this, the inclusion of organic manure in such an important programme as 
the AIC’s represents a change that is part of a general policy reorientation of the cotton 
sector towards sustainable agricultural practices. An AIC agronomist exposed this point 
while acknowledging the challenges for the adoption of conservation agriculture practices: 
When we talk about intensification we must not impose, because there are 
constraints. If you have to go for debris and cow dung to throw on your field, 
or even compost, it’s an extra effort, so it has to be really voluntary, it has to 
be the producer who is convinced that he needs that. But we are particularly 
insisting on the interest of the producer to do it, because we think it is more 
profitable and it is more and more where we wish to go. Especially since the 
AIC started to consider sustainable land management measures and even 
adaptation to climate change. Hence, in relation to these concerns, staff have 
already been trained to really achieve real changes at the level of the 
producers, more and more, so that we do not destroy the soil. The farmer 
must be careful to make the same land serve him for several years. So it’s 
really more and more a concern at the AIC level.104 
These issues permeated the AIC’s strategy for the development of the cotton sector. During 
the 2018 Fête du Cotonculteur in Banikoara, the main cotton-producing district of Benin, I 
witnessed the emphasis put on both fronts: intensification of production and adoption of 
conservation measures. On that occasion, farmers from all over the country came to the 
village’s stadium, where national authorities, including the Minister of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Fisheries, and the President of the AIC, distributed awards to farmers and cooperatives. 
The event was filled with political messages of gratitude towards Patrice Talon and the AIC, 
alongside praises for the good efforts of each one of the cotton growers. The messages in 
support of the intensification programme flowed abundantly – nothing surprising for an 
event that is organised by the AIC. However, among the expected political acclamations, 
speakers and banners emphasised climate change and the sustainability of agricultural 
practices (see figure 15, left). 
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Figure 15: The 2018 Cotton Grower Fair in Banikoara. On the left, the sign says: ‘Actors of the sector! let’s mobilise for 
sustainable agriculture through the promotion of sustainable land management, adaptation to climate change, and 
appropriate mechanisation’ 
  
The election of Patrice Talon, ‘a connoisseur of the field’, as many interviewees agreed, is 
not to be neglected. Some CRA-CF agronomists acknowledged that he changed his position 
towards cotton research once he became president. A major change for cotton research was 
the formalisation of the CRA-CF funding scheme through the revision of the finance bill, 
stating thereafter the AIC’s contribution at 10 CFA francs per kilogram of cotton exported. 
Prior to that, Talon, as the main actor sitting at the AIC, was a fierce opponent of that 
arrangement, as a senior CRA-CF researcher explained: 
before, he was against us… not because he didn’t know the value of our work, 
but maybe he didn’t want to invest in us and take our findings anyways. Now, 
he’s changed his position. He knows what cotton research needs and he is 
the one who dictates now that every change needs to go through us. Now, it 
is not the businessman who speaks, it is the head of state… he will be 
accountable for the results of his work… if we say cotton research is in a 
good shape today, is because of him, not because of the AIC.105 
From the perspectives of the farmers I interviewed, the re-establishment of the AIC enabled 
the end of uncertainties related to the delivery of agrochemicals and the provision of food 
fertilisers, which in turn allowed them to increase their production of subsistence crops 
without compromising cotton outputs. With regards to rural extension services, the new 
organisation was still to be implemented by the time I concluded my field research. Amongst 
the main aspects of the reform, extension agents were sceptical towards the suppression of 
the CARDERs and the establishment of regional centres specialising in local crops, while 
advice related to cotton would remain the responsibility of AIC agents and other 
subcontracted agencies. 
 





Most of these changes cannot be connected to any development project, but the upsurge of 
initiatives in the 2000s contributed to mainstreaming concerns that some actors of the sector 
had shared for many years but that remained marginalised – especially relating to the 
introduction of conservation agriculture aspects in the main agricultural programme of the 
country. However, the adopted changes remained aligned with the historical objective of 
intensifying cotton production, which was introduced by the colonial power and has become 
the common objective of the government, researchers, and extension agents throughout the 
years. In the next section, I move to more subtle and invisible effects of projects that occur 
outside the explicit policy changes led by the cotton elite. 
6.2.4. Subtle project footprints in transformed practices 
Who is the main actor of the sector? I asked that question to farmers in the main cotton-
producing regions and to a member of the farmer’s organisation in Cotonou and got two 
different answers that illustrate farmers’ naturalisation of domination. The organisation’s 
member was a member of the technical staff based in Cotonou, responsible for coordinating 
and bringing together the claims of tens of farmer’s organisations across the country. To that 
question, he replied proudly: ‘honestly, the farmer’.106 Although he replied with conviction, 
he expected me to be surprised – and I was. Not due to disagreeing with him, but until that 
moment I had heard different opinions from the most diverse actors. In Banikoara, the first 
cotton-producing district, I once met several cotton growers at the U-Com headquarters who 
had come to collect their boxes of agrochemicals. I asked the same question to a group of 
them who were sitting on their motorbikes under a tree waiting for their delivery. While the 
majority remained silent, a louder voice declared without hesitation: ‘It’s Patrice Talon!’. 
Everyone agreed and, in contrast to the Cotonou-based administrator, none of them thought 
about themselves.  
Farmers are constantly told that their contribution to the cotton sector is minimal. I have 
also asked multiple cotton growers what the main problems of the cotton sector were, and 
why it was not so profitable for them. Before mentioning the cost of production related to 
inputs, various informants declared that it was their fault, because ‘[they] like rest too much… 
after the harvest [they] do not do anything, just stay there, waiting for the rain’.107 In that 
same spirit, an AIC representative in the Alibori department blamed the farmers’ ‘laziness’ 
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for the lack of impact of new technologies, while researchers and extension agents addressed 
farmers in the same terms when visiting their fields. This is the structure in which knowledge 
travels in prevailing institutions. 
In addition, few are the spaces in which farmers can express their discontent. At the AIC, 
the claims coming from the villages hardly reach the meeting rooms where the price and 
quantity of agrochemicals are negotiated. Marginalised at the decision-making spaces, 
growers can express their demands in workshops that SODECO and the AIC organise in 
the field. In June 2018, I attended a session SODECO and the AIC jointly organised in 
Parakou to train cotton farmers and extension agents on new products and their correct 
application. The exchanges that followed the presentation depict the power relations among 
stakeholders, which determine the outcomes of conflicts of interest: 
Farmer: Didn’t the CRA-CF develop a variety so that we don’t need these 
products anymore? They are too expensive for us. 
SODECO: The CRA-CF seeks varieties with long fibres, but these are more 
sensitive… We cannot have it all! 
AIC: The adoption of cultivars is decided by farmers and ginners. The CRA-
CF test them at your fields. Researchers only validate a cultivar if the yields 
exceed 20 per cent compared to the previous ones. Then ginners look at the 
colour. If it is yellowish, the ginner does not want it… same if the fibre is not 
long. 
Farmer: But can’t we have a more productive cultivar? Like, if you mix two 
different cultivars… 
SODECO: Don’t you think the researchers thought about that? 
In this context, marked by unequal power relations, projects create short-lived arrangements 
with different rules and arrangements that potentially challenge the prevailing power 
structures. This can take different forms, some of them very subtle. A project coordinator 
shared with me the experience a farmer had had after deciding to adopt direct seeding on 
mulch – a technique the farmer had learnt in a project activity and that could increase 
revenues in the medium term. In the cropping season that followed the training, the farmer 
decided not to follow the ITK and plough it, but to cover it with crop residues instead. The 
project coordinator explained what happened afterwards: 
He had decided not to plough his field anymore, so that to allow some species 
to grow. He said that the neighbours, and even his own wife, were 
disappointed. She said: ‘what? the people will see your field like that, poorly 
maintained… it’s not good! You have to do like the others and clean your 
field so that you know that you are a good man.’ Then he said to himself: 
‘what should be done?’ He had to follow what was said to him as part of the 





hardworking, go and get rid of everything? … He hesitated a lot, but finally, 
he said ‘no’, that what he learnt at the project level should not be bad, he 
would leave it like that. But he was positively surprised when he went to see 
his plot… The roots came in well and the plants gave more cotton… he 
admitted he was lazy, but the results were there and people congratulated him 
now, saying that ‘it’s good, it’s good’. It was not easy at first, because it was 
something new, but over time they realised that it was really good for them.108 
This farmer’s experience demonstrates how deeply connected the idea of laziness is to 
farmers and how it might hinder innovations emerging from the bottom. However, in some 
projects, raising awareness and possibly creating disruption is part of the objective. A senior 
cotton grower in Banikoara praised training he had received from a project in which experts 
introduced cotton growers to basic accounting. This made them assess the real costs of 
production and profits. 
There was a training that we called… PAFICOT… Yes, PAFICOT trained 
us… If the cotton gives very well, we can find up to 1.5 per hectare. If we 
subtract all the expenses, you will see that we, on the ground, we fall. But if 
it was not because of the training, I would not know that we were losing. For 
me, we eat as we want… and we forget what we spent. So because of this 
training, it helped us, ah!, if we could continue to have training like that… 
really! Many people would want to stop growing cotton!109 
In a conversation, another farmer argued that this kind of training is not part of the national 
extension service repertoire, which is under the AIC’s supervision: 
CF#7: The agents train us on which period we have to sow, put the 
fertiliser… all that. But the project, it is not about that, it more about our 
concerns, how to do the planning, things like that… in September we had a 
training that scared me a lot. Really. They said that the products that we use 
are not good for consumption. All the fertilisers and insecticides, all that, it’s 
not good. 
Me: But did they say you should stop using these products? 
CF#7: Well, they said to stop putting it in the food crops… And not to use 
it near rivers or wells. 
CF#8: It’s going to kill the fish and the animals. 
CF#7: And it might make us sick as well. 
Me: It is the extension service who tells you what product you should use? 
CF#7: Yes. 
Me: And do you have a choice? 
CF#7 Well, they bring it to us only, and they tell how to apply it. We don’t 
have a say. 
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At times, projects constitute the only channel through which the actors of the cotton sector 
have access to alternative knowledge and information that contradicts the logic of 
intensification promoted by the government and the cotton elite since colonial times. 
Therefore, the brokering between project and enduring institutions sometimes happens in 
very subtle and diffuse ways. A useful example of this diffuse brokering is when a project 
participant attended a workshop that provided a positive experience of a practice that they 
also execute in their everyday tasks. An elderly farmer whom I interviewed multiple times 
decided to leave the cotton sector during the debt crises of the 1990s. He learnt cotton 
farming with the French in the 1970s. He remembered the details of this experience, 
especially the distinct social interactions with project experts: 
The foreigners they are more engaged. They come to the fields, they take 
notes, they listen to us. The Beninese they don’t even bring a piece of paper… 
He can’t remember everything we say here… it is not his problem if it is good 
or not good.110 
Even though this experience was a long time ago and short-lived, he still draws from it to 
criticise the current rural extension services. Conversely, farmers who have never 
encountered trainers other than the CARDERs’, have a different appreciation of the national 
service, pointing to other problems that relate more to logistics than to meta-practices: 
Our relationship with trainers is very good, we cannot say it’s not good… the 
problem is, it is necessary that they inform us early. Because they just called 
me for a training in N’Dali today… I was not aware, even the money for gas 
I do not have. So, if I knew before, I could go.111 
This difference of appreciation, between those who attended project activities and those who 
did not, came out frequently. Farmers who have experimented with something else, 
something different, had developed a critical opinion about the services they usually get. 
At the level of extension agents, the pattern is the same, but they have more agency to shape 
social interactions because they are responsible for delivering training to farmers. One 
extension agent criticised the way he received training from his hierarchy and praised the way 
projects generally do it. He specifically mentioned the way national trainers intimidate the 
participants. By contrast, in project activities, trainer-trainee relations were more horizontal. 
From this experience, he was able to draw some ideas to replicate in his own practice: 
If I want to conduct training, I warn them first, the day, the date, and the 
place. I’ll arrive in advance to let them know that delay is not allowed at any 
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time. So, when you start, you start, you make them understand that what you 
are saying is relevant. What you are giving them as training is relevant, that 
they are in need. Some people remain reluctant, others accept the rules right 
away.112 
Similarly, a former agent who became a CRA-CF researcher shared with me how fond he 
became of participatory methods after his experience in the COMPACI project (2006–2010). 
In this activity, project managers elaborated the diagnostic based on consultation workshops 
they organised in the villages. He tried to bring the same practice to his everyday work, to 
the planning of the extension service, but faced some constraints: 
In the training programme, I cannot get out of what came from the boss [in 
terms of content], but me, informally, in parallel, I had discussions with my 
team and sometimes with producers, to do what I thought was more 
participatory. Maybe it did not please them, I do not know, but that was quite 
informal, and nobody cared about that. Whether we do it or not, it was not 
important for the hierarchy. It did not regard anyone, because we did it 
around beers. And all that was rather friendly… it was not in the formal 
setting of the job… Well, we tried it, but it was not really the same thing… 
we were asked to prepare the budget, but in fact it was already decided from 
the top and then, well… we did not really have room for manoeuvre.113 
Although ‘decisions from the top’ hindered the effects of the participatory methods he 
applied, his action, inspired by a project experience, illustrates a project footprint outside the 
project framework. This shows that non-elite actors, such as extension agents and farmers, 
draw on project experiences to change their own practice and are able to do so according to 
their agency outside project spaces. Hence, elites are not exclusively responsible for 
brokering project processes into prevailing institutions. Every actor, by acting in the sector, 
appears as a potential bricoleur, because changed practices shape the prevailing structures, 
but, in this case, in a more diffuse and less obvious way that are hardly noticed and that 
remain off the radar in project evaluations. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described how the host context borrowed project components to use in 
prevailing institutions. Following the suggestion of a key informant, I decided to analyse the 
perpetuation of project arrangements in the host context in two different periods. This 
distinction was based not on the nature of projects, but on the configurations of the host 
institutional setting.  
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Projects played a determining role in building the cotton sector in Benin as an organised 
industry and export crop. It was not the impact of one single project, but the combined effect 
of various interventions in the long term that gave continuity to the colonial project of 
intensifying and increasing cotton production in Dahomey. Earlier projects occupied a 
dominant position in the cotton sector when they introduced arrangements that were 
essential for the intensification of and increases in production. These arrangements prevailed 
as the rule for subsequent transformations. For example, the first cotton project established 
the cotton-exclusive input credit system which made almost every farmer a cotton farmer 
and remained an indisputable element of the sector. In that same vein, World Bank projects 
consolidated the use of agrochemicals in cotton farming, suppressing by these means the 
low-intensity cotton farming techniques that existed before. Similarly, the processes that 
PARAB and PARCOB introduced in the cotton research domain also prevailed because of 
the inescapable need to have a plant breeding programme in such a competitive industry. 
These were the changes required to build the industry and make cotton an export crop. 
Later projects, in contrast, found in the host context consolidated institutions, in which their 
arrangements needed to fit in order to prevail. Projects no longer occupied a dominant 
position in the field and were unable to change established practices. For example, the 
arrangements, relationships, processes, and practices that PADSE introduced did not fit in 
the prevailing rules of the host context, hence they did not prevail. The project went against 
the long-term trend of increasing the use of agrochemicals and, thereby, against the interests 
of major actors of the sector. In addition, the project stood alone against the consolidated 
institutions in the host context and its arrangements were marginalised in the field as a 
consequence. This situation changed with the boom of projects and partners from 2004 
onwards. The multiplication of projects in the cotton sector gave projects a combined weight 
in the field. While the increase in initiatives made the analysis of project footprints more 
difficult, the reforms that have taken place since 2016 reflect elements coming from many 
projects from that period. By exploring the changes at the individual level, it was possible to 
observe changes in practices inspired by project experiences. These small-scale, subtle, and 






CHAPTER 7. BETWEEN CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE INTERPLAY 
BETWEEN PROJECT AND HOST CONTEXT THROUGH TIME 
Development projects consistently appear in the history of the cotton sector in Benin. 
Because of their constant presence, the components that projects introduced in the host 
context have regularised arrangements, relationships, and practices, creating an institution 
that became part of the enduring institutional ecology in which host actors navigate. As the 
process of institutional bricolage suggests, actors borrow components from different 
institutional settings, then piece them together to respond to everyday challenges according 
to the agency they have outside projects. Within this framework, I have followed project 
pieces as host actors use them when acting within the enduring institutions of the host 
context. In chapter 4, I started by locating project pieces in the life trajectories of the different 
categories of bricoleurs and distinguishing them from the other pieces available in the host 
context. The distinct features of a project piece come from the innate characteristics of 
projects, which are their resources and rules, alien to the context, and the short temporality 
and exclusiveness of interventions. Such characteristics appear as constraints that hinder the 
ability of a single project to structurally change enduring institutions. However, as I showed 
in chapters 5 and 6, projects do contribute to incremental changes in the host context, as 
host actors, at different scales, unpack project components and re-use pieces in enduring 
institutional settings, such as subsequent projects, and in prevailing institutions. At this point 
in my journey, I do not pretend to fully understand what shapes my own practice, but a 
historical examination of cotton development cooperation in Benin has contributed to 
resituating isolated encounters within a composite trajectory. In this chapter, I assemble the 
pieces as I insert the project into a historical trajectory. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I analyse the changes in the distribution of power 
within project ad hoc institutions as a way of analysing their ability to influence the prevailing 
context. Then, I discuss the evolution of the interplay between projects and the host context, 
as projects have seen their position in the field gradually going from the centre to the 
periphery. Finally, I conclude this section by examining the continuation of unequal power 
relations despite changes in the hierarchy of the cotton sector and the different roles that 
projects have played in this process. 
7.1. The growing agency of hosts within projects 
The examination of the trajectory of cotton projects in Benin brings to light the changes in 





of power within cotton projects. As many other development projects in the 1960s, the first 
cotton projects were a straightforward continuation of the colonial enterprise (Pacquement, 
2010). Consequently, colonial relations structured the international development field with 
the dominant and subaltern positions of coloniser and colonised transformed into the donor-
recipient dichotomy. In this structure, the cotton sector remained dependent on donors’ 
resources, creating a pattern of dependence on foreign support, as the decrease in cotton 
production in the absence of project support and the appearance of the saying ‘no project, 
no job’ illustrate so well (Mongbo and Dossou-Houessou, 2000). Consequently, 
development practices of later projects tended to reproduce this pattern, because, as 
suggested by Bourdieu’s theory of practice and considered in the institutional bricolage 
concept, early experiences have particular weight in shaping subsequent actions.  
This is not to imply that the project experience became immune to change. As I have 
discussed above, the criticisms of development assistance fostered changes in development 
paradigm and practice in such way that a project from the 1960s is very different from what 
we see today. Early development projects were criticised for inserting recipient countries into 
a linear development path that did not necessarily correspond to their characteristics or did 
not match the enduring possibilities and constraints of the host context. In this patronising 
way, the project – and development – was presented as an improvement, a step towards 
progress and modernisation, while discarding other histories, perspectives, and possible 
futures. 
Over time, the criticisms of those linear trajectories of development and hierarchical relations 
between projects and context were incorporated into project documents and strategies of 
implementation to encapsulate more constituting elements of the host country. For example, 
the World Bank interventions of the 1980s in the cotton sector in Benin integrated topics 
such as gender, community-based development, and the environment in their project 
documents. From the 1990s, projects moved the focus of the initiatives in the rural sector 
from state-led initiatives to themes such as poverty alleviation, sustainable livelihoods, gender 
equity, and good governance (Ellis and Biggs, 2001). This last move implied that project 
support would go directly to the private sector, farmers’ organisations, and ginning operators, 
instead of public entities, in a period of structural adjustments and retreat of the state. 
Yet those initiatives did not completely modify the structured positions in the cotton 
development assistance field, settled in its origins. These new pieces were incorporated into 





eradication of traditional cotton farming systems persisted. This suggests that the hierarchical 
positions between recipients and donor knowledge, practices, and plans remained 
predominantly unchanged. Projects still claimed to propose the way out of poverty and kept 
the host context dependent on them by providing the necessary resources to make the cotton 
sector function. It was only that the receiver end changed from the state apparatus to the 
private sector, as the development agenda of the nineties suggested. In other words, there 
was a change in the recipient side, but the unequal power relations between the dominant 
and subaltern positions in the development cooperation field continued. 
Projects continued to be a recurring element in the cotton sector throughout the years. The 
repeated introduction of temporary arrangements made projects an enduring institution of 
the host context. In this process, host actors, across different categories, developed a sort of 
pragmatic engagement with projects. The use of project resources and outcomes – in this 
case, the cotton sector itself – to fund neo-patrimonial networks motivated the 
projectivisation of cotton assistance, as large programmes gave place to shorter and more 
specific interventions. The fragmentation of aid in smaller projects enabled the donor 
community to maintain structured subaltern positions in the international development field 
and keep the project space under their apparent control. 
Later changes in ad hoc arrangements continued to be donor-driven. Later projects 
introduced new management tools with participatory mechanisms, improved accountability 
and transparency, and started to overtly challenge what had become conventional cotton 
farming that earlier projects extensively contributed to establishing. The agricultural sector 
continued to be a privileged host of participatory mechanisms (Moumouni et al., 2013). The 
resulting experiences within project spaces marked the life trajectories of host actors. For 
example, one cotton researcher particularly appreciated the diagnostic a project conducted 
before beginning activities, which contrasted with what he had seen before both within and 
outside projects. Additionally, he had been involved in planning and strategic meetings that 
he considered participatory: 
There were 30 to 40 people… there were farmers, the GIZ, some NGO 
representatives, mainly the people from the steering committee… But we 
called everyone… there were people from the field, like me, so they tried to 
have representation from all levels.114 
 





Further on, he acknowledged that ‘not all of them had the same weight in decision making 
though’. Indeed, projects did change their methodology and practice, but mainly to reassert 
their own relevance, similar to what Li (2007) observed when studying development 
interventions in Indonesia, a sort of contractual participation (Biggs, 1989), in which project 
leaders control decision-making power. At the same time, projects did not challenge their 
own purpose, as they continued to pretend to provide overestimated solutions for structural 
problems and to play the role of provider of resources to the host context (as Moumouni et 
al., 2013 also found). In this sense, it seemed that both donor and recipient were content 
with the status quo. On one side, projects provided the participating hosts, from cotton 
researchers to farmers, necessary resources that they could use to their own benefit; on the 
other, cotton projects enabled donors to compensate the continuation of cotton subsidies in 
their own countries while new implementation methodologies gave them legitimacy in 
emerging aid paradigms. 
The arrival of Southern cotton projects in this consolidated structure was promising as a 
trigger of change, because of the emphasis SSC discourse put on horizontal relationships, 
mutual benefits, and equality between host and provider. However, the introduction of a 
different development cooperation paradigm by Southern providers implied an encounter 
and conflict with practices that had become self-evident and were taken for granted, and 
thereby formed traditions in the field. This encounter brought to light the weight of 
traditional aid’s regularised practices in the development cooperation field. For instance, the 
main element of rupture that research participants perceived with Southern projects was the 
different level of financial support, which resulted in different arrangements and 
relationships between hosts and providers. While Southern providers introduced these new 
arrangements and practices, host actors replicated traditional patterns within SSC cotton 
projects, with no different expectations than they would have in a Northern project. This 
implies that host actors drew from past experiences in traditional aid projects when acting 
within Southern cotton projects. This mismatch of practices affected project processes and 
outcomes, as I explored in chapter 5. The practice that resulted is something between 
traditional aid and SSC. 
The study of the encounter between SSC and traditional aid practices also brings to light the 
agency that certain categories of host actors gained within projects, in contrast with the first 






Normally a project that comes to Benin, or anywhere, will have to have a 
partner on the ground, a sustainable structure, which is really the cement, 
which is really the support for this project there. Simply because, when a 
structure is well-established behind the project, this structure can perpetuate, 
capitalise information and data. It is also necessary that these structures have 
a minimum of means to be also able to assist this project when this project is 
in difficulty during its implementation. It is necessary that the structure has 
the means to fill the gaps of the projects during its period of 
implementation.115 
Note that the interviewee’s perspective contrasts with the purpose of development projects 
and mentality of many project managers: the host supports the project, and not the other 
way round. This is also very different from earlier cotton project logic, when the cotton 
sector depended solely on project support and resources, and projects were able to impose 
a farming system on the whole country and host actors were unable to challenge it. Hosts 
still need projects to carry on their activities, but to a lesser extent. 
However, the changes in the agency of host actors within projects is better explained by 
changes in the other fields of the host context than by changes in the paradigms of aid and 
development cooperation. When the informant above shared his perspective, he did so based 
on the recent fiscal bill sponsored by Talon and approved by the National Assembly that 
gives more resources to cotton research, specifically a tax of XOF 10 for each kilogram of 
cotton exported (Government of Benin, 2016). He felt empowered outside project spaces, 
and likewise within projects. This indicates that changes in development cooperation practice 
and ad hoc institutions, in contrast to changes in paradigms, depend more on the host 
context than on the donors and providers’ agenda. In the next section, I discuss the changing 
role of projects in the transformation of the host context. 
7.2. The decreasing weight of cotton projects in the host context 
The interplay between projects and host context did not follow a single pattern from 1960 
to 2018. There were periods when projects were at the centre of the field, and others when 
they were at the periphery. In the first years of cotton development assistance, projects gave 
continuation to the colonial plan of intensifying cotton production and thus occupied a 
dominant position. Indeed, the objectives of earlier projects were unequivocal: to make 
Benin a supplier of a commodity to the former coloniser’s industry. Therefore, projects 
contributed to creating the structure of the cotton sector, in the sense that they provided the 
 





necessary rules and resources to industrialise cotton production. France and World Bank 
projects imposed arrangements and practices as prevailing institutions, to the detriment of 
traditional practices and meanings related to cotton production in Dahomey. In a context 
still marked by colonial relations in spite of independence, hosts actors had limited agency 
to shape the cotton sector and occupied a subaltern position both in the cotton sector and 
in the cotton development cooperation field. 
The gradual increase in the agency of hosts actors in the cotton sector is tied to the 
transformations of the Beninese postcolonial state. The cotton sector was a secondary object 
of struggle for the political elites of the 1960s, probably because of the constant political 
instability that marked the first decade after independence. In this sense, Kérékou’s coup 
d’état was a rupture as it brought political stability and the possibility to adopt a national 
social and economic programme (Allen, 1992a; Ayo, 1984; Genné, 1978). It was also an 
attempt to break with the former colonial power. The political consolidation of the 
postcolonial state allowed the government to take over the cotton sector from the World 
Bank and France and to impose its own rules and arrangements. This new configuration in 
the field, with the state occupying the dominant position, gave cotton a different meaning, 
putting the development of the sector on a path that diverged from the intensification of 
production that had prevailed hitherto. As a result, without specific incentives, cotton 
became a less important objective for farmers and the pace of intensification faded as farmers 
turned to food crops, which were prioritised by the regime’s agricultural policy (Fok, 2010; 
Kpadé and Boinon, 2011). This demonstrates the importance of projects in that stage of the 
development of the cotton sector. 
However, this ended up being a short episode. In Cotonou, Kérékou faced a wave of protests 
against the single party structure, fostered by economic distress. The regime needed more 
resources to co-opt allies and help the postcolonial pact endure (Banégas, 2003). In this 
context, the regime reconsidered the nationalisation of the economy and re-established 
relations with France and the World Bank, including on intervention in the cotton sector. 
Thus, because of political and economic crises in other fields, the government looked back 
at the cotton sector as a source of revenue. In this process, projects again came to play a 
dominant role. 
In the 1980s, projects made cotton an economic asset for the state, which incorporated it as 
a source of income to sustain the postcolonial pact between elites, the ‘politics of the belly’ 





to the re-appropriation of the institutions of colonial origin that built African states (Bayart, 
1993). As Mbembe (2001) suggests, not only did the state adopt the forms, but also the 
colonial rationality of domination, combined with pre-colonial elements. Thus, similar to the 
construction of the state, the governance of the cotton sector was transformed as it was 
inserted into the political economy of Benin, acquiring new meanings and diverging from 
the rational industry that projects aimed to build. 
The agency of projects in the cotton sector started to fade as Beninese society embedded 
cotton and gave it its own meaning – in the case of the state, the support of the state 
apparatus and of the postcolonial pact. The relationship of farmers to cotton exemplifies this 
appropriation as well, but from below. Cotton farming never became a profitable business 
as projects promoted, but earlier projects created a system in which farmers became 
dependent on cotton agricultural inputs that they could use to grow other crops – and on 
cotton earnings, to spend on ceremonies and material possessions (Nansounon, 2012). 
Mongbo (1995, p.147) goes further and argues that cotton has become the social good that 
connects the village to the state apparatus thereby structuring peasant-state relationships. 
Therefore, farmers also gave their own meaning to cotton (entry point for inputs and yearly 
source of cash) that diverged from the expected emergence of an agri-business rationality 
that projects intended to develop in Benin – an outcome that Olivier de Sardan (1988, p.222) 
explains by the distinction between peasant and project logics, as farmers use project 
provisions in a way which does not correspond to the aims of projects. 
During the 1980s, cotton was consolidated in the national interest, while the position of 
projects in the field became less central – but earlier experiences under the rule of projects 
had left their mark. Although projects no longer structured the field, the prevailing 
institutions persisted while adapting the arrangements and practices that earlier dominant 
projects had introduced. The appropriation of the cotton sector as an object of struggle by 
host actors entailed a progressive differentiation between project and cotton sector 
institutional components. Certainly, project resources continued to flow to the public 
companies that came to occupy the dominant position in the cotton sector, such as 
SONAPRA and the CARDERs, but the cotton sector structure endured without projects. 
Questions regarding this were raised by the World Bank evaluators at the end of the Second 
Borgou project (1988–1993), because they feared that the CARDERs would not be able to 
run with the low resources of the government and in the emerging context of liberalisation 
(World Bank, 1994). As we have seen throughout this thesis, the CARDERs continued to 





lesser resources available from the government in the absence of project support. The 
example of the plant breeding programme at the CRA-CF, a few years later, also 
demonstrates the incorporation, adaptation, and transformation of project elements beyond 
project time frames. 
It was in a context in which hosts acquired agency and transformed the meanings of the 
cotton sector that the liberalisation process started. This process cannot be disentangled from 
the democratic transition, although very little has changed in terms of state functioning and 
elite coalitions. In fact, as Banégas (2003) shows, it was precisely to ensure the continuity of 
the postcolonial pact between the elites that the democratic transition was made necessary. 
Cotton was one of the fields to be controlled by both old and emerging elites. Therefore, it 
is in a very different host context that later projects intervened compared to the first waves 
of interventions. 
In the 1990s the cotton sector had become an autonomous social, economic, and political 
machine. Among host actors, the arrival of private companies reshuffled the positions in the 
field. Struggles between public and private companies, with repeated alliances and ruptures, 
emerged for the control of the cotton sector. As an extension agent suggested, ‘cotton 
became a dense network where everybody wants to eat, because it’s there where the money 
is. But it is also there where problems are’.116 At the level of farmers, if they were practically 
coerced to grow cotton in the 1960s, even the debt crises of the 1990s did not encourage 
them to quit the sector permanently. The consistency of incentives and the lack of 
opportunities to acquire cash in any other sector contributed to bringing back farmers to the 
cotton sector after the crises. Notwithstanding the reasons, cotton was the indisputable cash 
crop, especially in the northern departments. At the centre of the field, the institutional crises 
of the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, with the successive suppressions and reestablishment of the 
AIC, illustrate the moments of cleavage and alignment of elite interests. In 2016, the election 
of Patrice Talon, the king of cotton, and the stability his government brought to the sector, 
epitomise the dependence of the cotton sector on national politics rather than on projects.  
Against this background, from the 1990s on, development projects found a host context 
with regularised practices that they aimed to transform – and not create or govern. The 
obstacles that PADSE (1998–2005) found to changing consolidated practices exemplify the 
rigidity of the cotton sector’s structure and the inability of projects to change it. PADSE was 
 





also the first project that went against the logic of constantly increasing the use of 
agrochemicals that had characterised earlier projects and the cotton sector structure. Thus, 
the project was a rupture with earlier project practices, in addition to going against the 
interests of the emerging national cotton elite. As such, the project’s arrangements were too 
different and divergent to be completely incorporated as official practice, and the techniques 
shared remained marginalised. 
Interestingly, while the weight of projects dwindled and their scope narrowed, their number 
increased. Projects still populated the cotton sector, but their role went from dominant to 
peripheral. The example of COMPACI (2009–2012) shows the restricted weight of projects. 
The project aimed to promote the production of sustainable cotton under the label ‘Cotton 
made in Africa’ (CmiA), which restricts child labour in the fields, among other constraints, 
and provides higher remuneration to farmers. Such standards of cotton production 
contrasted with the prevailing practices in the cotton sector. Farmers and extension agents 
hired by the project admitted that farmers did not comply with the rules all the time. To 
avoid sanctions and keep the project running, they would make tours before the official 
missions to ensure that the evaluators would not find any children in the fields and that 
everything was under control.117 This means that the project succeeded in changing farming 
practices, but only within project spaces, which did not prevail once the project ended. As 
another sign of the decreasing weight of projects in the host context, the institutional crisis 
between the state and the AIC in 2012 induced the CmiA to suspend Benin’s accreditation, 
anticipating the end of the project. 
While the agency of hosts within projects increased and the weight of projects within the 
cotton sector decreased, the incorporation of ad hoc arrangements into the host context 
remained an authoritative process. 
7.3. The constant factor: The continuity of unequal power relations in 
the governance of the cotton sector  
In the discussion above, we have seen that the power relations within projects and between 
projects and the host context went through different configurations throughout the years 
and affected the way in which ad hoc institutional arrangements endured. This is to say, in 
regards to the research question, that there is no one way through which host actors 
 





incorporated ad hoc components into prevailing institutions. It is a dynamic process. 
However, there is one element that seems to be a constant factor in the history of the project-
context interplay in the cotton sector in Benin: the incorporation of ad hoc elements into 
enduring arrangements is an authoritative process.  
It is possible to distinguish two main phases in the history of the interplay between projects 
and host context: the first is characterised by the dominance of project arrangements over 
hosting structures, and the second is where the positions shifted, with the host context 
dominating project experiences. Additionally, there are two domains in the enduring 
institutions of the host context to be analysed: ad hoc institutions, observed in the recurrence 
of projects, and prevailing institutions. 
In the first period, it is important to recall that colonialism is at the root of the building of 
the cotton sector. The French colonial administration enforced the transformation of cotton 
production to respond to the interests of the metropole (Labouret, 1928; Levrat, 2008, 2009; 
Manning, 2004). Therefore, this was an authoritative process, carved within colonial relations 
of power. After independence, the former coloniser framed this colonial plan within cotton 
projects to enforce the rules for cotton production. While national political forces fought for 
the control of the state in the 1960s, the first cotton project multiplied production through 
incentives and by limiting the opportunities of farmers to access credit and cash in other 
sectors. 
In this process, the introduction of rules and resources to enable and constrain action created 
a new set of practices in the host context. Therefore, in the early years of the cotton sector, 
project institutions prevailed. They enabled a certain kind of agricultural practice, creating 
new norms while constraining traditional methods. For example, projects introduced new 
varieties of cotton and animal-traction for ploughing, and promoted the use of 
agrochemicals. This entailed the complete reorganisation of the institutions of the rural 
sector and the suppression of old arrangements in order to put in place a system that revolved 
exclusively around cotton (Mongbo and Dossou-Houessou, 2000; Nansounon, 2012). At 
this point, the ad hoc institutions of projects constituted the prevailing institutions. The host 
context incorporated such arrangements by coercion and the only moment of resistance was 
the few years under Kérékou when cotton returned to being a secondary object of struggle 
for the state and farmers alike. 
Political instability arising from economic distress drove Kérékou to reconsider placing 





government embarked on the cotton development path that colonial France had envisaged 
decades earlier. World Bank rural development projects were essential in this process. These 
projects provided all the pieces that allowed Benin to continue to produce and export seed 
cotton to world textile industries. They built ginneries and funded the national companies 
that promoted the use of agrochemicals, and supervised collection, processing, and 
marketing. The incentives were also back, with the payment of bonifications to extension 
agents and the insurance of price stability thanks to project resources. These projects made 
cotton a consolidated economic asset. Indeed, while projects structured the cotton sector, 
the national elite incorporated cotton as a source of income that perpetuated state politics of 
extraversion, funded clientelistic networks, and provided stability to the postcolonial state. 
As a result, production increased considerably and intensive cotton production in Benin 
reached a point of no return. 
The liberalisation of the cotton sector is a milestone in the trajectory of the cotton sector 
and of projects alike. First, this process strengthened the conflicting perspectives of France 
and the World Bank on the sector. France’s strategy was to pursue an integrated approach, 
with one national company overseeing the whole sector, while the World Bank pushed for 
the fragmentation of activities to increase competitiveness. The second option prevailed as 
Benin, in financial distress, started to negotiate Structural Adjustment Plans as early as the 
mid-1980s. Development projects continued to support the cotton sector through 
liberalisation, but it was no longer a question of building the sector but of maintaining it and 
of ensuring the transition towards a competitive system. At the national level, the cotton 
sector became the object of struggle between private and state elites, as the liberalisation 
process transferred the activities from public to private companies. Therefore, the 
functioning of the cotton sector was no longer dependent on external funding, but on the 
stability of alliances between the national public and private elites. 
This point marks the transition from a period in which projects were dominant to the second 
period, in which they have become peripheral experiences in the host context. It also marks 
the gradual differentiation between project and prevailing arrangements, as the former no 
longer prevailed in the cotton sector. 
Against this background, the power over the cotton sector went from the coloniser to 
projects, then from projects to the postcolonial state, characterised by the straddling between 
state and private sector (Banégas, 1998, 2003; Bayart, 1993; Mbembe, 1992, 1999, 2001). But 





positions of the field. Farmers especially, but also rural extension agents and cotton 
researchers, remained at the periphery as the postcolonial state perpetuated the modes of 
governance established in the cotton sector since its inception during colonial times. As an 
illustration, the recent concentration of power around Talon and his companies strangely 
mirrors the integrated system that France promoted during and after the colonial era. An 
extension agent and a cotton researcher summarised the nature of current relationships 
briefly when I asked about their room for manoeuvre in their everyday activities, respectively: 
‘the innovations are always acquired through the hierarchy… The hierarchy informs us via 
[cotton] research, they give us the notions, then we share with farmers’;118 ‘because I work 
for the State, the boss has to decide, and they sent us their decisions’.119 Hierarchical 
relationships trickle down to farmers, who were called ‘lazy’ by researchers, extension agents, 
and themselves.120 
In this context, shaped by arrangements introduced by early projects, later projects had less 
capacity to shape prevailing arrangements. As the life trajectories in chapter 4 show, projects 
became more intermittent and isolated events that contrasted with everyday activities for 
most of the groups of actors. While the first cotton projects intervened in all activities of the 
cotton sector (rural extension, ginning, marketing, input supply, and financial solvability), 
later projects, after liberalisation, focussed mainly on agricultural practices and institutional 
support to the AIC and farmers’ cooperatives. As a result, projects acquired different weight 
in the life trajectories of the different groups of actors. For example, throughout the chapters 
above, one can note that all groups of actors mention the importance of France and the 
World Bank’s projects of the 1980s, but the links to later projects are stronger within specific 
groups, mainly cotton researchers (because of the focus on agronomy) and secondarily with 
heads of farmers’ cooperatives, extension agents, and farmers. But projects worked much 
less with the AIC, ginners, and input suppliers. 
This happened while the donor community made efforts to change the project experience 
and to bridge the gap with the host context. Later projects also attempted to address the 
unequal power relations of the cotton sector through the promotion of sustainable 
agricultural practices that could empower farmers and rural workers. From the mid-1990s, 
some interventions diverged from the ‘all for intensification of production’ development 
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path. The post-2004 cotton projects illustrate this kind of experience. As I describe in 
chapters 5 and 6, these projects introduced conservation agriculture practices, and some of 
them participatory mechanisms, that were more aligned with the interests of farmers than of 
the cotton elite. These projects also worked more directly with farmers and researchers, 
bypassing the control of the state and of private companies over the dissemination of 
agricultural techniques. That period also saw the arrival of Southern providers, bringing to 
this context the SSC principle of horizontal relationships based on the context-similarity 
claim. However, these initiatives remained marginalised against the powerful conventional 
cotton system and the introduction of SSC principles in development cooperation practice 
brought to light the consolidation of traditional practices in the host context.  
Nonetheless, cotton projects, Southern and Northern alike, remained welcome experiences 
from which host actors, including the powerless, in different ways, could draw to change 
their everyday practice. As such, we have seen that some conservation agriculture practices 
shared by a variety of projects started to permeate the AIC’s strategy, now focussing on soil 
depletion, climate change adaptation, and integrated pest management. At the periphery of 
the cotton sector, some farmers were able to adopt aspects of conservation agriculture 
techniques, while extension agents attempted to reproduce in their everyday activities 
participatory processes that they had experienced within projects, as described in chapter 6. 
From this perspective, the multiplication of initiatives sharing divergent arrangements, 
relationships, processes, and practices is welcome. These changes in the prevailing 
arrangements, relationships, and practices show that the combined impact of multiple 
initiatives might compensate for the inability of a single intervention to have an impact. In 
other words, it appears that the agency of a single project in the cotton sector decreased 
throughout time, but that development cooperation, as an ensemble, can still have a weight 








Table 7: The project-context interplay through periods and domains of action 
 Prevailing institutions  Ad hoc institutions 
1960–1980s 
Projects > host 
context 
 
In this period, projects imposed their arrangements, which covered all 
aspects of cotton production, as prevailing institutions. 
The cotton sector is marked by the generalisation of project practices 
to the detriment of traditional ones and focusses on the intensification 
of the production. 
 
1980s–2018 
Host context > 
project 
 
• Continuation of the 
arrangements introduced 
during the first period 
• Incorporation of cotton as an 
object of struggle for the 
national elites 
• Straddling between private and 
public national elites 
• Concentration of the gains 
with the emergence of a 
monopsony and monopoly 




• Projects become shorter and 
more specific 
• More diverse arrangements, 
including participatory 
mechanisms, SSC, and 
introduction of new themes 
• Multiplication of partners 
• Some initiatives diverged from 




The longitudinal examination of cotton projects in this chapter shows that the role that 
projects have played in the constitution of the cotton sector in Benin, getting ad hoc 
arrangements to become durable, has varied through time, as both project and host context 
have constantly changed. These changes have shaped the conditions under which host actors, 
at different degrees and differently across periods, assembled project pieces to respond to 
everyday challenges through institutional bricolage. 
At first, projects were the main driver of the constitution of the cotton sector and occupied 
a dominant position in the field. In this configuration, the pieces that projects introduced 
were the main institutional arrangements available for the bricoleurs. Progressively, while the 
weight of projects diminished and host actors appropriated themselves the institutional 
arrangements introduced earlier, the positions in the cotton sector shifted. The post-colonial 
state and an emerging private sector moved to the centre of the field, while the dominance 
of the donor community was constrained within project spaces which did not coincide with 





incorporated project arrangements into enduring institutions has varied, it has remained 
largely shaped by unequal power relations between the centre and the periphery of the cotton 
sector and within project spaces, between implementers and hosts, throughout the periods. 







CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION: FROM AD HOC TO DURABLE THROUGH 
INSTITUTIONAL BRICOLAGE 
At the beginning of my learning journey, I was motivated to deepen my understanding about 
my own practice. I felt that projects and the social interactions I had within them often led 
to unpredictable outcomes. This meant that there were elements shaping these encounters 
that I was not aware of. Such insecurities regarding the role and weight of development 
cooperation have fostered debates that revolved around whether and why projects, as the 
main instrument of development cooperation, work or not. While this debate generated new 
paradigms, from old and new providers, development anthropologists started to look at how 
and for whom projects work. This question resituated the importance of the enduring 
institutions of the host context in shaping the temporary and specific arrangements of 
projects and whatever happened after the period of implementation, outside project spaces 
and times. I situate my research between the overemphasised focus on projects and the 
neglect of project experiences. I focussed my research on the cotton sector in Benin, from 
the time of independence, in 1960, to 2018. 
This thesis has examined how the host context comes to incorporate project arrangements, 
relationships, processes, and practices (that I call ‘project components’) into prevailing 
institutional arrangements. Such process I described as the way from ad hoc to durable. 
Institutional bricolage provided the framework through which I set out to answer my 
research question. In this chapter, I sum-up my findings around this concept before I reflect 
on what I have learnt from this journey. 
8.1. Performing institutional bricolage with project pieces 
The implementation of cotton projects represented the introduction of new institutional 
arrangements in the repertoire of institutions available in Benin. From that moment, host 
actors started to borrow pieces from projects in addition to the other institutional 
components that were already available in the host context. During the first cotton projects, 
the coercive introduction of new pieces involved the suppression of old arrangements. 
Farmers received incentive to change their cotton farming practices, mostly low-intense 
hitherto, and projects introduced institutional arrangements that overtook the previous 
consolidated institutions. Consequently, project components became the main pieces 
available for institutional bricolage in the cotton sector, and France and the World Bank the 





that the postcolonial state gradually made its own, by giving new meaning to cotton: it 
became the source of cash for farmers and the export crop for the state. 
From this situation, institutional bricolage continued to build and transform the structure of 
the cotton sector, as host actors, across different categories at different levels and scales, 
continued to piece together arrangements they gathered from multiple sources, 
predominantly projects. Progressively, the development of the cotton sector became the 
interest of host actors, who incorporated and adapted the arrangements previously 
introduced but continued to depend on project arrangements in their repertoire. However, 
as host actors gave their own meaning to the sector, they shaped the institutions accordingly, 
while the weight of cotton projects diminished due to their fragmentation, intermittence and 
increasingly detachment from the enduring context. As a result, the cotton sector became an 
institution, or an ensemble of pieces, that donors had not expected. Indeed, donors 
considered that hosts were misusing project components to their own interest, outside the 
sector. The resulting patchwork ended up being different from the initial plan of building an 
economic sub-sector in the shape of companies in industrialised countries. Instead, the 
ensemble of pieces that had built the cotton sector was transformed in the process of 
incorporation into the host context to respond to the interests of those who had the ability 
to shape prevailing institutions – in a process similar to what De Koning (2011, p.215) defines 
as ‘aggregation’, where, in the process of institutional bricolage, external arrangements are 
adopted and combined with local institutions, resulting in a relatively balanced situation. 
Consequently, the cotton sector also tended to reproduce initial arrangements that, as we 
have seen, were based upon unequal power relations between coloniser and colonised, then 
perpetuated between donors and recipients, and later between the national elite and rural 
workers. 
Pieces coming from later projects had to fit in with the existing composition, sharing broader 
meanings that earlier projects created and host actors re-interpreted. At this stage, the 
conditions of undertaking institutional bricolage were different from early experiences. 
Additionally, donors changed their project strategy. Instead of large development 
programmes, smaller interventions became the rule. This gave more room for manoeuvre 
for bricoleurs outside project spaces but allowed donors to keep the project experience under 
their control. From the host perspective, projects represented a source of institutional 
components from which they could borrow. The difference with earlier projects was that 






Within a different host context and under a changing development cooperation paradigm, 
institutional bricolage with development cooperation arrangements became more complex. 
The number of stakeholders increased with liberalisation, increasing the competition for 
control over sector resources. At first, liberalisation redistributed the power among the elite, 
namely the input suppliers, ginners, and the state, creating disruptions in the functioning of 
the sector. In this struggle, project pieces became part of the resources at stake and were 
diverted to other purposes, outside the cotton sector, corroborating the idea that institutional 
arrangements are multipurpose and can be re-interpreted and re-used in other institutional 
settings (Cleaver, 2001, 2012; Huggins and Mastaki, 2020). Adjusting to the context 
configuration and emerging paradigms, donors directed their support to local interventions, 
at the level of farmers and extension agents. As they diverged from the national elites’ 
interests, the project pieces became marginalised in the national repertoire of institutional 
arrangements, as the main policy reform of the cotton sector in 2009 elaborated without 
donors’ intervention, demonstrates. The contribution of projects was therefore constrained 
in project spaces and temporality, rural workers were unable to shape prevailing institutions 
by adopting project practices, as the example of PADSE demonstrates.  
The situation changed from 2004 with the multiplication of providers and projects. Project 
institutional arrangements flowed into the host context, replenishing the repertoires of the 
host context. More pieces and more diverse pieces became available to host actors to 
combine and apply to their everyday challenges in innovative ways. Such innovations 
remained dependent on the taken-for-granted rules, meanings, and power relations, as key 
elements that shape institutional bricolage. With regards to meanings and traditions, the 
introduction of SSC pieces, shaped and introduced in a different way, demonstrated the 
weight of past experiences on shaping subsequent practices. The arrangements that Southern 
partners introduced diverted from the routine and went through a process of resistance and 
re-shaping to fit within the consolidated practices.  
Alongside meanings and taken-for-granted rules, the power relations in the cotton sector 
shaped the process of institutional bricolage with projects pieces outside project spaces – or, 
in other words, the way from ad hoc to durable, as suggested in section 2.1.4. There are two 
domains and scales of analysis in which I analysed the role of power in shaping institutional 
bricolage: the power relations between projects and the host context, and the power structure 
of the cotton sector. As discussed in chapter 7, the power relations between projects and 
host context, at a macro level of analysis, changed throughout the period studied. Projects 





to the centre. Such changes indicate that institutional bricolage in the cotton sector reflected 
the interests of the donor community, first, then, later, that of the host institutions. Among 
the host actors of the cotton sector, and now moving to a micro scale of analysis, institutional 
bricolage remained shaped by the dominant actors of the field, be it projects, in the earlier 
years, or public and national institutions, later on. Therefore, the change of dominant 
position in the field, from projects to host actors, did not lead to a more balanced power 
structure in the cotton sector, as rural workers remained powerless within it. Yet the 
introduction of more pieces and through different channels by the multiplication of projects 
implied more possible ways from ad hoc to durable through institutional bricolage. By 
adopting a relational approach of power, this research also demonstrated that some 
powerless actors in the cotton sector might have enough agency to shape institutional 
bricolage at a micro level. This was observed in the action of rural workers who borrowed 
project arrangements when organising training or when assembling pieces using project 
practices when sowing their fields. At the national level, project components were also 
incorporated. This is an outcome of the multiplication of project pieces available, but mainly 
stems from the stability brought to the sector by the conjunction of private and public 
interests following the election of Patrice Talon in 2016.  
To conclude and to address my research question, the host context came to incorporate 
project institutional arrangements by combining new and old institutional components, 
creating meanings and traditions that determined subsequent arrangements, relationships, 
processes, and practices in the cotton sector. Over time, this process remained authoritative, 
top-down, because it was shaped by the unequal power relations that governed both the 
cotton sector and the interplay between projects and host context. These power relations 
also changed over time, transforming the role of development cooperation and its ability to 
change the host context. The historical perspective of institutional bricolage with project 
pieces shows that this process is neither linear nor radical. It is a gradual and slow process to 
which development cooperation contributes at different levels, at different moments, so that 
the effects of development projects cannot be generalised or anticipated. In conclusion, this 
research shows that the way projects work depends on their place in the history of the 
interplay between project and host context. It thus contributes to our understanding of how 





8.2. What I am taking from this encounter 
I began this research from the position of a project manager. I saw the host context through 
the lenses of projects, and the realisation of their limitations motivated me to approach 
projects from different angles. The main conclusion from this trajectory is the confirmation 
that, in the long durée, the host context prevails over projects. Practitioners often see projects 
as the utmost solution for the problems they have identified and overestimate their ability to 
change the host context. Such a pretentious perspective endures even within emerging 
approaches that aim to transform the project experience. We insist on looking for ways to 
make the project prevail over its context. We try to make it an iterative process, able to embed 
complexity and uncertainties, to make the project work in the way we, the guests, expect. 
Instead, as suggested by development anthropologists, we could accept that the project 
works anyway, whether in the way we expected or not, and that this is both a conscious and 
an unconscious process. A project is a lived experience that acquires other meanings and 
objectives during and after the period of its implementation. 
This perspective on projects was developed by considering projects as institutions, in the 
sense of regularised practices that endure over time. Although we all know that some 
countries have been hosting development projects for decades, we tend to neglect the weight 
of past experiences when we start implementing a new project (see Bierschenk et al., 1991, 
for example). Many criticisms of development projects have pointed out their lack of 
consideration of the host country’s history and particularities as a factor of failure. This 
research also shows that not only does the history of the context matter, but also the history 
of projects within that context. Seeing projects as an institution inserts the present 
intervention into a historical trajectory in which actors tend to reproduce old patterns of 
action which, in turn, consolidates the structure even more. This perspective also allows us 
to envisage how project institutions could change, and explains why radical changes in 
development cooperation paradigms, such as the imposition of project management models 
from the top, or the introduction of new paradigms, such as SSC, tend to fail, or at least to 
take an unexpected form. Inserted into an institutional continuum, change to development 
cooperation practice is a long process, as each actor shapes and is shaped by the prevailing 
structure.  
In this sense, institutional bricolage proved to be a valuable framework within which to study 
the impact of projects in the host context. This concept has been applied to the challenges 





Faggin and Behagel, 2018; Mosha et al., 2016; Sakketa, 2018; Sehring, 2009). It has allowed 
researchers to focus on how agents re-shape and negotiate institutions by combining, both 
consciously and unconsciously, arrangements drawn from various institutional settings. As 
such, the concept has provided a different perspective through which to understand the 
processes that occur when new institutional arrangements are introduced into a local setting 
with socially embedded institutions (see de Koning, 2011), including development 
interventions (Cleaver, 2002; Fokou and Bonfoh, 2016; Huggins and Mastaki, 2020; Osei-
Amponsah et al., 2018; Sakketa, 2018). In this research, this concept has served to expand 
the analysis to multiple interventions in one sector across different periods. This thesis shows 
that institutional bricolage enables us to further our understanding of the interplay between 
past and subsequent interventions and not only between contemporary institutional settings, 
or formal and informal institutions. 
With regards to the study of development cooperation, this approach resituates development 
cooperation project institutional arrangements within a historical perspective, giving each 
project and all projects combined a different weight. In this framework, development 
cooperation becomes a source of pieces that host actors necessarily combine with other 
pieces from different sources. As we cannot know the life trajectories of each actor who 
engages in development projects, the resulting combination of pieces from hosts and guests 
is inevitably unpredictable. This approach invites us to reconsider the capacity of projects to 
change the host context, making them appear less important than aid critics and supporters 
alike claim. However, if we consider projects as pieces, the more project pieces we have in 
the host context, the more diverse is the set of pieces that hosts can access to shape 
institutions. This also involves working with a variety of host actors, as each one of them can 
play a role in the interplay between structure and agency. The example of the introduction 
of SSC pieces in a consolidated field shows how the introduction of a different set of pieces 
disturbed the recurring structuration of development cooperation practice. The mismatch of 
practices that the introduction of SSC practices provoked has the potential to change 
regularised practices, as long as more initiatives take place. The new practices that traditional 
donors introduce face the same challenges. Whether such new resulting practices will become 
a pattern in the long term remains uncertain. This is a long and gradual pace of change that 
projects contribute to, piece by piece. 
The resituating of a project in the host context and in the history of development cooperation 
questions the power relations that continue to govern development cooperation practice. 





communities still see the interplay between project and context in a paternalist way, in spite 
of changes in both the aid paradigm and practice. The discussion about the coloniality of 
development studies and practice has gained momentum in recent years, and more and more 
calls for decolonising development permeate international development spaces (Aid Re-
imagined, 2019; Bhambra, 2020; Capan, 2017; Chiba and Heinrich, 2019; Clapham, 2020; 
Kornprobst et al., 2020; ODI Bites: Decolonising International Development, 2020; Pailey, 2020; 
Pinet and Leon-Himmelstine, 2020; Rana and Koch, 2020; Vieira, 2019, among many 
others). From this research, I conclude that the transformation of the development 
cooperation experience needs to take place in at least two different dimensions. First, the 
relationships within development projects continue to be marked by development 
cooperation coloniality. But it is also in this field that we have seen more improvements, with 
efforts from implementers to transform the project social space by addressing unequal power 
relations when designing or defining project objectives, for example. Secondly, coloniality, 
as a set of practices, also characterises the relations between development cooperation 
initiatives and the host context in both North-South and South-South projects. In this 
domain, the project is still presented as a model to follow, as a simulation of what the host 
context should be. In this regard, this research shows that host actors have a more precise 
understanding of what a project is and what it can do. Implementers, by contrast, continue 
to overestimate project content to the detriment of the dynamics that are already in place but 
that may be insufficiently Western or capitalist. 
Finally, an approach to the coloniality of development cooperation through these two 
dimensions implies that efforts to decolonise development cooperation initiatives require 
multi-dimensional and multi-sited political economy analyses. Recent developments in the 
cotton development assistance field in Benin are a good illustration of how complex the 
linkages are between the macro and micro levels. The rules of international trade are a 
product of the colonial system, with former colonies still providing commodities to the 
international market. In this arena, industrialised countries have promoted free trade in 
manufactured goods, while protecting their primary sector from international competition. 
The European Union and the United States, in particular, continue to provide large subsidies 
to their cotton farmers, keeping the supply of cotton in the international market high and 
prices low. When developing countries succeeded in putting some pressure on the WTO (see 
Sneyd, 2011, for a thorough historical analysis of this process), the response of the US and 
Europe was to implement projects to make African cotton competitive, instead of changing 





compensation to African cotton producing countries or the end of subsidies. Thus, at the 
same time as these projects neutralised structural change at the macro level, they introduced 
sustainable agricultural practices which could have the potential to improve the life 
conditions of farmers. However, at the national level, the straightforward adoption of such 
practices could undermine the hierarchical positions of the dominant agents in the cotton 
sector and their status in the postcolonial state and in the capitalist world system. As a result, 
we have contradictory movements as we navigate from the macro to the micro level. This 
means that development cooperation projects and their pieces of bricolage take different 
meanings at different levels. Thus a project can be both an instrument and a challenger of 
unequal power relations, according to the scale and place of analysis. Hence, the coloniality 
of development cooperation must be approached both structurally, at the level of the 
international arena of struggle that gives life and purpose to projects, and specifically, at the 
level of projects and their insertion within the host context, lest any decolonial effect 
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62 AIC 23.05.18 Parakou AIC#12 
63 Cotton grower 24.05.18 Kandi AIC#13 
64 GIZ 29.05.18 Parakou IDP#8 
65 Brazilian Cooperation Agency 01.06.18 Cotonou IDP#10 
66 IFDC 05.06.18 Cotonou IDP#11 
67 MAEP 06.06.18 Cotonou MAEP#2 
68 Port of Cotonou 07.06.18 Cotonou CF#11 
69 WTO 19.06.18 Geneva OMC#1 
70 CIRAD 01.08.18 Cotonou IDP#14 





72 Plateforme des Acteurs de la Société Civile du Benin 
(PASCIB) 
06.08.18 Cotonou ORGP#3 







A.2. Profiles of research participants 
Table 8: Interviews and focus group discussions 
Number of individuals met 72 
INRAB 9 
MAEP 9 
Cotton growers 18 
UDCVPC 1 













Port Authority of Cotonou 1 
Total interviews 83 
In-depth interviews 57 
Participant observation 5 
Focus groups 3 







A.3. Questionnaire summary 



















4.1.1. Combien d’ha de coton 
avez-vous planté la saison 
dernière?
4.1.2. Combien de tonnes 
avez-vous récolté lors de la 
dernière campagne?
4.1.3. Combien la vente de 
coton vous a rapporté lors de la 
dernière campagne?
4.1.4. Occupez-vous un poste au 
sein de la coopérative/UCPC/ 
UDPC ou FN CVPC? Si oui, 
lequel?
4.3. Combien de 
cotonculteurs encadrez-vous?
4.2.1. Dans quelle institution 
travaillez-vous?
4.2.2. Depuis combien d’années?
4.2.3. Quel poste occupez-vous 
actuellement?
Oui Non Ne sais pas
7. Quels projets de coopération ci-dessous 








- Cotton Bio Helvetas
- CapBio



















- plus de 20
- Ne sais pas
6.1.2. De quel type d’activité s’agissait-il?
- Formation en salle
- Voyage d’études ou séminaire à l’étranger
- Formationou activité sur les champs au Bénin
 -Réunion de Coordination ou plani!cation
- Autre
6.1.3. De quel partenaire s’agissait-il?
6.1.4. Quand avez vous participé?
- Après 2010
- Entre 2000 et 2010
- Entre 1990 et 2000
- Avant les années 1990
- Ne se souvient pas
5. À votre avis, qui est le 
principal partenaire 
étranger du secteur du 
coton? 6. Avez-vous déjà participé à une 
activité organisée en collaboration 





Table 9: Questionnaire summary and respondents’ profiles 
 Number % 
TOTAL 240 100% 
Gender   
Women 17 7% 
Men 223 93% 
Median Age 35.2  
Commune of Residence   
Parakou 14 6% 
Kandi 0 0% 
Banikoara 113 47% 
Kérou 100 42% 
Cotonou 2 1% 
Abomey-Calavi 2 1% 
Nikki 1 0% 
Bembereke 2 1% 
Bohicon 1 0% 
Sinendé 1 0% 
Ndali 4 2% 
Occupation   
Cotton grower/farmer 208 87% 
Researcher/agronomist 7 3% 
Administrator/manager 8 3% 
Rural extension agent 16 7% 
Ginner 0 0% 
Other 1 0% 
   
Participation in a development cooperation project   
Yes 60 25% 
No 156 65% 
Don’t know 24 10% 
   
How many times have you participated?   
Once 2 4% 
2–5 29 52% 
6–10 12 21% 
11–20 3 5% 
More than 20 times 10 18% 
   
Kind of activity   
Training 49 82% 
Study tour or workshop abroad 6 10% 
Training or on-farm activity in Benin 48 80% 
Planning, coordination, or restitution workshop 9 15% 
Other 4 7% 





Which partner?   
Germany/GIZ 26 31% 
African Development Bank 0 0% 
World Bank 5 6% 
Brazil/EMBRAPA/ABC 6 7% 
China 2 2% 
CTB Belgian Technical Cooperation 5 6% 
United-States/USAID/Millennium Account 5 6% 
FAO 2 2% 
France/CIRAD/AFD 6 7% 
IFDC 4 5% 
India 2 2% 
The Netherlands/SNV 3 4% 
Switzerland/Helvetas 5 6% 
Turkey/TIKA 2 2% 
European Union 2 2% 
UNPD 2 2% 
Other 7 8% 
Don’t know 48 57% 
If other, please specify CEDEAO    
   
   
When did you participate?   
After 2010 59 98% 
Between 2000 and 2010 11 18% 
Between 1990 and 2000 4 7% 
Before the 1990s 1 2% 






A.4. Excerpts from interviews in original language 
Page 66 : 
Sa voix est prépondérante... quand il parle, plus personne ne parle. Puisqu'à lui seul il 
représentait, même parmi les égreneurs, il pesait plus lourd que tous les autres égreneurs. 
(AIC#8, 18/04/2018) 
Le DG de la SONAPRA a actionné le monde entier, pratiquement. Il est allé en Estonie, 
dans ci, dans ça, et ainsi de suite, dans presque tous les pays où on pouvait trouver des 
intrants. Mais il n'a pas réussi à trouver un gramme d’intrant ! Il n'avait pas un gramme 
d'intrant qui pouvait coûter le prix qu'il avait offert... Il y avait donc une difficulté totale pour 
cette campagne. En mai, il n'y avait pas encore un gramme d'intrant dans le territoire, alors 
que la campagne démarre en juin. La situation était complètement bloquée. Ils ne savaient 
pas quoi faire. Et lors du conseil de ministres, Yayi Boni demande comment sortir de cet 
égrenage, et on lui a dit : il n'y a qu'une seule personne qui puisse sauver le Bénin, il n'y a 
qu'une personne, personne d'autre ne peut le faire en dehors de Talon. Personne d'autre ! 
(AIC#8, 18/04/2018) 
Page 87 : 
Je crois pas que je travaille de la même manière [dans un projet]. Le projet attend de moi un 
résultat là, tout de suite. Je lui donne le plus vite possible, de la meilleure manière. Quand 
c'est l'État, je me donne un peu plus de temps, parce que je sais que je ne serais pas vite 
évalué... donc, je me donne un peu plus de largesses, ça c'est vrai… Je travaille moins quand 
je travaille pour l'État que quand je travaille pour un projet, c'est vrai… Ce n'est pas qu'une 
question financière, c'est une question de savoir qu'on a pas de suivi derrière, oui. Je sais que, 
avant qu'on ne vienne me suivre ici, je sais que j'aurai fait tout ce que j'ai à faire. Et les 
procédures sont tellement longues que bon, je me permets quelques fois de m'amuser, voilà. 
(INRAB#8, 22/05/2018) 
Lorsqu’un projet prend un expert pour venir nous former… ils ne vont pas bâcler le travail… 
lorsqu'il finit le travail, ils viennent sur le terrain pour vérifier, et si tu ne comprends pas ils 
t'expliquent à nouveau… Mais de l'autre côté, avec nos frères de l’AIC, ce que tu ne 
comprends pas ils viennent ils t'insultent devant les producteurs tout. Là, tu es frustré, tu ne 
peux pas faire un bon travail. (MAEP#4, 09/02/2018) 
Page 88 : 
Vous voyez, notre mal, ce que le producteur n’a pas les moyens… c’est pas en termes de 
moyens financiers. C’est des moyens… je sais pas… pas les moyens de vérifier la qualité des 
produits qu’on nous donne. Je vous avais dit que c’est un problème de l’État, c’est l’État qui 
devrait le faire. Mais, qu’est-ce qui prouve que ce que l’État a fait là, que c’est bien et que ça 
peut rapporter aux producteurs ? Mais nous organisations ne sont pas structurées jusqu’à ce 
niveau pour pouvoir faire cette contre-expertise. Donc on s’en tient à ce qu’on nous donne. 
Or les factures ne font que monter. Les produits qu’on a achetés cette année, la date de 
préemption est septembre, ou même août [2017]. (CF#3, 17/11/2017) 





La particularité c'est que quand un projet vient pour former comme ça, il y a un 
accompagnement qui suit. Il y a l'accompagnement, il y a les mesures incitatives au niveau 
du producteur qui suivent. Pour mettre le programme, par exemple, de WACIP, on a dit 
maintenant, les producteurs pilotes qui seront identifiés, on va leur donner gratuitement de 
l'engrais pour leur champ de démonstration. On dit maintenant aux agents qui abritent ces 
producteurs-là, lorsque vous venez pour des formations, il y a des per-diem qu'on vous paye. 
Et il y a des compléments de carburant qu'on vous donne chaque mois. Donc, au niveau des 
agents il y a des mesures d'accompagnement, au niveau des producteurs il y a des mesures 
d'incitation. Voilà comment est-ce qu'on travaille avec ces différents projets. (MAEP#5, 
07/04/2018) 
La différence des formations des deux institutions là ? … Il faut connaître le monde des 
[bailleurs], il y a l'accompagnement qui existe, il y a une motivation, les producteurs qui 
s'engagent à travers la mise en place des matériels de travail. Ça fait que les gens sont vraiment 
motivés… par contre au niveau de l'INRAB, il y a peu de motivation, c'est à dire que, c'est 
ceux qui sont volontaires, qui veulent adopter, qui sont intéressés, ils viennent… c'est plus 
difficile de mettre en œuvre car ils n'ont aucune motivation. 
Moi : de quel type de motivation parlez-vous ? 
Je parle du matériel de travail. Par exemple, quand on fait du compostage en fosse. On met 
à la disposition des producteurs bénéficiaires des brouettes, des pelles, des bottes, pour faire 
l'activité. Alors que de l'autre côté, on va former les gens, voilà, voilà comment on fait, 
comment on utilise, ceci, ceci. L'activité s'arrête là. C'est la triste réalité, mais c'est la réalité. 
(AIC#4, 21711/2017) 
Dans la plupart des projets que j'ai connu, pour atteindre des objectifs on va trois fois plus 
vite que quand c'est dans l'administration ordinaire. Au CRA-CF, nous là, il faut d'abord faire 
signer le chef, le chef du chef du chef du chef... et finalement au bout d'un an, pff, ce qui doit 
être fait n'est pas fait. Alors que dans un projet, généralement, ce que j'ai constaté, lorsque la 
décision est prise, puisque les moyens sont disponibles, très souvent il y a rien qui bloque 
quoi, très vite vous avez vos motos, même si c'est un tracteur, très vite vous l'avez… c'est ça 
que je voulais dire… (Focus group with CRA-CF agronomists on 09/04/2018) 
Page 90 : 
En dehors des cadres des projets… je peux dire qu'il n'y avait pas de formation, hen.. Pour 
le poste que j'occupais. Mais pour les agents qui sont sur le terrain, il y avait des formations 
pour leur montrer comment suivre les essais, recyclage... Il y a que les projets qui viennent et 
qui peuvent organiser ces formations-là. (INRAB#2, 13/11/2017) 
Page 92 : 
Bon, ils [les projets] choisissent… ça dépend des critères qu'ils ont défini. Si le projet a par 
exemple comme objectif d'impacter à la fin du projet 45% des femmes, donc, tu vois, le 
projet va dire 'ah, quand vous allez choisir 6 hommes, il faudrait qu'il y ait 4 femmes, dans le 
village'. Donc le projet vient selon les critères. Ou bien il va vous dire, 'ah, les producteurs 
que vous allez choisir, il faudrait que ce soient des producteurs qui disposent d'un cheptel, 
parce que moi, l'application que je veux mettre, je vous ai dit que la fumure de fond là, c'est 





ont des cheptels, je peux les prendre, parce que je sais qu'en termes de disponibilité de bouses 
de vache, le problème ne va pas se poser. Il peut dire que je vais travailler avec les producteurs 
qui ont un rendement un peu amélioré… à 1200 kg/ha, lui, il va prendre ces producteurs. 
Donc, ça dépend des critères de l'objectif qu'on vise… C'est comme ça que ça marche. 
(MAEP#5, 07/04/2018) 
Page 96 : 
Il faut remarquer que ce n'est pas évident qu'un projet à l'échelle de deux ans, 4 ans même, 5 
ans, puisse apporter quelque chose qui puisse impacter vraiment la culture – puisque c'est 
une culture annuelle, donc on le fait qu'une seule fois à l'année, donc tout ce qu'on lui apporte 
plutôt est évalué d'année en année. (INRAB#7, 02/08/2018) 
Page 97 : 
En fait, le problème de la temporalité est pour moi très important et l'afflux de ressources 
qui vient avec les projets contraint souvent le coordinateur, ou bien les acteurs de ce projet, 
à définir dans le temps qui leur est imparti et à montrer vite [les résultats] … après quand 
bien même ils ont toujours une ligne durabilité, c'est toujours la ligne qui est difficilement 
remplie à la fin du projet. (INRAB#8, 09/04/2018) 
Page 98 : 
Les gens sont pressés, mais que ça ne devrait pas être ça, parce qu'avant que les résultats ne 
soient validés, il faut les tester d'abord. Bon, donc, il y a cette impatience-là dans la mise en 
œuvre des projets. (IDP#7, 17/04/2018) 
Même si ça va marcher ça prend... ça prend, arrivé à un temps-là, quand le projet disparaît, 
c'est que on lâche. Rares sont ceux qui continuent avec l'innovation que les bailleurs ont 
voulu qu'on fasse. (MAEP#4, 09/04/2018) 
Page 102 : 
[Dans les années 1970] les blancs qui venaient acheter. C'est la Compagnie Française, en ce 
temps-là. Donc les français viennent aussi acheter et ils ont même leur acheteurs à part, et 
leurs encadreurs à part, en ce temps-là…Nous, jusqu'à présent, nous voyons que c'est le 
blanc qui achète, même actuellement, c'est le blanc qui achète. Parce que, ça reste pas ici. 
Tout ce qu'ils sont dans le Benin ici, là, ils ne sont que des organisateurs. Mais le coton même, 
ça va là-bas. Vous voyez, non ? (CF#6, 07/02/2018) 
Page 105 : 
C’est à partir donc de la colonie française… Des colons français, sont eux qui ont vraiment 
développé le coton et à un moment ils ont créé les centres de recherche… les premiers 
centres de recherche, c’est les colons. Même là où nous sommes là, c’est eux qui l’ont fait 
(INRAB#1, 19/10/2017) 
Les français sont des partenaires de vieille date. Depuis nos ancêtres. (INRAB#2, 
13/11/2017) 
 





Il y a des spécialistes français qui sont dans des institutions, dans des organismes 
internationaux et qui travaillent dans la zone intertropicale, c'est à dire dans l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest par exemple, ou bien en Afrique centrale… Donc, ils ont des chercheurs du CIRAD, 
mais qui travaillent dans nos zones ici depuis des années, qui ont des expériences dedans… 
Ils sont les connaisseurs du domaine - au moins c'est comme ça qu'on les prend, donc tout 
ce qu'ils disent c'est comme parole d'évangile… c'était comme ça… du point de vue 
scientifique, technique, ils nous apportaient beaucoup, et puis, on a plaisir à acquérir ces 
connaissances puisque nous savons que ça va nous servir après, même s'ils s'en vont quoi… 
(INRAB#2, 13/11/2017) 
Les français, ils ne sont pas trop différents de nous. [Silence] Pour faire quelque chose, c'est 
d'abord les moyens avant l'activité… le système français, c'est bon quand on a la disponibilité 
financière, matérielle, avant de démarrer une activité, parce qu'après on pourra demander des 
comptes rendus... pour rendre compte, quoi. (INRAB#6, 31/01/2018) 
Page 111 : 
Le faire-faire est une nouvelle méthode, différente de l’habitude… Ici, les béninois dirigent 
les activités… les pratiques endogènes sont là. On a essayé de faire ça, d’adapter à notre 
réalité et disséminer à travers des formations où on partage nos expériences… c’est un projet 
inclusif. (ORGP#2, 25/04/2018) 
Page 112 : 
Les ressources de ces projets, qui va manger, qui va pas manger, c'était ça qui créait les 
difficultés entre les producteurs… Les cotonculteurs étant appuyés au sein de la FUPRO par 
le projet de la Banque Mondiale, PARFC, il y a un certain nombre de ressources qui sont 
mises à leur disposition. Ces ressources placées à la FUPRO, seront noyées dans plusieurs 
activités qui ne sont pas nécessairement coton. (AIC#8, 18/04/2018) 
Page 113 : 
Il faut former les producteurs, tout ça là, parce qu'on cherche toujours à améliorer à avoir 
plus de ce qui existait. Donc, s'il n'y a pas de formation, ça peut pas aller… c'est là où les 
partenaires devraient nous appuyer. Par exemple, maintenant, si on pouvait trouver un 
partenaire pour l'UD qui pourrait nous aider, à améliorer, à avoir, à amener les informations 
jusqu'au bout, vous voyez? Ici déjà, construire une bibliothèque… et le matériel technique. 
Parce que ça aussi, c'est comme si c'était une marque déposée…qui reste de générations en 
générations, mais sans l'équipement- on a un problème d'équipement, ça ne peut pas aller… 
On a envie hein... on envie de se développer, mais il y a les moyens aussi qui manquent. 
(ORGP#6, 11/04/2018) 
Page 119 : 
J’ai rencontré aussi une équipe du Brésil, il y a de cela deux ans… ils font du coton bio. J’étais 
dans une structure faitière départementale. Donc eu je les ai rencontrés dans le cadre de 
responsable départementale, pour voir comment introduire le coton bio dans nos zones… 
des brésiliens, mais avec des allemands aussi… c’était une réunion de planification… donc 
c’est eux qui sont venus vers nous… alors pourquoi ils n’ont pas donné suite, je sais pas 





En fait, ceux dont je parlais c’était pour pouvoir maintenir le sol sans les engrais chimiques… 
pour voir quelles sont les avantages et les inconvénients du coton bio et du coton 
chimique[sic]. (CF#3, 17/11/2017) 
Page 120 : 
En fait, les gens ont fait une semaine... les CPV, c'est eux qui ont été formés, nous, les 
producteurs, on nous a appelé le dernier jour pour aller sur le terrain… Donc comme c'est 
eux [CPV] qui étaient chargés de nous suivre sur le terrain… Donc voilà l'expérience qu'on 
a eu. Et c'était des brésiliens qui portaient le projet.... Je sais pas si c'est... C 4... ou si c'est C3 
plus Togo... Il y a un projet C4 là… c'est par rapport à ça qu’on était là. Mais nous, on nous 
a ciblé nous, ceux qui font la semence de base là, pour aller sur le terrain voir comment est-
ce qu'on peut maintenir nos sols fertiles quand on fait le coton avec l'apport de la fumure 
chimique… c'est ce que moi j'ai retenu par rapport à cette expérience là... mais il n'y a pas eu 
de formation avec module ou documents ou trucs comme ça. (CF#3, 06/04/2018) 
Page 121 : 
Le C4 a démarré au Bénin en 2010... ou 2008, 2010, la période là, ça nous a formé à Parakou, 
c'est après ça qu'il y a eu des phases qu'on a eu à assister à Bamako… En 2016 je suis encore 
réparti à Bamako… je suis [allé] assister une formation au Brésil, tout récemment, en 2017. 
J'ai fait trois mois là-bas… pendant tout mon séjour… j'ai eu le temps de connaître au moins 
les zones productrices du Brésil… où j'ai compris que vraiment, effectivement, le coton est 
vraiment développé… et j'ai compris que, effectivement, quand on prend le coton, le coton 
est une culture de rente qui peut vraiment nous permettre de valoriser nos richesses, dans 
nos pays. (MAEP#3, 07/02/2018) 
Quand nous, on voit un expatrié… tout ce que l'expatrié va nous sortir, quel que soit ce qu'il 
est en train de dire, on dit 'reste à vérifier'… ou bien on peut lui dire, ce qui se passe à 
l'extérieur ce n'est pas la même qui peut se passer ici, parce qu'il y a le climat qui diffère, il y 
a aussi les moyens. Donc on arrive à montrer à ces derniers ce qui se passe chez vous, ce 
n'est pas la même chose… 
La seule formation que j'ai fait avec les brésiliens j'ai tellement apprécié, j'ai toujours parlé de 
ça… Ils mettent tout en œuvre pour que vous même vous voyez ce qui se passe chez eux et 
ce qui se passe chez vous et à vous de voir comment vous allez équilibrer les choses pour 
que ça marche… Les allemands ne montrent pas ce qui se passe là-bas. Ils viennent 
seulement nous dire 'vous devriez faire ceci' 'vous allez faire ceci' et ils ne viennent pas 
directement eux-mêmes. Ils prennent des experts béninois, des docteurs, des experts des 
autres pays qui viennent travailler, eux, ils viennent seulement suivre. (MAEP#4, 
09/02/2018) 
Page 122 : 
Par rapport aux chinois, il vaut mieux être franc... Ah, c'est difficile, travailler avec les chinois. 
Bon, dans un premier temps, ceux à qui on avait à faire là, nous on estimait qu'ils n'étaient 
pas des spécialistes du domaine… Il y a des éléments, comme des b-a-ba en sciences que, si 
tu es un scientifique et que tu ne connais pas, ou bien que si tu cherches à contredire, on te 
prends en même temps comme quelqu'un qui n'est pas du domaine. Donc ça fait que nous, 





permis de faire les expérimentations qu'il faut pour tirer des notions de leur méthode de 
travail, alors que c'était très intéressant pour moi… Donc eux, en tout cas ceux à qui on a eu 
affaire, c'était très très très difficile de collaborer avec eux. (INRAB#2, 13/11/2017) 
On a pas à dire ce qu'on souhaitait avoir. Quand vous venez dans une structure de recherche, 
c'est que c'est gagnant-gagnant. Une fois que vous êtes arrivé, et nos variétés vous battent 
déjà, ça veut dire que bon, on a pas grand-chose à prendre chez vous. (INRAB#3, 
13/11/2017) 
Eux autres [les Turcs] ils viennent nous inculquer directement des trucs là que c'est bon, c'est 
bon. On ne peut pas amener quelque chose à la recherche pour dire que c'est bon. C'est bon 
chez eux, mais ici chez nous, il faut qu'on teste pour voir si c'est bon. (INRAB#3, 
13/11/2017) 
Page 123 : 
[INRAB#2] Dans la partie de protocole qu'ils ont fait et qu'on a amendé – ça n'avait pas 
bien de poids. Si on dit, on va faire telle densité, et eux proposent : on va faire telle densité, 
nous, on dit non. A la mise en œuvre, nous, on est pas là-bas, on a d'autres tâches aussi, ils 
font ce qu'ils ont pensé 
[INRAB#3] Ils ne tiennent pas compte des amendements 
[INRAB#2] Alors qu'il y a des réalités du Bénin ici, que nous connaissons, et eux ne savent 
pas (13/11/2017) 
Non, ce n'est pas les mêmes approches. Souvent ils viennent avec leur argent et ils dépensent 
leur argent. Les chinois ils viennent avec leur argent, ils dépensent, les turcs, ils viennent avec 
leur agent, ils dépensent... les indiens, ils viennent avec leur argent, ils dépensent... les 
brésiliens c'est encore plus grave, parce qu'ils ne viennent même pas avec de l'argent [rires] 
c'est de là-bas qu'ils disent ce qu'il faut faire avec l'argent. C'est plus grave. (INRAB#7, 
02/08/2018) 
Ils n’ont même pas l’argent des brésiliens… ce n’est pas grand-chose. (INRAB#1, 
19/10/2017) 
Page 124 : 
L'inconvénient c'est que les moyens ne soient pas réellement utilisés pour faire le travail 
réel… par moments on peut dévier pour aller faire autre chose avec. C'est ça qui devient 
l'avantage dans le système brésilien, puisque lui il veut voir le travail fait avant d'encaisser 
l'argent. L'inconvénient de là-bas, devient l'avantage ici. Puisqu'il faut forcément s'y mettre 
avant d'avoir les sous quoi. Mais moi je crois quand même que ce système est bien puisque 
dans le cadre du projet, c'est une innovation qu'on veut partager… Le fait même de le faire 
est à notre avantage, donc quand les gars agissent comme ça, je crois qu'ils ont en partie 
raison aussi, parce que... il faut qu'on coure à notre bien-être. (INRAB#6, 31/01/2018) 
Du point de vue logistique, leur façon de gestion ne prend pas en compte nos traditions d'ici. 
Vous voyez, non. C'est à dire que… je prends un exemple simple, dans une formation, il y a 
des formateurs que vous avez invité, il y a des producteurs que vous avez invité. Vous voyez 
? Maintenant, dans nos traditions ici, le formateur sera plus payé que le producteur. Il sera 





constaté que c'est le contraire. Les producteurs sont plus payés que les formateurs. 
(INRAB#2, 13/11/2017) 
Page 125 : 
Tous les projets sont pas comme ça. Donc, ça fait que systématiquement la grille de 
paiements des formateurs c'est à part, et quelles que soient les situations, le formateur est 
plus payé que le participant. (INRAB#3, 13/11/2017) 
Page 126 : 
Le problème que nous avons eu c'est que nous avons demandé au conseil de ministres qui 
avait autorisé au temps de l'ancien ministre de viabiliser le site, mais dans la mise en œuvre 
on a toujours de problèmes. On a jamais réussi à le faire. Donc, on peut avoir le groupe 
[électrogène] et commencer à travailler avec le groupe, le temps qu'on écrive, parce qu'à 
l'échelle d'un pays, il faut faire une demande en septembre et voir que c'est financé en 
septembre de l'année suivante, parce que c'est le budget national. (INRAB#7, 02/08/2018) 
Page 128 : 
[Les chinois] se sont vite rendus compte que le transfert de technologie ce n'est pas évident, 
que nous, nous avons nos technologies et eux, ils ont leur technologie et que ce n'est pas 
forcément des problèmes de technologie, c'est beaucoup plus d'autres problèmes qui seraient 
bien d'aller solutionner. Après les analyses, si bien de leur côté que de notre côté, il était 
question alors de voir comment est-ce qu'il faut améliorer les technologies qui existent ici, 
en essayant de voir quelles sont les insuffisances et quelles sont les forces, les faiblesses de 
ces technologies-là. Et rentre également l'accent sur la mécanisation de l'agriculture. 
Comment est-ce que nous allons mécaniser l'agriculture de manière à conserver les sols et à 
avoir les résultats attendues de manières durable ? (INRAB#7, 02/08/2018) 
[Nous allons] recruter un agent, un mécanicien, spécialiste en mécanisation qui va travailler 
auprès d'eux [l’équipe chinoise] pour leur inculquer notre nouvelle vision de la mécanisation. 
Ce n'est plus le labour systématique, c'est le labour minimum. Notre mécanicien va travailler 
avec eux pour quand même permettre de percer un peu sur cette expérience. (INRAB#7, 
02/08/2018) 
Page 129 : 
Depuis le mois d'août [2017], nous n'avons pas de financement. Tous les travaux qui ont été 
fait du mois d'août jusqu'en décembre, c'est moi même qui ait supporté. De janvier jusqu'à 
maintenant, ça y est tous les salaires sont payés, c'est moi même qui ait supporté. Je suis 
obligé, pour ne pas subir le coût des contrôle, je suis obligé de passer les activités carrément 
dans les activités du CRA-CF, de considérer que le projet ne va pas rembourser, parce que si 
tu regardes le mécanisme de fonctionnement des projets, normalement ils ne peuvent pas 
me rembourser, ils disent : il faut d'abord une demande, il faut qu'on autorise de faire de la 
dépense. Alors que j'ai déjà fait la dépense. Je risque de commencer par pleurer pour dire : 
donnez-moi… Et voilà que j'ai déjà écrit le nom du projet sur la dépense, je ne peux plus 
modifier. (INRAB#7, 02/08/2018) 
J'ai demandé à mon conseiller d'administration d'autoriser à ce que nous inscrivions [les 





reconnu que c'est bien. Si le bailleur, à cause de ces problèmes de procédures ne veut pas 
financer, tsc, on oublie ça et puis on prend… les activités vont porter la griffe du C4+Togo, 
mais dans la réalité, il n'y a pas ça… Mais il faut qu'on fasse d'une manière qu'on mobilise 
des fonds pour financer nous-mêmes et laisser le projet faire ce qu'il veut. Si c'est pour faire 
voyager les gens, il n'y a qu'à le faire le temps qu'il veut, si c'est pour venir pour former les 
gens, il n'a qu'à venir ici pour former les gens… mais, il ne faut pas que nous restions 
dépendants du projet… Quand on sera dans le comité de pilotage, on va leur dire, que nous 
allons désormais travailler sans eux. S'ils viennent, c'est bon, s'ils ne viennent pas, c'est pas 
grave. Nous allons le faire. Il y a les moyens pour le faire, donc il vaut mieux qu'on le fasse. 
(INRAB#7, 02/08/2018) 
Page 135 : 
Ce sont des projets de développement, qui ont travaillé pour faire développer la filière. Ils 
ont beaucoup travaillé sur la pratique paysanne, ont beaucoup travaillé sur le conseil, sur le 
renforcement des capacités… Et ils ont effectivement eu leur impact sur les résultats, parce 
que la production a été multiplié par quatre pendant tout le temps que ces projets ont 
travaillé. Et on a eu les résultats derrière sur la décennie qui a suivi. Donc c'est très bon. 
(INRAB#7, 02/08/2018) 
Page 136 : 
C'est vrai qu'il y a eu de l'argent frais disons pour avoir des ressources pour structurer- 
puisque l'AIC était à son début au moment où le projet Banque Mondiale a été exécuté. Il 
n’y avait presque rien en ce moment-là. La mise en place des manuels de procédures, tout ce 
qui est organisationnel, c'était avec l'appui de la Banque Mondiale que c'était mis en place. 
Même le personnel de l'AIC a été recruté, le premier personnel technique de l'AIC a été 
recruté sur la base de ces fonds… Pour qu'on dise que l'AIC doive prélever un montant sur 
chaque kilo de coton graine vendu, c'était une étude financé par le programme. Et à quoi ce 
montant doit servir c'est une étude qui a indiqué cela. Donc, c'est pratiquement ce 
programme qui a mis en place toute la structure de l'AIC, ça, c'est indéniable. (AIC#8, 
18/04/2018) 
Page 138 : 
Par le passé on faisait des adaptations à travers les variétés exotiques, mais depuis 1996, le 
centre même a son programme en bonne et due forme de création variétale… C’était avec 
les partenaires français, que le programme de création variétale a été mis sur place… Donc 
aujourd’hui nous avons plusieurs variétés déjà dans nos centres… Actuellement on a trois 
en vulgarisation. (INRAB#1, 19/10/2017) 
Page 139 : 
INRAB#4 : En fait, ce n'est pas un projet comme les autres projets, c'est un projet spécifique 
à la recherche… on a pu former dans ce projet les gens, donc c'est ça qui a permis une 
pérennisation, contrairement aux autres projets, les projets de développement, vous voyez, 
ce genre de projets, la stratégie n'est pas forcément la même… au niveau de la recherche, on 
continue encore de bénéficier des fruits de ce projet qui était passé, donc on continue les 





INRAB#6 : Dans le cadre par exemple de PARAB, PARCOB, comme nous on est dans la 
nécessité de faire la sélection variétale, la création variétale, malgré que le projet est parti, ça 
continue… les gens ont été formés – parce que c'est spécifique là. Dans les autres cas, si à la 
fin- moi, mon avis, hein- si les gens n'adoptent pas, c'est qu'ils n'ont pas besoin. 
INRAB#8 : je ne suis pas d'accord. Je ne suis pas d'accord, parce que, regardez, dans 
PARCOB, PARAB là, ceux dont les compétences avaient besoin d'être améliorées et qui ont 
vu leurs compétences améliorées, il faut le compter aux bouts des doigts. C'est une toute 
petite équipe de la recherche, donc le type d'acteur impliqué, et le mécanisme est tel que, avec 
ou sans le projet, il y aurait section génétique, qui aurait des ressources qui seraient toujours 
affectées à ce qu'on fasse les essais, à ce qu'on fasse la sélection. 
Page 140 : 
C'est difficile d'amener un produit d'ailleurs qui soit compétitif dans notre dispositif [de 
création variétale]. C'est le secteur où le CRA-CF a le plus investi ces vingt dernières années. 
(INRAB#7, 02/08/2018) 
Page 143 : 
Parce que ça demande, d'abord, le savoir-faire du producteur dans la connaissance des 
ravageurs, ils doivent venir faire des observations dans les champs, il ne peut pas venir traiter 
n'importe comment, hein. Il doit observer, compter, pour voir le nombre d'insectes présents 
et les types d'insecte présents… donc selon les types d'insecte qu'il va rencontrer dans le 
champ, il va avoir le produit, tout ça là… C'est pas facile. Or, l'autre méthode dit : vous faites 
sept traitements chaque deux semaines. Vous venez, les trois premiers traitements et les deux 
premiers traitements vous utilisez tel produit… il vient seulement et il applique chaque deux 
semaines, c'est facile, hein? Mais l'autre on a dit : il faut faire des observations chaque semaine, 
s'il y a problème, tu fais traitement... c'est pas facile. Le producteur n'a pas le temps – ils ont 
beaucoup de choses à faire et c'est aussi un peu une organisation spontanée… et il y a aussi 
l'ignorance. (AIC#3, 21/11/2017) 
Page 144 : 
Parce que la LEC il y a lutte ciblée. Pour cibler là, ça veut dire que tu fais les observations. Si 
un producteur fait les observations avant de traiter, ça veut dire qu'il fait déjà LEC. 
(INRAB#4, 20/11/2017) 
Beaucoup ne connaissent pas PADSE, dans le coton on parle de LEC, et quand on dit LEC, 
immédiatement il faut faire référence au projet PADSE. Mais ça a marqué son temps quand 
même. Les acquis sont là, hein ?! Les producteurs connaissent, seulement que, il suffit que 
nous, nous les décideurs qu'on prenne la décision de poursuivre la technologie, là les 






Page 145 : 
[Le projet] leur permet [aux producteurs] d’économiser des produits. Donc, c’est devenu un 
enjeu [entre] les distributeurs d’intrants, producteurs [il montre ces mains comme dans une 
balance, pour montrer les poids des différentes catégories] Vous voyez ? (Rires) C’est les 
distributeurs finalement [qui ont gagné]… C’était des affaires de gros sous (INRAB#1, 
19/10/2017) 
Page 146 : 
Tous les projets qui sont arrivés après 2004-2005 ou 2006 s'inscrivent dans l'initiative C-4 
avec comme objectif d'aider les filières à être compétitives sur le marché international. Donc 
leur objectif est suffisamment clair. Il n'était pas question de venir donner des moyens aux 
acteurs sur le terrain – non, ce n'était pas ça. Sur quel levier on met l'accent pour que le coton 
qui est produit soit compétitif sur le marché international. Chaque acteur, chaque projet a 
essayé de prendre des objectifs spécifiques dans cet objectif global. (INRAB#7, 02/08/2018) 
Il y a beaucoup de projets, chacun vient avec une technique différente et pense qui est la 
meilleure (AIC#5, 16/03/2018) 
Page 147 : 
La différence c'est que, au niveau de l'IFDC, la gestion intégrée de la fertilité des sols, on part 
sur certains concepts par rapport aux différentes plantes qui peuvent améliorer la fertilité des 
sols. Alors qu'au niveau de la GIZ, c'est beaucoup plus des mesures de conservation… Donc, 
il y a des méthodes mécaniques de conservation du sol qui ont été apprises également aux 
producteurs… on a fait pas mal. Également j'ai travaillé avec le projet...on appelle ça WACIP. 
Vous connaissez WACIP ? Donc, WACIP également, on a travaillé, c'est un projet américain, 
WACIP a travaillé sur le coton et dans le cadre de l'amélioration des rendements… donc la 
fumure de fond est souvent la fumure organique, et cette fumure organique peut être la bouse 
de vache ou des résidus de récolte... donc voilà ce qu'ils font eux autres, leur approche. 
(MAEP#5, 07/04/2018) 
Quand on nous avait recruté en 2007, c’était vraiment bon, c'était le bon temps, la culture du 
coton, puisqu'en ce moment il y avait les projets, programmes. On avait le projet WACIP, 
financé par la Banque Mondiale [sic] qui nous appuyait régulièrement. On était recruté, 
franchement, on avait pas d'expérience, on nous appelait régulièrement pour les formations, 
on nous formait. Mais, avec le temps, WACIP a fini, le projet PAFICOT est venu, toujours 
sur le coton, le projet PAFICOT est venu, toujours sur le coton, et ça a continué avec les 
mêmes activités que WACIP faisait. (MAEP7#, 21/11/2017) 
Pendant cette période-là, nous agents de terrain, on se plaignait pas. (MAEP#8, 21/11/2017) 
Page 149 : 
Ah, on en a pas [matières organiques]! … On compte beaucoup sur les peuls, mais les peuls 
ne restent pas sur place… ils sont obligés d'aller dans les forêts classées… Ceux qui ont la 
chance d'avoir [des animaux] et de stocker des forages, de faire des forages pour ça là, ils 
peuvent bénéficier de ça. Mais ça c'est insuffisant... Même, les choses des WC là, quand vous 
videz les WC, certains producteurs maintenant [utilisent ça] ça enrichit aussi le sol, mais 





La technique là, il faut faire fosse comme ça là… Tu mets les tiges, le caca des bêtes et tu 
mets l'eau. Dans trois mois après ça va pourrir tu vas verser dans le champ, même si tu n'as 
pas utilisé l'engrais, ça peut aller…  Seulement que c'est un peu difficile. Il faut avoir des 
matériels pour pouvoir faire. Sinon, quand ça va pourrir, il faut avoir des brouettes avec 
lesquelles tu vas ramasser. C’est pas facile, mais c'est bon. (CF#7, 08/02/2018) 
Page 152 : 
Bon, en fait, l'année dernière ils s'étaient engagés pour faire de l'intensification. Mais en 
réalité, c'est pas de l'intensification, c'est l'appui à l'adoption de technologies, c'est l'appui à 
l'adoption des fiches techniques, parce que parler d'intensification c'est comme s'ils 
inventaient quelque chose... ni en approche, ni en technologie… ils n'inventent rien. C'est 
nous qui avons mis en place les nouvelles formules d'engrais, c'est nous qui avons mis en 
place les nouvelles doses d'engrais qui sont adaptées aux différentes régions… Aussi, nous 
avons travaillé avec l'USAID sur l'utilisation du compost, de l'engrais vert, tout ça, pour 
booster la production, donc, si dans leur projet dit d'intensification c'est demander au 
producteur d'utiliser la dose d'engrais recommandée par la recherche, avec la formule 
d'engrais recommandée par la recherche, et d'apporter de la matière organique au sol… mais 
il y a pas un projet… Ce qui a fait augmenter la production c'est quoi : étant donné qu'on a 
adopté des nouvelles doses d'engrais, qu'on a augmenté les engrais, et que derrière on a 
demandé aux gens, dans la mesure du possible, d'apporter de la matière organique, ça fait 
que la quantité totale d'engrais apportée au cotonnier a augmenté. (INRAB#7, 02/08/2018) 
Quand on parle d'intensification il ne faut pas forcer, parce qu'il y a des contraintes derrière. 
S'il faut aller chercher des débris, les bouses de vache pour jeter dans son champ là, ou bien 
eux même faire le compostage, c'est des efforts en plus, donc il faut que ça soit vraiment 
volontaire, il faut que ça soit le producteur qui soit convaincu qu'il faut ça… Mais nous on 
insiste surtout sur l'intérêt pour le producteur pour le faire, parce qu'on estime que c'est plus 
rentable et c'est de plus en plus vers quoi il faut aller. Surtout que l'AIC a commencé par 
intégrer dans sa façon de faire les mesures de gestion durable de terres et même d'adaptation 
au changement climatique. Donc, par rapport à ces préoccupations, pour lesquelles le 
personnel déjà a subi la formation, est à répercuter sur les producteurs pour atteindre 
vraiment des réels changements au niveau des producteurs, de plus en plus, pour qu'on ne 
détruise plus le sol, il faut que le producteur fasse attention comment faire pour que le même 
sol puisse lui servir pendant plusieurs années. Donc c'est vraiment de plus en plus un souci 
au niveau de l'AIC. (AIC#2, 09/07/2018) 
Page 153 : 
Il faisait partie de ceux qui combattaient la recherche. Mais, s'il combat c'est pas parce qu'il 
ne connaît pas. Il connaît très bien ce que la recherche peut apporter… peut être qu'il voulait 
rester en cachette pour prendre les résultats de la recherche et les utiliser et refuser d'investir 
dedans. Maintenant il a changé de position. Il sait de quoi la recherche a besoin… et c'est lui 
qui impose maintenant que toutes les activités soient initiées par la recherche, soient instruites 
par la recherche… Donc, maintenant qu'il est arrivé, c'est que vous devez savoir c'est que 





comptable des résultats de son travail de chef de l'État. Si aujourd'hui on dit que la recherche 
est bien, c'est [grâce à] lui, c'est lui, c'est pas l'AIC. (INRAB#7, 02/08/2018) 
Page 154 : 
Nous aimons trop le repos ! Après la récolte on a rien à faire, on reste comme ça, à la maison, 
on attend encore la pluie, tu vois ? C'est pas bien. (CF#7, 08/02/2018) 
Page 156 : 
Il s'est dit, par rapport à la technologie qu'ils ont appris des brésiliens, de ne plus arracher, 
de ne plus débroussailler son champ, donc, qu'il fallait laisser quand même certaines espèces 
pousser et qu'il l'a fait une première fois et que les voisins, même sa propre femme était 
déçue, elle disait: quoi? on va voir ton champ comme ça, mal entretenu… c'est pas bien! Il 
faut faire comme les autres et nettoyer ton champ, pour qu'on sache que tu es un brave 
homme. Il s'est dit : mais qu'est-ce qu'il fallait faire ? Fallait suivre ce qu'on lui a dit dans le 
cadre du projet, laisser le champ comme ça, ou est-ce qu'il faut faire comme tout le monde, 
travailleur, aller enlever tout… il s'est mis à beaucoup hésiter, mais que finalement, il s'est dit 
que non, que ce qu'on lui apprend au niveau du projet ne doit pas être mauvais, qu'il allait 
laisser ça comme ça. Mais qu'il était surpris favorablement quand il est allé voir ses tubercules 
dans le sol… Les racines au niveau du coton aussi étaient bien entrées et que ça a donné plus, 
quoi, je sais pas si en termes de qualité du coton, ou bien, mais qu'il s'est rendu compte que 
vraiment- qu'il s'est dit qu'il était paresseux, mais que les résultats étaient là et les gens l'ont 
félicité en retour maintenant, en disant ça là, vraiment, c'est bien, c'est bien… au départ ce 
n'était pas facile, parce que c'était quelque chose de nouveau, mais qu'avec le temps ils se 
sont aperçus que vraiment c'était pour leur bien. (IDP#7, 17/04/2018) 
C’était une formation qu'on appelait... PAFICOT. Oui, c'est PAFICOT qui nous a formés. 
Donc… euh… si le coton ça donne très bien, on peut trouver jusqu'à 1 tonne 500 par 
hectare. Si on donne le prix et on supprime toutes les dépenses, vous allez voir que nous à 
terre, on tombe. Mais si ce n'était pas à cause de la formation, moi je ne savais pas qu'on était 
perdant. Pour moi, on mange comme on veut et on oublie ce qu'on a dépensé. Donc à cause 
de cette formation, ça nous aidé, ah ! si on pouvait continuer à avoir des formations comme 
ça… vraiment ! Beaucoup de gens même vont vouloir laisser le coton. (CF#6, 07/02/2018) 
CF#7 : Les encadreurs, ils nous forment dans quelle période il faut semer, dans quelle 
période il faut mettre l'engrais, tout ça… Mais l'autre projet, c'est pas ça là-bas, ça concerne 
nous bien là, comment tu vas faire la planification, c'est des choses comme ça… dans le mois 
de septembre, on a fait aussi une formation qui m'a fait très peur. Vraiment. Ils nous ont dit 
que les produits que nous utilisons ne sont pas bons à consommer. Tous les engrais et autres, 
insecticides, tout ça, ce n'est pas bon. 
Moi : Mais ils disaient qu'il fallait arrêter d'utiliser les produits? 
CF#7 : Bon, il a bien dit de ne pas utiliser ça dans le vivrier. Et si nous utilisons encore, de 
ne pas utiliser ça aux bords des cours d'eau, puits, consorts comme ça. 
CF#8 : ça va tuer les poissons et les animaux. 
CF#7 : ça peut nous rendre malades aussi. 





CF#7 : Bon, on nous amène seulement, on dit c'est ça là qu'il faut utiliser, comme ça. On a 
pas le choix. (CF#7 et CF#8, 08/02/2018) 
Page 157 : 
Ceux qui viennent de l’extérieur, il veut vraiment avoir [des informations] … eux même ils 
viennent voir, prennent notes et ils écoutent les choses… si c’est un béninois par exemple, il 
amène aucun papier ici et ce qu’on dit là, il ne peut pas retenir tout. Si c’est bon, ou pas bon, 
c’est pareil. (CF#1, 25/10/2017) 
Nos relations avec les formateurs, c’est très bon, on ne peut pas dire que c’est pas bon… le 
problème, il faut qu’ils nous avertissent tôt… Parce qu’aujourd’hui j’ai dit, c’est tout à l’heure 
qu’on vient de m’appeler pour une séance maintenant, à N’Dali, et je n’étais pas au courant 
depuis hier… Même l’argent d’essence je n’ai pas. Donc si je savais depuis, je saurais 
comment me déplacer. (CF#2, 10/11/2017) 
Page 158 : 
Si moi je veux dérouler une formation, je les préviens d'abord, le jour la date et le lieu. Je vais 
en avance les attendre pour qu'ils sachent que le retard n'est pas permis à tout moment. Donc, 
lorsque tu commences, vous commencez, tu les amènes à comprendre que c'est que tu es en 
train de dire est pertinent. Ce que tu es en train de leur donner comme formation est 
pertinente, ils sont dans ce besoin… il y a des gens qui sont réticents, il y a des gens qui 
acceptent les règles en même temps. (MAEP#4, 09/02/2018) 
Page 162 : 
Il y avait... disons, 30 ou 40 personnes… il y avait des producteurs, il y avait la GIZ, il y avait 
quelques représentants d'ONGs, il y avait surtout le comité de pilotage. Mais on appelait tout 
le monde... Il y avait des agents de terrain comme moi, donc ils essaient de faire représenter 
toutes le couches (INRAB#8, 22/05/2018) 
Page 164 : 
Normalement un projet qui vient au Bénin, ou n'importe où, il va falloir que ce projet ait 
comme un partenaire sur le terrain, une structure durable, qui soit vraiment le ciment, qui 
soit vraiment l'appui de ce projet-là. Simplement parce que, lors que c'est une structure qui 
est bien établie, derrière le projet, cette structure-là peut perpétuer, capitaliser les 
informations et les données. Il faut également que ces structures aient un minimum de 
moyens pour être en mesure de venir en aide à ce projet lorsque ce projet est en difficulté 
pendant sa mise en œuvre. Il faut que la structure ait les moyens pour venir en aide - c'est à 
dire pour combler les insuffisances des projets pendant sa période de mise en œuvre. 
(INRAB#7, 02/08/2018) 
Page 167 : 
Le coton c'est ça, c'est un maillon vraiment dense, où tout le monde veut se retrouver autour 
pour bouffer. Parce que c'est là, où il y a l'argent. Et c'est là encore où il y a des problèmes. 
(MAEP#7, 21/11/2017) 





Les nouvelles technologies sont toujours acquises par la hiérarchie. La hiérarchie nous 
informe, par exemple, par la recherche [coton]… c'est eux qui nous donnent les notions et à 
notre tour maintenant on fait le partage en milieu paysan. (MAEP#3, 07/02/2018) 
Je suis dans le cadre des activités de l'État… il faut que les patrons décident et nous on nous 
envoie un peu ce qui est décidé en fait. (INRAB#8, 22/05/2018) 
Page 230 : 
Dans la Donga, on fait le coton seulement pour les engrais… ça donne pas ici, tout le monde 
sait ça (CF#15, 28/11/2017) 
On peut pas manger le coton. (CF#8, 08/02/2018) 
On fait le coton comme si c'était une obligation. On a pas eu autre chose à faire. Si on pouvait 
trouver autre chose, qui dépasse le coton, on allait laisser le coton de côté… produire les 












FORMULAIRE DE CONSENTEMENT 
 
 
TITRE DU PROJET : Coopération pour le Développement et l’incorporation 
d’arrangements institutionnels ad hoc dans le contexte local 
au Bénin 
Référence de 
validation du projet : ER/AG591/1 
    
 
Cochez s’il vous plaît toutes les sections qui vous sont applicables et pour lesquelles vous 
souhaitez donner votre consentement : 
1. 
J’ai lu, ou on a lu pour moi dans ma langue maternelle, et j’ai compris l’information sur 
ce projet, telle quelle fournie dans la fiche d’information.  
2. 




J’accepte volontairement l’enregistrement audio de l’entretien. 
Je comprends qu’il me sera donné, sous demande, la transcription contenant toute 
information enregistrée pour mon approbation préalable. 
 
4. 
Je comprends que toute information que j’aurais fournie est confidentielle, et que 
aucune information que je partage n’entraînera l’identification d’aucun individu dans les 
rapports du projet, que ce soit par le chercheur ou par une autre partie.  
 
5. 
Je comprends que ma participation est volontaire, que je peux choisir de ne pas 
participer en partie ou à la totalité du projet et que je peux me retirer à n'importe quel 
moment du projet sans être pénalisé ou défavorisé d'aucune façon. 
 
6. 
Je consens au traitement de mes informations personnelles aux fins de cette étude. Je 
comprends que ces informations seront traitées comme strictement confidentielles et 
traitées conformément à la loi de 1998 sur la protection des données. 
 








Nom, Prénom : Nom, Prénom : 
Signature : Signature : 












FICHE D’INFORMATION POUR LE PARTICIPANT 
 
MÉMOIRE INSTITUTIONNELLE DE LA COOPÉRATION POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT 
DANS LE SECTEUR DU COTON AU BÉNIN 
 
 
Vous avez été invité à participer de cette recherche qui est menée dans le cadre du 
programme de Doctorat de l’Institut d’Études du Développement de l’Université de Sussex, 
Angleterre. Avant de décider si vous prenez part ou non, il est important de comprendre les 
objectifs de cette recherche et ce qu’elle impliquera. S’il vous plaît, prenez le temps de lire 
avec attention les informations suivantes. 
 
QUEL EST L’OBJECTIF DE L’ÉTUDE ? 
 
Cette étude est menée dans le cadre du programme de doctorat de l’Institut d’Études du 
Développement de l’Université de Sussex, Angleterre. La recherche de terrain a lieu au Bénin, 
d’octobre 2017 à juillet 2018. 
 
L’objectif de recherche est d’étudier la mémoire institutionnelle de la coopération 
internationale au Bénin dans le secteur du coton et ainsi comprendre comment les 
expériences passées et les connections historiques entre les pays partenaires façonnent les 
programmes de développement. 
 
SUIS-JE OBLIGÉ DE PARTICIPER ? 
La participation est entièrement volontaire et vous pouvez annuler votre participation à 
n’importe quel moment, même après avoir accepté de participer. 
 
MES INFORMATIONS SERONT CONFIDENTIELLES ? 
Oui. Dans cette recherche l’anonymat et la confidentialité des participants seront respectées 
rigoureusement. Toute donnée collectée sera traité avec confidentialité et jamais accessible 
à des tiers. Nous garantissons que toute information fournie sera anonyme. 
 
QUI A APPROUVÉ CETTE ÉTUDE ? 
Le plan de l’étude a été approuvé par des chercheurs de l’Institut d’Études du Développement 
en Mai 2017 et les considérations éthiques par le Research Ethics Committee de l’Université 
de Sussex. 
 
CONTACT POUR PLUS D’INFORMATION 
Alvaro Moreira 
E-mail: a.moreira@ids.ac.uk (contact permanent) 
Adresse: Lasdel, BP 1383, Parakou 
Tel : +229 60 888 333 // WhatsApp: +44 7843 711876 
 
Si vous avez des doutes sur la façon dont l’étude est conduite, vous pouvez contacter les directeurs de 
cette recherche : 
Dr. Jeremy Allouche, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 
j.allouche@ids.ac.uk 
Dr. Alex Shankland, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 
a.shankland@ids.ac.uk 
 






A.6. List of cotton projects in Benin (1960–2018) 
Table 10: Complete list of cotton projects in Benin from 1960 to 2018 
PERIOD OF 
IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT TITLE 
DONOR/ 
PROVIDER 
1963–1969 Cotton Development Project France 
1972–1977 Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (ZBCP) World Bank (+France) 
1977–1982 Technical Assistance Project (WB-TAP) World Bank (+France) 
1981–1988 Borgou Province Rural Development Project (BPRDP) World Bank (+IFAD) 
1982–1992 Zou Province Rural Development Project (ZPRDP) World Bank (+France) 
1988–1993 Borgou Province Rural Development Project II (BPRDP II) World Bank (+France, 
IFAD, BAD) 
1996–2000 Support to Agricultural Research Project (PARAB) France 
1998–2005 Benin Organic Cotton Project (BOCP) Netherlands 
1998–2005 Farming Systems Improvement and Diversification 
Programme (PADSE) 
France 
2001–2006 Cotton Research Support Project (PARCOB) France 
2003–2008 Cotton Sector Reform (PARFC) World Bank 
2004–2009 Support for the Cotton Sector Reform Project (PARSC) France 
2006–2010 Cotton Made in Africa (CmiA) Germany 
2006–2013 Cotton Producers Organisations Strengthening Programme 
(PROCOTON) 
Netherlands + SNV 
2006–2009 Cotton Sector Competitiveness Enhancement Netherlands + IFDC 
2006–2013 West African Cotton Improvement Programme (WACIP) United States 
USAID + IFDC 
2007–2011 Integrated Production and Pest Management (GIPD) FAO (EU funding) 
2007– 2013 Support for Textile Cotton Sector Project (PAFICOT) AfDB 
2009–2013 Support to Cotton Sector in C4 Countries (C4-Brazil) Brazil 
2009–2012 Competitive African Cotton Initiative (COMPACI) Germany 




2012–2017 Support to Cotton Production in Benin China 
2012–2017 Cotton Technical Assistance Programme for Africa (TAP 
Cotton) 
India 
2013–2015 COMPACI phase II Germany 
2013–2015 Cotton Farming Project Turkey 
2013–2015 Integrated Management of Cotton Pests (GIRCOT) CORAF 
2014–2017 CAP Bio II Switzerland 
(Helvetas) 
2014–2018 Four Country Cotton Partnership (C4CP) United States 
USAID + IFDC 
2014–2018 
Technological Strengthening and Dissemination of Good 
Agricultural Practices for Cotton in C4 Countries and Togo 
(C4+Togo) 
Brazil 
2015–2016 Technical Innovations and Africanisation of Cotton Farming 
Sustainability Indicators (ITK Aid-coton) 
France and EU 
2016–2021 ProSol Germany 







A.7. The current mechanisms and functioning of the cotton sector  
A.7.1. Growers’ organisations and their pragmatic relationship with 
cotton 
Although more than 160,000 farmers grew cotton in 2018, only a few of them had it as their 
preferred crop. Especially in the regions where the yields are not high enough to ensure 
profitability, it appeared from interviews and observations I carried out in the field that the 
main – and often the only – reason farmers grow cotton is to join the input supply system, 
which enables them to buy agrochemicals on credit and increase their production of food 
crops. For example, in the Donga department, the climate is favourable to a diversity of 
crops. Thus, farmers can grow a larger range of vegetables and fruit, both cash and 
subsistence crops. However, they still opt for growing cotton to have access to fertilisers on 
credit, in spite of the disadvantageous climate for cotton farming. In Bassila, a district of the 
Donga, cotton yields have been below national average for the past ten years (AIC, 2017). In 
that region, cotton is clearly not a profitable business. In November 2017, I visited a cotton 
field in which a farmer conducted experiments for the Cotton Research Centre (CRA-CF). 
In face of the poor results of his plot, embarrassed in front of the researchers, he explicitly 
said that ‘in the Donga, we only grow cotton for the fertilisers. It is not worth it otherwise, 
everybody knows that’.121 
This pragmatic connection with cotton is equally observable in the northern departments, 
where cotton yields and profitability are higher. In the Alibori and Atacora departments, the 
popularity of the crop is due to the favourable rainfall regime for cotton farming. Yet cotton 
is rarely the only crop and a pragmatic attitude prevails. A successful cotton grower in the 
district of Kérou explained: ‘[without cotton] it would be difficult to grow maize, because it 
is hard to find fertilisers otherwise’. By extension, if farmers had an option, they would opt 
out of the cotton industry and grow other crops, because the ‘work in the cotton fields is too 
hard’, and ‘we cannot eat cotton’,122 after all. A grower put it bluntly: ‘we grow cotton as if it 
were an obligation… We do not have anything else to do… If we could find something else 
that tops cotton, we would leave cotton aside… and produce subsistence crops instead, like 
maize, sorghum’.123 
 
121 CF#15, 28/11/2017. 
122 CF#8, 08/02/2018. 





Food crops also constitute a source of income for farmers, but the market is much more 
uncertain. The price of food crops oscillates throughout the year according to national levels 
of supply and demand. The price of maize, for example, can vary by a factor of three within 
a few months: in the period following the harvest, from August until November, the price is 
usually very low – around 8,000 CFA Francs for a bale of 120kg. In July, the same quantity 
of maize can reach 24,000 CFA Francs and is barely sold by farmers, since most of them, by 
that time, have already traded their reserves to the merchants with storage facilities. By 
contrast, cotton is the only crop that has its purchase price guaranteed regardless of market 
fluctuations. The government fixes the purchase price at the beginning of the cropping 
season, in April. The price announced two months before the seeding period is then 
guaranteed until the end of the cropping season in February/March of the following year. 
The functioning of this system rests upon the structured organisation of cotton growers in 
cooperatives. 
‘The decision [to create cooperatives] came from the top’,124 remembered an elderly grower. 
The cooperative system has taken different names throughout the years, but the principles 
remained the same in 2018. The ensemble of village cooperatives (CVPC, Coopérative 
Villageoise des Producteurs de Coton) forms, at the district level, the U-Com-CVPC, or 
Union Communale des Coopératives Villageoises de Producteurs de Coton. The U-Coms 
play a determining role in the organisation of the sector. They are responsible for the 
distribution of inputs (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, and herbicides), for organising the 
collection of cotton in the fields, and managing the bureaucracy related to payments, taxes, 
and debts. At the departmental level, the U-Coms of a given department come together in 
the UD-CVPC (Union Départementale des Coopératives Villageoises de Producteurs de 
Coton). Finally, at the national level, the cotton growers have their own national federation, 
assembling all the Departmental Unions: the FN-CVPC (Fédération Nationale des 
Coopératives Villageoises de Producteurs de Coton). In each of these levels, from the district 
to the national, the groups are headed by a president, who is elected in a general assembly, 
and is assisted by administrative staff, such as a secretary, an inputs supply officer, a treasurer, 
and so on – all of them are generally also cotton growers. 
 





As I show in the next section and in chapters above, the voice and interests of cotton growers 
lack a consistent channel from the fields and village cooperatives in the north to the offices 
in Cotonou, where decisions are made, despite having a structured, hierarchical organisation. 
A.7.2. The input supply system 
The cotton sector is the most organised agricultural sector in Benin, in particular because of 
the input supply system. The credit system has been a worldwide incentive in the cotton 
industry since the eighteenth century (see Beckert, 2015). The premise that led to the 
establishment of the system – that farmers cannot afford the factors of production (seeds 
and agrochemicals) – still prevails in Benin. 
Before the planting season, each farmer indicates to their cooperative how many hectares of 
cotton they intend to plant that year. The CVPC’s Chargé d’Intrants gathers the data from 
every member of the cooperative and estimates the total requirement of agrochemicals, based 
on the official technical itinerary. The information is then transferred to the U-Com. At the 
level of the U-Com, an AIC representative is responsible for gathering the forms and 
transferring them to the Departmental Union and National Federation. At the national level, 
the overall demand for inputs is estimated. Based on the demand, the Ministry of Agriculture 
opens a call for tenders for the supply of agrochemicals, to which accredited importers can 
submit their offer. 
In this trade, the ginners stand as guarantors. At the beginning of the cropping season, the 
AIC allocates a share of the estimated total production of seed cotton to each ginnery. The 
quota determines how much seed cotton each ginnery will buy and process in a given 
cropping season. The ginners transfer to the AIC the equivalent of 40 per cent of the total 
value of their share. With this advance, the AIC pays the input suppliers and organises the 
distribution of products in the U-Coms. From that point, the farmers themselves come to 
collect their boxes that they bring back to the village cooperatives and distribute among 
members according to their cultivated area. The timely and effective distribution of 
agrochemicals is one of the major determinants of the success of a cropping season. It 
enables growers to seed their fields early, increasing the chances that the plant will grow 
during the rainy season. 
After the harvest, the AIC organises the collection of seed cotton in the fields. Each village 
cooperative informs the U-Com and AIC representative that they have seed cotton harvested 





in the village. Once the truck is loaded, the cotton is sent to the designated ginnery. Until the 
weighing, the cotton still belongs to the farmer, who has to bear all the risks and responsibility 
for his product, even though he has little or no capacity to supervise the process. 
Figure 17: Collection of chemical fertilisers at the U-Com CVPC of Kérou 
 
At the weighbridge, an AIC staff member inspects the quality of the cotton, determines 
whether it is first choice or second choice, and calculates the total value of the load. The 
ginner only pays the farmer through the AIC if the value of the farmer’s load exceeds the 
farmer’s debt. Once a farmer’s cooperative has provided enough seed cotton to repay the 
collective debt, the ginner pays the cooperative through the AIC. The U-Com finally 
distributes payments to village cooperatives, and the village cooperative distributes them to 
growers, according to the surplus of their individual output over their debt. 
In the ginneries, the machines separate the seed from the cotton bowl, and compress the 
cotton into bales. The bales of cotton pile up in warehouses before leaving the country 
through the Port of Cotonou. India and China are the main buyers of Beninese cotton, and 
also the main trade partners. If the government fixes the purchase price of seed cotton, the 
ginners sell cotton lint at the international market rate, which oscillates according to cycles, 
trends, and policies decided far away from the fields of northern Benin. Yet growers are the 
ones who support the fall in prices in the international market. Despite the price-fixing by 
the government before the beginning of the cropping season, when the price in the 
international market falls, ginners pressure the authorities to reduce it. The growers who 
decided to grow cotton in May, expecting to sell the outputs at a guaranteed price, can see 





thousands of farmers are unable to pay off their debts and the promise of the white gold 
becomes a burden to carry for many years. 
The principle of the input supply system has changed little over the years: the timely 
provision of inputs to farmers. The role played by the AIC has changed over the years, 
however. Its creation was motivated by the need to organise the sector following the arrival 
of competitors in the input supply and ginnery markets. As such, the Association 
concentrated the flow between ginners, input importers, and farmers, as presented in the 
figure below. Since 2016 and its reestablishment, the input importers retracted from the 
Association, which became composed by ginners and farmers alone. This corresponds to the 
emergence of a monopsony and monopoly in the cotton sector. Indeed, Talon’s ginneries 
are the only ones able to buy cotton in advance, and his companies also provide the inputs. 
As a result, there has almost been a merger between input importers and ginners, and the 
AIC gained importance in the interfaces with farmers via its role in rural extension services, 
distribution of inputs, and collection of seed cotton, while it lost its coordination role. 
Figure 18: The functioning of the input supply system 
 
The input supply system functions alongside the rules of cotton farming. The quantity of 
fertilisers a farmer needs is defined by a precise technical itinerary that farmers follow in an 





A.7.3. The Technical Itinerary and the definition of agricultural 
practices 
The Technical Itinerary (ITK) provides the guidelines for producing cotton. The ITK is an 
official document released every year that prescribes the agronomical aspects of cotton 
farming. The elaboration of the document starts at the INRAB’s Cotton Research Centre 
(CRA-CF). CRA-CF agronomists conduct regular experiments in different agroecological 
zones. They test varieties of cotton, combinations of different fertilisers, and diverse pest 
management techniques. Based on the results of several years of continuous research, the 
CRA-CF proposes changes in the ITK. Then, the INRAB, the AIC, and government officials 
discuss the proposal at the Direction of Agriculture in the MAEP. Thereafter, new guidelines 
are compiled in a document that is circulated to all Rural Development Managers (RDR), 
who sit at each of the departments’ prefectures, and have the MAEP as line ministry. RDRs 
oversee agricultural production and organise rural extension services, deployed by the 
CARDERs. Rural extension agents receive training on the new guidelines and instruct their 
group of farmers. The instructions in the ITK are crucial for the profitability of cotton 
farming, because the itinerary stipulates the quantity of agrochemicals per hectare that 
farmers need to buy on credit. The ITK also informs about the best sowing periods in the 
different regions and on how to proceed with pest treatments. 







(quantity per hectare) 
PEST 
MANAGEMENT 
Alibori and Atacora 20 May to 20 June 250kg NPK + 50kg Urea 7 applications (one every 
fortnight) 
Borgou and Donga 10 June to 5 July 250kg NPK + 50kg Urea 7 applications (one every 
fortnight) 
Others 25 June to 15 July 200kg NPK + 50kg Urea 7 applications (one every 
fortnight) 
The AIC estimates that the total production cost related to agrochemicals (including 
fertilisers, herbicides, and pesticides) should not exceed 40 per cent of the predicted earnings 
of a given farm. However, if a farmer observed the dosages of agrochemicals stipulated in 
the ITK in 2018, the cost of inputs per hectare could reach 46 per cent of his potential 
earnings, based on the national average yield of 1.1 tonne per hectare. In fact, expenditure 
on agrochemicals is generally higher. This is because, in many cases, cotton growers order 
more agrochemicals than they need in their cotton fields in order to use them for food crops. 
Gergely (2009) estimates that approximately 10 per cent of fertilisers bought via the cotton 





Decision makers in Cotonou thoroughly discuss the changes they intend to apply in the ITK. 
Cotton growers are indirectly represented in the discussions, since they are represented at 
the AIC alongside ginners. In turn, the AIC represents all actors of the sector in the 
discussions at the MAEP’s Direction of Agriculture. This is an arena in which international 
development partners have no direct influence, since donors and providers are not 
represented in the meetings. Nonetheless, the ITK remains the main instrument of diffusion 
of and change in agricultural practices in cotton farming. 
In recent years, the major change has been the introduction of new varieties that are better 
adapted to the different producing areas. However, the quantity of agrochemicals (NPK + 
Urea) advised in the ITK has constantly increased throughout the years: it went from 100 
kilograms per hectare in the 1980s, to 200 kilograms in the 1990s, then to 210 kilograms in 
2009 (Gergely, 2009; MAEP and INRAB CRA-CF, 2018; World Bank, 1981). In 2017, the 
recommended dosages of agrochemicals increased to 300 kilograms per hectare. These 
changes match the interests of input importers in expanding their market. Conversely, this 
has a direct impact on the cost of production and potentially reduces farmers’ profits if yields 
do not also increase. 
Such increases of dosages were justified by the accelerated depletion of the soil, especially in 
the largest cotton-producing areas. Farmers do acknowledge that the soil is becoming less 
and less fertile, but their main concern remains the high cost of factors of production and 
the low prices paid for seed cotton. From 1998 to 2018, the price of fertilisers increased 26 
per cent, while the price of seed cotton increased 17 per cent (Ouin-Ouro, 2018b; Ton, 2004). 
As a result, while cotton production has continuously increased throughout the years, 
farmers’ share remained unchanged and has even decreased: in 1998, the value of an average 
cotton farm’s output accounted for XOF 568,000, against XOF 557,000 in 2018125 (Minot et 
al., 2001; Ouin-Ouro, 2018a). The transformation of farming practices has become the main 
object of cotton projects since 2004. Development partners see in them a way to increase 
rural income and alleviate poverty. But these practices carry heavy interests that lie away from 
farmers and projects’ reach. 
  
 
125 Using a Power Purchasing Parity conversion factor, it was possible to estimate the price in constant 
US dollars: a single cotton farm’s output went from 2,624 dollars in 1998 to 2,573 dollars in 2018. 
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